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SOUTH CAROLINA HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION 
The forty-third annual meeting of the South Carolina Historical Association 
was held on Saturday, April 7, 1973, at Converse College, Spartanburg, South 
Carolina. About sixty members attended one or more sessions. 
Following registration in Carmichael Hall, the first session was called to 
order with presentation of papers in parallel sessions in Hartness Auditorium 
(U.S. History) and Room No. 200 (European History). Papers presented in the 
U.S. History session were "The Palmetto Regiment Goes to Mexico" by Dr. E. 
M. Lander, Jr., of Clemson University, discussed by Dr. Robert Moore of 
Columbia College; and "Ben Tillman and the Annexation of Hawaii" by Dr. 
Jamie Moore of the Citadel, discussed by Dr. Joseph Stukes of Erskine College. 
Papers presented in the European History session were "Some Important 
Aspects of the French Policy of James I, 1610-1619" by Dr. Thomas V. 
Thoroughman of Wofford College, with Dr. B. 0. Bargar of the University of 
South Carolina as discussant; and "The Naval Policy of England's Liberal 
Government, 1906" by Mr. Rodger E. Stroup, a graduate student at the 
University of South Carolina, with Dr. John Y. LeBourgeois of Clemson 
University as discussant. After the morning session, a meeting of the Executive 
Committee was held. 
Luncheon was served at 1 p.m. in the College Dining Hall, followed by the 
annual business' meeting. The minutes of the forty-second meeting were 
approved as printed in the PROCEEDINGS. The treasurer's report was 
distributed to all members present and was approved. 
The Executive Committee nominated the following slate of new officers for 
1973-1974: 
President: C. W. Bolen, Clemson University 
Vice-President: Wylma Wates, State Archives 
Secretary-Treasurer: Dr. Joseph Stukes, Erskine College 
Executive Committee Member (term to expire 1976) 
Dr. Richard M. Gannaway, U.S.C. at Lancaster 
There were no nominations from the floor, and the motion that the slate be 
accepted by acclamation was seconded and passed. Hewitt D. Adams of 
Clemson University was named Editor of the PROCEEDINGS. 
President J. M. Lesesne Jr. of Wofford College announced that the 1974 
meeting would be held at the University of South Carolina campus at Conway. 
He thanked Converse College for its hospitality and expressed the appreciation 
of the association to Dr. N.F. Magruder and the local arrangements committee. 
In the afternoon parallel sessions the American History papers included 
"Conservation Attitudes toward Cuba, 1895-1898" By Dr. G. Wayne King of 
Francis Marion College, with Mr. Foster Farley of NeVvberry College as 
discussant; and "President Theodore Roosevelt and Army Reform" by Mr. 
John A. Matzko of Bob Jones University, with Dr. Robert K. Ackerman of 
Erskine College as discussant. The European History papers were "Great 
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Britain, India, and Napoleon's Invasion of Egypt" by Dr. Edward B. Jones of 
Furman University, discussed by Dr. Frederick F. Ritsch of Converse College; 
and "The Motivational Underpinnings of British Exploration in East Africa" 
by Dr. James A. Casada of Winthrop College, discussed by Mr. Wayne Culp of 
Wofford College. 
After a social hour between 5:00 p.m. and 6:30 p.m. at the Spartanburg 
Arts Council Building, the Banquet Session convened in the Dining Hall. 
Following dinner, Distinguished Visiting Professor at the University of South 
Carolina Owen Dudley Edwards, of Edinburgh University, delivered a 
stimulating talk on "The American South and Northern Ireland" 
There being no further business, the meeting was adjourned at 9:30 p.m. 
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BEN TILLMAN AND GOVERNMENT FOR HAWAII, 
Jamie W. Moore 
* Research for this study was completed under a grant from The Citadel 
Development Foundation. 
The disparate elements in the title of this paper are related in an 
uncomplicated way. An important contributor to the Organic Act of 1900, 
albiei in an inadvertent and indirect manner, Senator Benjamin H. Tillman of 
South Carolina helped bring into being an instrument of government more 
democratic and more protective of individual rights than the Hawaiian Islands 
had ever known. As one might suspect, however, the process by which this 
contribution occured was not simple. 
For most of the nineteenth century the native monarchy of Hawaii ruled 
over an economy dominated by Americans, dependent upon Oriental muscle for 
its labor, and located within a sphere of influence of the United States. The 
authority of the white minority was pre-eminent, and directed to the promotion 
of political stability, economic efficiency, and protection of property rights. 
Power in government derived from the land, the plantation system utilized to 
gather in the islands' cash crops, and the labor laws which protected 
commercial agriculture. 1 
Laborers brought into Hawaii and most of the native plantation hands 
worked under contracts first authorized in 1850 in an "Act for the Government 
of Masters of Servants.'' It closely followed the form of "The Seaman s 
Shipping Act of the United States," from which it had been taken, and 
subsequent legislation amending or relating to this law did not change its major 
features. The contract laws allowed the making of labor contracts for a term not 
exceeding five years. To spur recruitment of labor, the laws permitted contracts 
to be made in a foreign country for service in Hawaii. To encourage the labor to 
work efficiently, the laws provided that if a person bound by contract absented 
himself from service he might be brought back and compelled to serve double 
the time of his absence. If a laborer refused to work he could be committed to 
prison at hard labor until he consented to serve, and the costs of the court action 
were assessed against him. The master too had obligations. If he was guilty of 
cruelty, misusage, or violation of the contract, he could be fined from five to one 
hundred dollars and in default of payment could be imprisoned at hard labor 
until the fine was paid. But because the master was given the ad> antage in the 
eyes of the law, the contract system developed abuses, and in time the labor 
practice became abhorrent to foreigners and many Hawaiian whites who 
considered the punishment provisions barbaric.2 
The contract labor system and the coolie traffic—the terms contract 
laborer and coolie were used interchangeably—received a substantial boost 
after the conclusion of the United States-Hawaiian Reciprocity I reaty in 1876. 
The treaty admitted Hawaiian sugar to the United States duty free, increasing 
the demand for the great cash crop. More labor was needed to produce the 
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sugar, and Polynesians, Portuguese, Chinese, and Japanese were imported in 
increasing numbers. 
Plantation Labor Imported 
Nationality Years Number of Laborers 
Chinese 1852-1900 46,000 
Polynesian 1859-1885 2,450 
Japanese 1868-1907 180,000 
Portuguese 1878-1913 17,500 
Norwegians 1881 615 
Germans 1882-1897 1,280 
Galicians 1898 370 
American Negro 1901-1902 200 
Puerto Ricans 1900-1901, 1922 5,885 
Koreans 1903-1910 7,420 
Russians 1906-1912 2,475 
Italians 1900-1908 85 
Spanish 1905-1916 7,500 
Poles 1913 20 
Filipinos 1906-1929,1945 110,000 
By concluding the Reciprocity Treaty the United States had made Hawaii's 
prosperity possible. But the American government took another action which 
contributed to a basic dilemma confronting the sugar planters. 
In the United States, interest in excluding Oriental immigration had led to 
the passing of laws prohibiting the transportation of coolies by American citi­
zens in American vessels. And in some quarters, there was a growing movement 
to eliminate the competition of Hawaiian sugar by terminating the Riciprocity 
Treaty.4 The planters met this threat with suggestions that Hawaii become 
American territory so the benefits of the bounty given on sugar could be kept. 
But growing sugar at a profit meant utilizing a cheap labor system, and 
annexation would prohibit automatically the entrance of Chinese laborers into 
Hawaii. Complicating the problem still further was the debate over the contract 
system. The American government continued to enact more stringent 
legislation affecting labor in the United States. In Hawaii suggestions for 
wholesale reforms were put forward. But the contract laws were always 
renewed without serious amendment, the most telling argument in their favor 
being that more laborers were needed, and no one had any alternative means of 
acquiring them. 
Between 1870 and 1890 the interplay of the factors involved in sugar 
production created a stronger demand for annexation. The sugar economy 
became more prosperous and more important. 
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Sugar Exports — Teas. 
1837 
1850 
1860 
1870 
375 
720 
9,392 
4 1880 
1890 
1900 
1910 
31,792 
129,889 
289,544 
517,090 
and more labor was required to produce the sugar. The labor which was 
brought in was mostly Oriental, predominately Japanese. As the proportion of 
Orientals in the population of the islands began to rise, the white minority 
increasingly became alarmed about the possibility of losing political control. 
Race became the most important issue in local politics, and it was inextricably 
comingled with the questions of economic development and relations with the 
United States. 6 
The growth and development of large scale commercial agriculture capped 
a century of change in Hawaii which had been destructive to the native culture. 
In an effort to restore Hawaii to control by Hawaiians, Queen Liliuokalani 
attempted to inaugurate a revolution from the top to depose the whites. The 
reaction of the planters, who had anticipated just this development, was prompt 
and decisive; in 1893 by coup d'etat they established a provisional 
revolutionary government and ended the monarchy. Convinced their future 
depended upon getting the United States to accept Hawaii as a territory, they 
made their desire to be annexed clear. Benjamin Harrison was sympathetic, 
Grover Cleveland was not. He withdrew the treaty Harrison had sent to the 
Senate, opposed annexation behind the scenes, and backed the report of James 
H. Blount's investigating commission that showed the annexationist cause in an 
unfavorable light. Blount's report recommended against admitting Hawaii as a 
territory, concluding, among other things, that not only had the revolutionaries 
overturned a legitimately constituted government, they expected to govern the 
islands by so abridging the right of sufferage as to retain control in their 
hands. But even though rejecting territorial gain, the American government 
acted to extend its informal sphere of control over Hawaii. Congress, on 
February 7, 1894, in the House and May 31 in the Senate, passed resolutions 
warning foreign states that intervention in the islands would be considered an 
act unfriendly to the United States. 9 
Protected from outside interference, the Provisional Government of 
Hawaii turned to consolidating its power. In 1893 it promulgated a new 
constitution, dedicated to the principle that the dominant white American 
minority which had made the revolution and which owned the property was 
going to rule. 
Control of the land, now secure in the hands of the revolutionaries, had 
always been important. Originally title to all island land had been vested in the 
Kamehameha monarchs. During the reign of Kamehameha III (1825-1854), 
sweeping changes in the feudal system were made. The fundamental 
modification, called the Great Mahele (literally "division'), allocated some 
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1,600,000 acres, about two-fifths of the entire land area of the islands, to the 
Hawaiian chiefs. Kamehameha III divided the remainder into "crown lands" 
(nearly a million acres) for the support of the royal family and "public lands" 
(about a million and a half acres) to support operation of the government. Less 
than 30,000 acres was vested in the commoners ot the kingdom. Consequently, 
the family farm and homesteading never became a major force in Hawaii's 
agriculture. When the monarchy was terminated, the crown lands which had 
not been sold off were merged with the still extant public lands. All this wealth 
accrued to the provisional Government of Hawaii.10 
The Constitution of the Republic of Hawaii which protected this property 
provided for the control of persons or groups dangerous to the government; 
contained various articles restricting freedom of religion, speech, and the press; 
limited use of the writ of habeas corpus; defined citizenship and the rights of 
citizens in a way to exclude Orientals; and outlined the procedures for 
becoming a member of the electorate in a manner whereby property, loyalty, 
and examination requirements limited the right to freeholders, a group 
predominately white and native that numbered only 6,327 in 1896.12 Under 
the Constitution of 1893 the economically privileged white minority tightend its 
grip on the islands. But it was a delicate task. For even as the voting rolls were 
being purged—the number eligible to vote was lowered from 14,217 in 1892 to 
2,693 in 1893 and the number of Americans eligible dropped from 670 to 
409—the inescapable fact of the Republic was the minority status of the whites. 
In Hawaii there were 3,086 Americans, 4,161 Europeans, 15,191 Portuguese, 
21,616 Chinese, 24,40 1 Japanese, and 39,504 Hawaiian natives or part-native 
Hawaiians. 13 
The basic weakness of the Republic was its domination by the "other 
Caucasians," a term including Americans and West Europeans but excluding 
others, chiefly the Portuguese. One alternative means of carrying out the dual 
purpose of maintaining the political supremacy of the class the government 
represented and abetting its economic prosperity was to sit atop a carefully 
balanced multi-racial society, arrange labor importations with great care so as 
not to disturb the balance, play off the antagonists of one race against the 
others, and allow no one group to get too strong. The other alternative would be 
to build a population base that would support the government. Both means 
were tried, and both failed. For the planters, this meant that annexation to the 
United States was their only feasible course of action. Once part of the 
mainland, the American people would become Hawaii's new population base, 
and the island's white minority would instantly be transformed into a majority. 
Thus the planters pressed for annexation, and put away consideration of 
potential ill effects or complications. They assumed, for instance, that because 
of the peculiar conditions in Hawaii, the American laws against contract labor 
would not be applied. 14 
Until the outbreak of war with Spain, the American government was 
unresponsive. But on May 4, 1898, three days after the victory of Commodore 
Dewey at Manila Bay, Representative F. G. Newlands of Nevada introduced a 
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resolution for the annexation of Hawaii into the House of Representatives and a 
brief but sharp debate preceded its adoption by Congress. The race question 
was not the central issue. Far more important to the Congress caught up in the 
emotionalism of the struggle to free Cuba was the strategic and economic 
desirability of Hawaii. But the race issue did arise, partially condition the 
character of the debate, and by its presence did indicate that in the near future 
Congress was going to have to grapple anew with an issue fundamental in both 
American and Hawaiian society. 16 
To the extent that the subject of race did enter the debate, discussion took 
place within a framework laid out first in the reports of the House and Senate 
Committees on Foreign Relations.17 Originally written in connection with the 
annexation effort of 1893, both had been quickly updated to emphasize the 
national interest, national security aspects of annexing Hawaii. Each 
deprecated "alleged objections" which related "to the character of population 
we will acquire from those islands." Both found the whites of Hawaii "united in 
support of good government" and "the supreme governing powers in the is­
lands," a characteristic viewed as "the natural condition" which existed 
"whenever white and colored races were admitted, on equal terms, into the 
exercise of civil rights connected with government." The reports drew an 
analogy between the American Negroes and Indians and the Hawaiian natives; 
they were groups "not unfit for citizenship," but who, if they filled the 
executive, legislative, and judiciary departments, "could not conduct the 
government for a year in a proper constitutional way." Firmly equating white 
rule with good rule, the Committees on Foreign Relations upheld in principle 
government by the white minority in Hawaii as the basis for annexation. 
In the debate in Congress, annexationists argued seven themes regarding the 
race question. They admitted that natives and Orientals could not be 
considered desirable acquisitions to American society. But they contended that 
because the non-whites could be controlled, they posed no dangers. 
Annexationists suggested that taking in Hawaii was a unique event. They 
intimated that in time, somehow, the non-white races of Hawaii would 
disappear or become less numerous and important.18 The basic annexationist 
thesis was quite simple; Hawaii, it said, raised no new problems which could 
not be solved. The solution they implied was similar to that which had been 
found for "the Negro problem" in the United States—persisting difficulties 
were to be handled by local people within their own institutions, even if 
guaranteed constitutional rights were lost in the process. The most usual 
argument for an annexationist, none of whom made any mention of non-whites 
of Hawaii in any context other than their innate inferiority to the Anglo-Saxon 
race, was to conclude that the overwhelming and obvious reasons for taking 
Hawaii were of such importance that annexation should not be denied because 
of the "undesirable population elements." 19 
Opponents of annexation used precisely the same arguments to prove their 
case. They postulated that because the natives and Orientals were the different, 
inferior recipients of an advanced Western civilization whose institutions they 
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could not maintain, Hawaii was incapable of self-government and had only 
the choice between anarchy and non-republican forms of rule. To Tillman, this 
proved the impossibility of any benefits coming from annexation. Tillman's 
views on the question of mixing races and democratic politics were down to 
earth; the commonsense way of dealing with the franchise problem, he said, 
was to exclude all but whites from government.20 
Tillman looked upon the debate over Hawaiian annexation as an 
opportunity to state again his reasons for having launched a one man oratorical 
campaign to educate the North to the Southern persuasion, and he made the 
most racially oriented argument that was to be heard in Congress on the subject 
of Hawaii. The acquisition of "103,000—well, I do not know what they are 
properly called; I will just say colored people," he said, would be an opening 
wedge to further acquisitions of territory containing "aliens in blood, aliens in 
language, aliens in thought and feeling" "I come from a Commonwealth where 
there are 750,000 (Nlegroes and only 500,000 whites," he added, (where) "ev­
ery thoughtful man...has been lying awake at night thinking...how that race 
problem would be settled so as to preserve the Anglo-Saxon race in its purity . . . 
For Tillman, the only real issue was the prevention of racial amalgamation, 
which he knew would lead to mongrelization, by the wisest possible 
statesmanship. He pointed out to his fellow Senators that South Carolina, by 
constitutional amendment, "as far as the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments 
of the National Constitution would permit," had been able to temporarily put 
down the danger by disfranchising "this ignorant mass." But in Hawaii, 
Tillman warned, unlike in South Carolina, there were too many "colored 
people" to disfranchise all of them. In the end, he predicted, the United States 
would be forced to declare that the Constitution did not extend to "conquered 
territories." 21 
Tillman's agrument, and the arguments of others who spoke against 
annexation and used race as their theme, had a domestic basis. Aware that it 
was theoretically possible for the rest of the nation to end the South's 
re-institution of white supremacy, southerners wanted no precedents set in 
Hawaii by the extension of full political rights to the natives and Orientals. 
Conversely, they desired very much any precedent for excluding non-whites 
from the ballot. The fact that these arguments did not meet with more success 
does not detract from the potential of this appeal. Only by agreeing that white 
supremacy was the natural order of things and by then suggesting that in 
practice in Hawaii the institutions by which the white minority maintained its 
control would not be disturbed did the annexationists negate this 
anti-imperialist tactic. So sucessfully was the race issue minimized in just this 
fashion, that the vote on annexation, while showing strong opposition from the 
South and border states, correlates upon political rather than sectional lines.22 
The annexation having been consumated, the problem of fitting Hawaii 
into the body politic of the United States remained. Immediately a special 
Commission was charged by Congress with making recommedations for 
organizing a government for Hawaii, but until it reported and Congress acted 
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the existing Hawaiian government was to remain in power. 
The report of the commission, transmitted to Congress July 7, 1898, made it 
obvious that the members assumed it would be possible to realize the American 
ideal of universal sufferage and a republican form of government. And, as in the 
United States, government was to be of, by, and for the people. The basic 
question, of course, was which people. The Commission recommended that the 
privileges of citizenship be extended to only those persons who were born or 
naturalized citizens under the Republic of Hawaii. This group included native 
Hawaiian landowners, most Americans and Europeans, about seven hundred 
naturalized Chinese, and one Japanese policeman. Sub-Committees of the 
Commission stated a variety of reasons why the American element should be 
allowed to dominate the islands. The committee on the Judiciary found that the 
Constitution of the Republic of Hawaii had given the people political 
institutions which compared favorably with those of any government. It 
concluded that the maintenance of a fair standard of legislative quality 
depended upon resting citizenship upon educational and property 
qualifications for the electorate, "a satisfactory means of distributing 
authority." The Sub-Committee on Public Lands recommended the retention 
of existing land laws, which restricted ownership. The Sub-Committee also 
noted the high degree of education in the islands, and credited it to the system 
of open institutions which mixed races in the classrooms.23 
Debate in Congress over the type of government to be provided for Hawaii 
had begun before the Commission finished its work. Basic positions were 
established in a verbal exchange between Senators George Vest of Missouri and 
Thomas C. Piatt of New York. Vest argued that since under the Constitution of 
the United States no powers were given to the government to hold colonies, all 
acquisitions had to be organized and governed so as to eventually become a part 
of the United States. It followed, said Vest, that all persons "born within said 
lands were citizens of the United States, irrespective of the nationality of their 
parents," and held the same rights, including the right of self-government, as 
did citizens of the United States. These rights, concluded Vest, applied to 
Orientals as well as Hawaiian natives and whites. Piatt argued that the territory 
was not to be organized under the Constitution but under the Congress which, 
being given by legislation an absolute power to organize government in a 
territory, was limited in the exercise of that power only by the rights conferred 
by the Federal Constitution upon citizens. To the important question of who 
was to be considered a citizen in Hawaii now had been joined the equally 
important question of what American rights the citizens of Hawaii had.24 
The Congressional deliberations, often shoved aside for matters pressing 
and otherwise, went on for over a year, a circumstance deplored by President 
McKinley in his 1899 annual message to Congress. But Congress was bogged 
down in the issue of how to keep the machinery of government in Hawaii in the 
hands of the white Americans without overturning the Constitution.25 
Few Congressmen doubted that franchise restrictions of some kind were needed 
to preserve "good rule," but anti-annexationists like Tillman kept raising the 
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embarrassing race question. Losing no opportunity to chastise his opponents for 
their hypocrisy, Tillman alternated between piously suggesting that the natives 
and Orientals be given full rights of citizenship and demanding that citizenship 
rights be established solely on the basis of skin color. On the one hand, the 
Senator said, perpetuating white control by means of property qualifications 
was clearly a violation of fundamental American law. On the other hand, if it 
were wrong to take government out of the hands of the whites in Hawaii, if the 
natives and Orientals had to be protected against themselves, as the 
annexationists alleged, if self-government for all classes would be an evil, then 
surely the same arguments applied within the continental limits of the United 
States.26 
Tillman did not win his point; Congress was not in a mood to grant the 
precedent of excluding voters by race that he sought. The Senate sent to the 
House a proposed Organic Act which defined citizenship in terms of properly 
and-or other economic status. But the House was full of Populists enthusiasm 
for doing away with political control by vested economic interests. It struck the 
entire text of the Senate bill and substituted a measure that stated that voters in 
Hawaii had only to be male, United States citizens, registered, paid up 
tax-payers, and able to "read, speak, and write English or Hawaiian." No less 
desirous to maintain white government than the Senate, the House members 
had no thought of admitting natives and Orientals to the ballot en masse: they 
intended for the language provisions to secure white domination. But in reality, 
the action by the House foreshadowed the lowering of a number of the barriers 
to citizenship. In Hawaii 962 out of every 1000 school age child' en attended 
school, and out of every 1000 people over the age of six, 639 could read and 
write enough to satisfy the language requirement. Moreover, while dismantling 
the economic devices of political control in Hawaii, the House threw out 
sections of the Hawaiian law codes which had empowered officers of the 
Republic to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and the provisions of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Hawaii which established property 
qualifications for voting and holding office.27 
The changed proposed Organic Act was returned to the Senate, where it 
promptly ran into substantial opposition. In the House version, sufferage was to 
be restricted by the retention of language qualifications and examinations and 
by requiring proof of payment of poll taxes. But certain laws of Hawaii allowed 
the government to confiscate property if taxes were not paid and these could be 
interpreted to apply in case poll taxes were not paid. If payment could not be 
made the laws contained such sanctions as imprisonment for debt and 
punishment by forced labor while imprisoned. For those under labor contracts 
even more stringent controls could be applied. To the fore, in full cry with 
righteous indignation at this economic royalism, came Tillman and the rest of 
the anti-imperialists. The South Carolina senator still wanted apartheid for 
Hawaii, but for the moment he was more interested in wrenching power from 
the sugar trust, a group Tillman had a history of attacking.28 
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The fight against economic oligarchy was more successful than the fight 
for white supremacy. The Organic Act of 1900, which became the fundamental 
law of Hawaii on April 27, 1900, was a statute which created a government far 
more liberal from that envisioned by individual contributors to its provisions. 
The Act conferred citizenship in the territory of Hawaii upon all persons who 
were citizens under the Republic, repealed laws inconsistent with the 
constitution of the United States, as Congress found them to be inconsistent, 
and gave the right to vote to registered male citizens residing in the territory 
who could read, write, and speak English or Hawaiian.29 
Although broadening the franchise, the Organic Act did not establish 
political democracy in Hawaii and did not change the fact that the white 
minority controlled the land. But it had a number of features to commend it. 
The Act freed the people from the more odious provisions of the Constitution of 
1893. It was a fundamental law more democratic and less restrictive than the 
constitution proposed by the last native monarch in 1892. It took strong 
exception to existing practices: penal contracts were forbidden, Chinese 
exclusion laws were applied to the islands, and all labor contracts were 
terminated automatically as of June 14, 1900. Like the original Federal 
Constitution, while it did not establish a democratic government, it did 
establish a government in which democracy had a part.30 
In its final form, the Organic Act was a document consistent with 
American idealism, but it had not been brought to this state by moralists and 
idealists. Rather, the establishment of a more liberal government in Hawaii is 
directly traceable to the work of anti-democratic factions in Congress. 1 here are 
three proofs of this contention. The first is that from 1900 onward Hawaii had 
more political and economic democracy. For a few days after passage of the act 
work stoppages were common; afterwards the status of labor and treatment of 
laborers improved. The reaction of the governing minority was to deplore the 
difficulty caused them by the more open sufferage and less strict labor laws. But 
the Act was consistent with Hawaii's constitutional experience, pragmatic, and 
therefore acceptable to this group.31 
The second proof is that the number of voters and percentage of the 
population eligible to vote rose consistently after 1900. In 1893, under the 
Republic, 2,639 persons, about 1.2 percent of the population, could vote. After 
1900:32 
Year Registered Voters Total Population Percent Eligible 
1900 
1910 
1920 
1930 
1960 183,118(1959) 
11,216 
14,442 
26,335 
52,127 
154,001 
181,874 
255,881 
368,300 
632,772 
7.8 
7.6 
10.3 
14.2 
29.9 
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The third proof reveals itself after an examination of the process by which was 
decided the constitutional status of the inhabitants of possessions acquired as a 
consequence of the Spanish-American War. 
Shortly after passage of the annexation resolution, the Supreme Court of 
Hawaii held that because the Constitution of the United States "in its fullness" 
did not immediately extend to the territory the protections afforded by the Bill 
of Rights did not apply3.3The Supreme Court of the United States established 
a similar doctrine in 1901, thus getting around the question of admitting the 
population in the territories to rights of citizenship equal to those enjoyed by 
citizens in the United States. Saying that the inhabitants of Hawaii were under 
the jurisdiction of congress rather than the Constitution, the Court rested part 
of its argument on its faith in the Anglo-Saxon race and in Congress as an 
institution of Anglo-Saxon character. In fact, the Court went so far in its 
determination that it opened up the question of whether or not people 
inhabiting the territories had any inherent political rights at all. These appeared 
to be left to the discretion of Congress. Not until 1904 was a more orderly 
doctrine brought into focus: that guarantees in the Constitution differed as to 
their force (some rights were fundamental and followed automatically into new 
territories, others were procedural and might or might not be in force as 
Congress saw fit), that Congress retained the power to make laws for territories 
without being subject to all the restrictions which are imposed when laws are 
passed for the United States (but Congress did not have the power to act 
unconstitutionally), and that the powers of Congress when legislating for the 
territories were not without limitation.34 
During the six year interim between the annexation and the determination 
by the Supreme Court, the legal safeguards accorded the people depended upon 
Congress. In this period of almost absolute legislative supremacy the 
opportunity to turn to other means of government certainly existed. Congress 
might have elected to establish some type of imperial system, might have 
defined citizenship rights in the manner desired by the elite who had governed 
the Hawaiian Republic, and might even have written the kind of laws Tillman 
wanted. It did none of these thing. What Congress did do was to return to the 
principle of establishing a fundamental law guaranteeing individual rights, and 
then allow these rights to be subverted in certain instances in a manner 
consistent with practices in the United States. 
As a matter of justice and ethics, this outcome might appear shocking. But 
in an age when the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race was a doctrine so firmly 
established that the point was not even debated—in an age where the laws of 
many states of the union showed clear distinctions that were applied on the 
basis of color—the consequences of territorial acquisition might have been 
radically different, both for the peoples overseas and the minoritites at home. 
Both racists and economic oligarchs made the reforms in Hawaii's future 
possible. 1 illma n and his supporters espoused a doctrine of white supremacy 
and tried to get it legitimized. But they lost that fight. Having a deep rooted 
hatred of economic exploitation by vested interest groups, they then refused to 
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go along with the establishment of rule in Hawaii on the basis of property. 
Because some Congressmen were unwilling to write white supremacy laws and 
because other Congressmen were unwilling to endorse economic royalism, 
factions ground together. The grinding resulted in the creation of a territorial 
government better than the doctrine of either faction was capable of creating 
alone. 
'Always sought by the Americans but seldom attained was the optimum state 
where Hawaiian monarchs reigned but did not rule, a condition which combined 
stability with opportunity. The definitive study for this period is the three volume 
work, Ralph S. Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom 1778-1854, Foundation and 
Transformation (Honolulu, 1939); The Hawaiian Kingdom 1854-1874, Twenty 
Critical Years (1953); The Hawaiian Kingdom 1874-1893, The Kalakaua Dynasty 
(1967), On the evolution of the American sphere of influence see Merze Tate, The 
United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom (New Haven, 1965). 
7 Kuykendall, Hawaiian Kingdom, I, 185-95, 328-29, II, 177-95; Donald Rowland, 
"The United States and the Contract Labor Question in Hawaii, 1862-1900," Pacific 
Historical Review, II (Sept., 1933), 249-69; Edward Johannessen, The Hawaiian 
Labor Movement, A Brief History (Boston, 1956), 49. 
3 Johannessen, Hawaiian Labor Movement, 25-26. See Kuykendall, Hawaiian 
Kingdom, III, 153, for figures for Chinese immigration and emigration. 
"On the reciprocity treaty see Merze Tate, Hawaii: Reciprocity or Annexation 
(East Lansing, 1968), passim; Kuykendall, Hawaiian Kingdom, II, 217-30, 247-57, 
III, 17-40. Both authors conclude that the main reason for concluding the treaty in 
the United States was geopolitical. To the Congress, control over the islands was a 
vital American interest. The way to exercise control, it was felt, was by building up 
American commerce and furthering American interests in the islands. (The use of 
economic devices to achieve political objectives was a common theme in American 
diplomacy in the Pacific. See Jamie W. Moore, "Economic Interests and 
American-Japanese Relations; The Petroleum Monopoly Controversy," The 
Historian, XXXV (August, 1973). 
5State of Hawaii, Department of Planning and Research, Statistical Abstract of 
Hawaii, 1962 (Honolulu, 1962), 11; Kuykendall, Hawaiian Kingdom, I, 315, II, 141, 
III, 83. 
6From a present day perspective the contract system, plantation agricultural 
practices, and the political system appear exploitive. Payment of eleven cents a day 
plus food and shelter to Chinese labor, for example, evokes little sympathy. But on 
balance, it can be said that for most of the people involved in the system it 
represented an improvement in their lot. The ordinary worker found life under the 
Kamehameha monarchs tyrannical rather than idyllic, and the immigrant labor was 
usually the product of domestic upheaval at home. Johannessen, Hawaiian Labor 
Movement, 4-49; Kuykendall, Hawaiian Kingdom, III, 51-78. 
7Kuykendall, Hawaiian Kingdom, III, 479-605; William Adam Russ, Jr., The 
Hawaiian Revolution 1893-94 (Selinsgfrove, Pa., 1959) is favorable to the 
revolutionaries; Liliuokalani, Hawaii's Story (Boston, 1898), is not. 
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8 W. Stull Holt, Treaties Defeated by the Senate (Philadelphia, 1933), 152-54; U. 
S. Congress, House, President's Message Relating to the Hawaiian Islands, H. Ex. 
Doc. 47, 53d Cong., 2d sess., 1893, III-XVI, 73-80. This "Blount Report" also contains 
the text of the annexation treaty rejected by the Senate and an approximate text of 
the constitution proposed by Queen Liliukalani, pp. 6-9, 581-90. The administration 
also provided a published resume of the diplomatic correspondence between the 
American government and the Hawaiian Kingdom, U. S. Congress, Senate, Message 
From the President of the United States Transmitting Correspondence Respecting 
Relations Between the United States and the Hawaiian Islands from September, 
1820, to January, 1893, S. Ex. Doc. 77, 52d Cong., 2d sess., 1893. To counter the 
revelations which were hurting their cause, the annexationists conducted their own 
inquiry into the revolution. See the report, largely the work of the pro annexationist 
Senator John T. Morgan of Alabama, U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign 
Relations, Report from the Committee on Foreign Relations, S. Rept. 227, 53d 
Cong., 2d sess., 1893, 310-11. 
9 Kuykendall, Hawaiian Kingdom, 187Jt-1898, 650. 
Robert H. Horwitz and Norman Meller, Land and Politics in Hawaii (East 
Lansing, 1963), 2-3; Kuykendall, Hawaiian Kingdom, I, 137, 145-46, 155-56, 175-76, 
269-98. 
Printed in U. S. Congress, House, Foreign Relations of the United States, 
l89Jt: Affairs in Hawaii, H. Ex. Doc. 1, 53d Cong., 3d sess., 1895, Appendix II, 
1350-71. 
19 For a summary of the attempt to combine minority rule with representative 
government see Ralph S. Kuykendall and A. Grove Day, Hawaii: A History 
(Englewood Cliffs, 1961), 183-202. 
13 Robert C. Schmitt, Demographic Statistics of Hawaii 1778-1965 (Honolulu, 
1968), 76. Kuykendall, Haioaiian Kingdom, III, 116, gives the percentage change for 
major groups between 1876 and 1900: Hawaiian and part Hawaiian, 89.2 per cent to 
26.0 per cent; Caucasian, 6.3 per cent to 17.5 per cent; Oriental, 4.5 per cent to 56.5 
per cent. 
14 Hilary Conroy, The Japanese Frontier in Haivaii, 1868-1898 (Berkeley, 1953), 
131-38. The natives shared with the whites the fear of the Orientals growing 
numbers. 
,s The timing was significant. A resolution for the annexation of Hawaii had been 
introduced in the Senate on March 16, but had not yet been called for consideration. 
Recognizing that in the Senate a majority favorable to annexation could be counted 
upon, but not the two-thirds necessary for ratifying a treaty, Newlands introduced a 
joint resolution which could assure annexation after a simple majority vote in both 
houses. U. S. Congress, 55th Cong., 2d sess., Congressional Record, 2853, 4600; U. 
S. Congress, House, Government for the Territory of Hawaii, H. Rept. 305 To 
Accompany H. R. 2972, 56th Cong., 1st sess., 1899, 1-2. The Senate vote was exactly 
a two-thirds majority. For an exploration of whether or not this was imperialism and 
if so what kind see Ernest R. May, American Imperialism A Speculative Essay (New 
York, 1968). 
Merze Tate, "Slavery and Racism as Deterrents to the Annexation of Hawaii, 
1854-55," Journal of Negro History, XLVII (1962), 1-18, makes the case suggested 
by the title convincing. Rubin Francis Weston, Racism in U. S. Imperialism (Colum­
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bia, S. C., 1972) concludes that the common denominator for expansionists and 
anti-imperialists was racism. For the former, it operated to exclude non-whites from 
the letter and spirit of the Constitution. For the latter, it inhibited the urge to 
acquire overseas possessions. This is not .to be doubted, but any study which focuses 
upon race as the central issue of imperialism is. For a generation which didn't worry 
about what is called "racism" today, the entire issue was a complication to larger 
questions. If any issue raised enough strategic interest in the United States it was 
always possible to minimize racial problems that might be involved. The New York 
Journal, May 2, 1900, for example, carried an editorial calling for the admission of 
Nicaragua, then the site for the proposed Isthmian canal, to the union. But the 
Baltimore Sun, Nov. 12, 1898, castigated President McKinley for his comments on 
the "blessed influence of the Spanish-American War in healing sectional divisions." 
Because McKinley was also expressing alarm at the overthrow of Negro rule in 
South Carolina, said the Sun, and as it was his administration which had cheerfully 
endorsed the successful overthrow of the blacks who owned Hawaii, the Chief 
Executive was something less than consistent. See these and related items in the 
Arthur P. Gorman (U. S. Senator, Maryland) Mss., Vol. 34, 305-06, Southern 
Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N. C. In the case of 
the Hawaiian annexation, as Earl S. Pomeroy, Pacific Outpost, American Strategy 
in Guam and Micronesia (Stanford, 1951), 5-18, points out, it was the exceptional 
character of the strategic value of Hawaii that was important. But even then it took a 
merging of commercial interests with the events of the Spanish-American War to 
impell Congress to act. 
17 U. S. Congress, Senate, Annexation of Hawaii, S. Rept. 681 To Accompany S. 
R. 127, 55th Cong., 2d sess., 1898, 10-12; U. S. Congress, House, Annexation of the 
Hawaiian Islands, H. Rept. 1355 To Accompany H. Res. 259, 55th Cong., 2d sess., 
1898, Part I, 6-7, Part II, 1. 
18 The natives supposedly were becoming extinct "by the laws of nature," which 
had contributed to a "mysterious decline" in the population; Orientals, bound by "a 
natural love of their homeland," returned thence as quickly as possible; and the 
course of development indicated that Hawaii was to be filled up in the future with the 
white race. Blount had already demolished these ideas as a facade to encourage 
annexation (House Ex. Doc. No. 47, 73-80, 138) and the population decline, traceable 
to contact with Western diseases, had been reversed in 1875 or 1876 (Kuykendall, 
Hawaiian Kingdom, II, 177). But the arguments were more than a facade; the people 
who made them tended to believe them, despite rather obvious evidence to the 
contrary. For an inquiry into this phenomina see Irving L. Janis, Victims of 
Groupthink (Boston, 1972). 
19 The debate over the annexation of Hawaii brought out all the arguments which 
later were to be applied in determining the destiny of the Philippines, Cuba, Puerto 
Rico, and the Pacific Islands. For blow by blow accounts and analyses see: William 
Adam Russ, Jr., The Hawaiian Republic [189U-98) And Its Struggle to Win 
Annexation (Selinsgrove, Pa., 1961), 338-56; Marion Mills Miller, ed., Great Debates 
in American History (New York, 1913), III, 169-324; D. Dedmon, "Analysis of the 
Arguments in the Debates in Congress on the Admission of Hawaii to the Union," 
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (State University of Iowa, 1961). 
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Mss., Clemson University, Clemson, S. C. 
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in the negative. 55th Cong., 2d sess., Congressional Record, 6019, 6712; Barbara 
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Hawaiian Islands," unpublished M. A. thesis (Smith College, 1944), 137-50. 
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public schools with an enrollment of 14,286. The Committee concluded, p. 136, that 
mixing the races in educational institutions "operated to break up racial antagonisms 
and unite the diverse races in the schoolrooms." 
24U. S. Congress, Senate, 55th Cong., 3d sess., Congressional Record, 20, 94, 
287-90, 292, 432-9. 
25 The measures being considered in Congress were S. 222 and H. R. Res. 2972. 
Each was reported as being the substance of the recommendations contained in the 
Report of the Commissioners to Hawaii. S. 222 appears to have been nearer the 
mark. For McKinley's message see House Doc. No. 1, Part 1, 56th Cong., 1st sess., 
LII-LIII. 
26U. S. Congress, Senate, 56th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record, 1923, 
1981, 2031, 2084; Simkins, Tillman, 353-57. 
27 U. S. Congress. House, 56th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record, 2490, 
3747, 3751, 3853-66, 3964-65, 4072, 4508, 4528; U. S. Congress, House, Government 
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Dependencies of the United States (New York, 1905), 65-6; Schmitt, Demographic 
Statistics, 78. 
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Spanish-American War. As indicated by his speech in Congress on February 7, 1899, 
Tillman viewed the struggle in the Philippines as a Filipino war of national 
liberation. See U. S. Congress, Senate, 55th Cong., 3d sess., Congressional Record, 
1530-32, portions of which are reprinted in Leslie E. Decker and Robert Seager II, 
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THE NAVAL POLICY OF ENGLAND'S 
LIBERAL GOVERNMENT, 1906 
Rodger E. Stroup 
In early December, 1905 the Conservative government of Arthur James 
Balfour was replaced by a Liberal government under Sir Henry 
Campbell-Bannerman. During the following year the new Liberal government, 
reduced the naval budget and cut back on the construction of new vessels. 
Throughout 1906 some conservatives and other big navy advocates accused the 
Liberals of abandoning previously established guidelines as outlined by the 
Conservative government in November and December of 1905. In addition to 
contemporary critics, the Liberals have been portrayed by many distinguished 
historians as departing from established policies. As early as 1918 Bernadotte 
E. Schmitt wrote that "the Cawdor programme had been abandoned" by the 
Liberals so there would be more money for their costly social reforms.1 In 
1936 R. C. K. Ensor wrote that the Liberals, "by abandoning the Cawdor 
programme," lost the British lead in the construction of dreadnoughts. As 
recently as 1963 George Monger spoke of Campbell-Bannerman's "reduction 
of the Cawdor programme."3 It is the contention of this paper that the 
Liberals did not abandon previous guidelines, nor were the reductions made 
during 1906 a departure from either the Cawdor Memorandum or the policy of 
the Balfour government. A brief survey of preceeding naval policy will aid in 
understanding the Liberal program of 1906. 
The Naval Defense Act of 1889 reinstituted the two-power standard first 
established in 1770 by the Earl of Chatham. The act provided that Great 
Britain would build sufficient vessels each year to insure that the British navy 
would remain stronger than the next two most powerful navies. In the first 
years following 1889 the English based their naval construction on the size of 
the French and Russian fleets.4 However, the German naval program soon 
became an important factor in determining British policy. The German Naval 
Law of 1898 attracted little attention in Westminister, because the German 
navy was small and the proposed construction would not affect the balance of 
power. In 1900 Germany passed a revised naval law which did cause some 
concern in England, but the British were still building on the basis of the 
French and Russian fleets. 
The advent of the Balfour government in 1902 resulted in an expanded 
version of the two-power standard. Balfour was obsessed with the question of 
national security, especially the absolute necessity for English naval superiority. 
In a private letter in 1909 Balfour stated that "If we fail in maintaining our sea 
power, it does not matter in the least where we succeed; tariff reform, social 
reform, all reforms are perfectly useless. As a nation we shall have ceased to 
count."5 In March, 1904 Balfour hypothesized that Great Britain could 
become involved in a war with the two next most powerful navies while the 
third strongest remained aloof from the destruction. In this situation, Balfour 
argued, the British navy might not be in as commanding a position as 
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desired. In early 1905 the government adopted a recommendation by two 
parliamentary committees that the British navy maintain a two-power standard 
plus a ten per cent margin over a possible Franco-German combination. By 
July, 1905 the two-power plus ten per cent standard was the accepted policy of 
Balfour's government. 
In addition to the advent of this new standard, several other important 
changes were occuring in the British navy. With Admiral Sir John Fisher as 
First Sea Lord, the navy embarked in 1904 upon a revolutionary reform 
program which aimed at reduced expenditures and increased efficiency. Most 
observers agreed that by the end of 1905 the British navy was well above the 
two-power standard, but the question which remained to be answered 
concerned the rate of German construction.8 
The signing of the Anglo-French agreement in 1904 and the defeat of the 
Russian fleet at Tsushima in 1905 affected the question of a standard for the 
navy. The Russian fleet had disappeared, and the French fleet was not likely to 
be combined with that of another power against the British. However, the 
growth of the German fleet was alarming, and it was now potentially more 
dangerous than the Russian fleet was a few years earlier. In the years from 
1904 to 1914 the two-power standard was gradually abandoned, and the size of 
the German navy became the yardstick used by the Admiralty to determine 
British needs. However, the shift away from the two-power standard was never 
complete, because it always alarmed the British to see statistics depicting the 
navy below a two-power standard.9 
In November, 1905 shortly before leaving office, Balfour's Conservative 
government outlined its proposed naval policy for the next several years. 
Known as the Cawdor program, the proposals detailed the needs of the navy so 
that British naval superiority would not be endangered by the construction 
programs of the other powers. The core of the policy was new construction, 
calling for between f9 and flO million to be spent each year for this purpose. 
The Cawdor policy proposed that to maintain the necessary superiority over 
France and Germany, that four large armoured vessels be laid down each year. 
The 1906-1907 program was outlined in detail, calling for the construction of 
four large armoured vessels of dreadnought design, twelve submarines, twelve 
coastal destroyers, and five destroyers. The program recommended thi.t the 
construction program for each year be formulated on a year by year bas's. The 
guidelines for determining the level of new construction included, first, the 
construction programs of the other powers, second, the trend of British f >reign 
policy and international relations, and third, the limitations on naval 
expenditures created by the needs of national finance.10 
In addition to outlining naval policy, the Cawdor program assured the 
public that Great Britain had a sufficient force of battleships to insure 
superiority over the combined fleets of Germany, France, and Russia. While 
affirming that Great Britain had, at present, naval superiority, the Cawdor 
program pointed out that it was necessary to build four large armoured cruisers 
each year since the advent of the dreadnought brought a completely new type of 
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vessel onto the scene. The new policy asserted that Great Britain must maintain 
superiority in each new type of armoured vessel that might be developed.11 
A strength of the Liberal victory at the polls in January, 1906 was an 
important factor in the naval policy pursured by Campbell-Bannerman's 
government. In the House of Commons the Liberals won 402 seats and could 
count on the support of 83 Irish Nationalists and 29 Labour members. The 
opposition consisted of only 132 Conservatives and 25 Liberal Unionists. In 
addition, the new parliament was the first middle class parliament in history, 
one in which the majority of the members worked for a living.12 The 
parliament definitely had reform on its mind, though some Liberal members 
envisioned more radical measures than others. 
After the January, 1906 election the new Liberal government had little 
time to consider the question of expenditures before it was necessary to place 
the naval estimates before parliament. On February 15, a memo from the 
Board of Admiralty to the Cabinet requested that the Cawdor program be 
accepted without change. The Board argued that while alliances may disappear 
naval power was the best way Great Britain could insure continued peace in the 
world.13 Campbell-Bannerman's government decided to accept the Cawdor 
program, and prepared to introduce it in parliament. 
On March 1, 1906, Edmund Robertson, the Secretary of the Admiralty, 
introduced the naval estimates in the House of Commons. Robertson stated 
that because of the brief amount of time available to prepare the budget, the 
Liberals accepted the Cawdor program without amendments. However, 
Robertson pointed out, the limited time available also meant that the Liberals 
did not feel irrevocably committed to the Cawdor program. Robertson 
emphasized that only a small sum was contained in Vote 8, that part of the 
estimates dealing with new construction, since the four large crusiers called for 
in the Cawdor program would not be laid down until late in the year. 
I1 urt hermore, Robertson requested that, as in previous years, Vote 8 be 
considered late in the session, about June, so that more time could be given to 
the details of the vote.14 
In June, 1906 before Vote 8 was considered by the Commons, the Board 
of Admiralty sent a revised naval estimate to the Cabinet, stating that it would 
be possible to reduce naval expenditures by reducing the amount of new 
construction, cutting the number of personnel, and redistributing the ships 
in the fleets. The Board reported that it was unanimous in dropping one 
armoured cruiser from the 1906-1907 program, and substituting for the three 
ocean destroyers and four submarines, one small unarmoured ship. In addition, 
the fleets were reorganized to strengthen the Channel fleet, and the number of 
men was reduced from 129,000 to 127,000.15 
1 hough it is difficult to prove, it is probable that the government suggested 
the reduction to the Admiralty. In the parlimentarv debates during July, 1906 
when the reductions were announced, the Liberal government denied 
suggesting the reductions to the Admiralty and claimed that the impetus came 
from the Sea Lords. However, Lord Tweedmouth, First Lord of the Admiralty, 
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stated in the House of Lords on July 30, that he first suggested to the Sea Lords 
the possibility of a reduction in new construction. Since Tweedniouth favored a 
large navy, in this instance he was probably acting on instructions from the 
Cabinet.16 
Though the June report from the Admiralty suggested a reduction, one can 
see traces in the report that the Board of Admiralty was not altogether 
overjoyed at the prospect. The report stated that although the present strength 
of the navy was excellent, and relations with foreign nations were good, "still 
alliances and ententes are not everlasting, and the unexpected must never be 
neglected." It was further suggested that Great Britain should not sit hack and 
allow other countries to close the gap in the construction of the newest types of 
vessels, as this would be a dangerous experiment that could possibly lead to 
future disasters. The Admiralty report also contained several tables which 
showed that Great Britain would lose some of its advantage by reducing 
construction to only three armoured vessels each year.17 The suggestion from 
the Board to reduce new construction does not fit the tone of the remainder of 
the report and provides further evidence that the Admiralty did not instigate 
the reductions. 
()n July 13, the Cabinet considered the revised naval estimates and agreed 
to the program suggested by the Sea Lords.'8 The most controversial proposal, 
and the one which drew the loudest attacks from the Conservatives, was the 
reduction of one dreadnought from the 1906-1907 program and the 
construction of only two dreadnoughts in the 1907-1908 program, or three 
dreadnoughts in 1907-1908 if the upcoming Hague Conference was not 
successful.19 
On July 26, Edmund Robertson introduced the reduced estimates in the 
House of Commons. The new program recommended by the Admiralty 
included the elimination from the 1906-1907 program of one dreadnought, 
three ocean destroyers, and four submarines. Robertson said the Sea Lords 
proposed the revised program and they did not think the balance of sea power 
would be endangered by these changes. The major reason for the reduction, 
according to Robertson, was that the building programs of the other powers 
had not advanced as fast as believed when the estimates were originally framed/0 
The Conservative attack on the reduced program was led by Balfour. Like 
most Conservatives, Balfour did not think the Liberals were fit to govern, and 
his comments on the new program reflected this bias.7' While admitting it was 
the government s prerogative to alter the program, Balfour believed the change 
was too rapid and did not allow the House an opportunity to fully discuss the 
reductions. Since the Liberals suggested that the new proposals were forced on 
the government by the Amiralty, Balfour accused the Liberals of concealing 
their real motives behind the Sea Lords. Additionally, Balfour argued, no 
reason was given for the reduction, except that the Sea Lords felt it would not 
endanger naval superiority. Balfour further feared that if only three 
dreadnoughts were built each year, Great Britain would fall below the 
two-power standard. Furthermore, the former prime minister was not 
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convinced that Great Britain would be able to maintain her advantage in the 
speed at which she could construct a dreadnought.22 
Campbell-Bannerman presented the government's argument in the 
Commons. He assured the House that the proposed reductions were unani­
mously approved by the Sea Lords who "expressly asked that the House of 
Commons should be informed that it (the reduction) was their recommendation 
. . ." No pressure, he added, was placed on the Sea Lords to reduce the 
estimates for new construction. At present, the prime minister continued. 
England could build faster than any other nation. What the other powers might 
do in the future was unknown, but Great Britain should proceed on what was 
known.23 
The main argument Campbell-Bannerman presented centered on the 
current diplomatic situation, and the coming Hague Conference. The prime 
minister believed it was the duty of Great Britain to take the lead in arms 
limitation, and the proposed reductions would show the world that the British 
were sincere. As early as December 21, 1905, in his first public speech as 
prime minister, Campbell-Bannerman fervently stated his continued hope that 
the arms race among the powers could be halted. 25 
The policy followed by the late Conservative government gave 
Campbell-Bannerman another strong argument. In studying the naval program 
for the two proceeding years, the Liberals found that the Balfour government 
made reductions in the number of vessels scheduled for construction. In the 
1904-1905 program one armoured cruiser was dropped from a total of four, 
and thirteen destroyers were eliminated. The 1905-1906 program was short 
one armoured cruiser. Not only were cutbacks made, Campbell-Bannerman 
pointed out. but the government never revealed that these vessels were not 
constructed. 
On August 2, 1906, the new naval estimates came up in the Commons for 
second reading. Again Balfour and Campbell-Bannerman were in the forefront 
of the debate, but this time the controversy revolved around the question of the 
two-power standard. Balfour argued that a Franco-German combination was 
not impossible, and England should build against the next two strongest navies, 
regardless of the current diplomatic situation. 
In replying to Balfour, Campbell-Bannerman said it was not reasonable to 
build against the two powers who were "more likely to be antagonistic to each 
other than any other two Powers you can find on the continent of Europe." 
Campbell-Bannerman added that the two-power standard was convenient, but 
it was not everything. Instead, the government "ought to consider what the 
requirements of the Navy are, just as we consider w hat the requirements of the 
Army are, and see that we have a sufficient Army and Navy for these 
requirements."28 
The debate on the new naval estimates took place in the House of Lords 
on July 30. While the debate in the Commons revolved around disarmament 
and the assertion that the Sea Lords wanted the reduction, the debate in the 
House of Lords took on a more technical tone. The main debate in the Lords 
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was between Lord Cawdor and Lord Tweedmouth. Lord Cawdor complained 
that the government had abandoned the two-power standard without 
establishing any other yardstick to measure British naval requirements. The 
fact that no other nation had accelerated their building was the only 
justification given by the government for a twenty-five per cent reduction in 
battleship construction, and to Lord Cawdor, this did not constitute a 
satisfactory explanation. 
In defending the new program, Lord Tweedmouth pointed out that a 
cutback made late in the year was not a new innovation. The present reduction, 
the First Lord continued, was possible because no new battleships were laid 
down abroad during the current year.30 The cutback of three ocean destroyers, 
Tweedmouth stated, was decided upon because the new type currently entering 
service was complex, and the navy wanted experience'with the new design 
before an entire fleet was constructed. The elimination of four submarines was 
also attributed to the design of a newer type, because the Admiralty did not 
want to construct a fleet of obsolete submarines.31 
The House of Lords appeared more satisfied with Lord Tweedmouth's 
presentation of the reductions than the House of Commons was with the prime 
minister's defense of the cutback. Viscount Goschen, twice First Lord of the 
Admiralty in the late nineteenth century, wondered why the technical reasons 
detailed by Tweedmouth were not used by the government in the Commons. 
It appeared in the Commons debate, Goschen added, that the government 
merely wanted to cut expenses and gave no good reasons for a reduction. But in 
the Lords, Tweedmouth gave good reasons for the reduction. It seemed, 
Viscount Goschen concluded, that the government badly mismanaged the 
whole affair.33 
Though there was considerable opposition to the new program, especially 
from the old line Conservatives, the naval estimates were passed within a few 
days. The Conservatives and other big navy advocates continued to stir up 
opposition to the new program, and discontent rumbled on through the fall. 
This opposition did not worry the front bench, however, as Germany had not 
laid down any dreadnoughts and England was still well above a two-power 
standard.34 
The Sea Lords, as technical advisors, did not become publicly involved in 
the debate on the new estimates. Sir John Fisher, as First Sea Lord, was 
primarily responsible for a memorandum dated February, 1906 which called 
for strict adherence to the Cawdor program, and stated that the Admiralty 
"cannot base their plans upon the shifting sands of any temporary and 
unofficial international relations.''35 By fall, however, Fisher was a 
strong advocate of the new estimates, and was fully in favor of the reduced 
expenditures on new construction. In a letter to Lord Tweedmouth, Fisher 
said the Admiralty would not be scared by paper programs, "the bogey of 
agitators," but would build only when other nations did so. Fisher continued, 
saying, "our present margin of superiority over Germany (our only possible 
foe for years I is s o great as to render it absurd in the extreme to talk of anything 
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endangering our naval supremacy, even if we stopped all shipbuilding 
altogether." Fisher concluded that the Sea Lords would not allow anything to 
happen which could in any way endanger British naval superiority. 38 
By the elimination of one dreadnought, three ocean destroyers, and four 
submarines from the 1906-1907 program, did Campbell-Bannerman's 
government appreciably alter the naval policy as outlined by the previous 
Conservative government? It does not appear so. 
During the first half of 1906 Great Britain was well above the two-power 
standard. Even many of the Conservatives who attacked the July reductions 
admitted that the navy was over the two-power standard.39 The various 
Admiralty reports recognized Great Britain's superiority over the next two 
strongest navies. The Admiralty's concern was not for the present, but, in light 
of the announced building programs of the other powers, for the future. Thus 
when the reductions were recommended in July, 1906 Great Britain was in no 
immediate danger of falling below a two-power standard. 
The prospects for the future also appeared bright to the government. Great 
Britain already had one dreadnought built and three more were to be laid down 
shortly. No other power had laid down any dreadnoughts by the end of 1906. 
This meant, considering the British advantage in the speed of construction, that 
the English would have four dreadnoughts before any other power had complet­
ed one. Since the British could build faster, the government reasoned, it would 
be a simple matter to watch the foreign powers and lay down the number of 
dreadnoughts needed each year to maintain a comfortable lead. 
The reductions in themselves were not an innovation by the Liberal 
government. As pointed out by Campbell-Bannerman and Lord Tweedmouth, 
there had been similiar unannounced reductions in the past two years, and no 
one had said these would endanger British naval superiority. In fact, the 
Balfour government did not consider it necessary to inform parliament at the 
time of the cutback. Yet when the Liberal government came to the parliament, 
and openly recommended a reduction, some members of the late Conservative 
government were certain a cutback would mean a loss of British naval 
. . 40 superiority. 
According to Admiral Fisher, no change occured at the Admiralty with the 
advent of the Liberal government. In fact. Fisher pointed out that nothing 
drastic was done, and Admiralty policy was only a continuation of that started 
when Fisher became First Sea Lord in October, 1904. Fisher also mentioned 
the reductions of the past two years under the Balfour government, and 
explained that the reason for those cutbacks was the lack of construction 
abroad. However, when the Liberals advanced that explanation as a reason 
for the July reductions, a cry arose from the opposition leaders, who declared 
that such a weak reason was not an adequate explanation. 
The guidelines established in the Cawdor program remained the Liberal 
policy through the year 1906. In mentioning the naval programs, the Cawdor 
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policy stated that the Admiralty formulated British policy "for the next year 
and next year alone....This years' design may be comparatively obsolete next 
year."' The program pointed out that to publish more than an annual schedule 
was foolish, because it would give possible enemies a chance to arrange their 
programs. Additionally, the three factors which the Cawdor program 
established to determine shipbuilding needs, namely, the construction 
programs of the other powers, the trend of British foreign policy, and the 
limitations on naval expenditures created by the needs of national finance, were 
followed by the Liberals, and resulted in a decision to cutback the amount of 
42 new construction. 
It is evident, at least to the end of 1906, that the new Liberal government 
made no drastic changes in the naval policy pursued by the previous 
Conservative government. The reductions of July, 1906 were not unusual since 
cutbacks were made by the Conservatives. The reasons for the deletion of 
several vessels from the 1906-1907 schedule were based on guidelines laid 
down in the Cawdor program. The reforms initiated by Admiral Fisher in 1904 
continued untouched through 1906; they were, in fact, advanced by the 
Liberal government. The fleet, because of Fisher's reforms, was more efficient 
than it was five years earlier. 
The desire to cut armament expenses was present in the minds of many 
Liberals in early 1906. The social legislation which the Liberals favored would 
require more money than was available without a reduction in defense 
spending. The need for social legislation, coupled with a sincere hope that a 
British arms reductions would lead to disarmament discussions, spurred the 
government onward. However, the guidelines for the 1906 reductions 
originated in previous Conservative practices and the policies stated by the 
Conservatives in the Cawdor program. The possibility of the navy losing 
command of the seas was never in question. The following statement which 
Campbell-Bannerman made during the July debates serves as an appropriate 
conclusion to the question under discussion: "No man here wishes the Navy to 
be weak for all the manifold duties which it has to perform....We are all as keen 
as anyone can be to maintain the efficiency of the Navy, but extravagance never 
procures efficiency. You get efficiency only when expenditure is kept within 
reasonable bounds." 43 
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PRESIDENT THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND ARMY REFORM 
John A. Matzko 
After the Spanish-American War, cartoonists had a never-ending field day 
picturing Theodore Roosevelt as the "Rough Rider." The dullest newspaper 
reader could hardly have failed to recognize the half-military, half-cowboy 
figure sporting spectacles and prominent incisors. Yet despite the military 
imagery conjured up by Roosevelt's five months of active duty, the 
"Colonel"—a title he relished—retained only a secondary interest in the 
Regular Army. The navy of Alfred Thayer Mahan remained his first love. 
Indeed, he wrote in the Autobiography (1913) that during the well-known 
charge up "San Juan" Hill, his spontaneous thoughts ran to naval tactics 
gleaned from The Influence of Sea Power upon History! 
Nevertheless, it was during Roosevelt's post-war career that the Regular 
Army of the United States was transformed from a frontier constabulary to an 
armed force decisive in a global conflict. Admittedly Roosevelt's contributions 
to the important military reforms of his Administration were of decidedly lesser 
importance than those of his personal friend and advisor, Secretary of War 
Elihu Root, but the President's interest in various major and minor aspects of 
army reform has been virtually ignored by both military historians and 
Roosevelt biographers. One possible reason for this disinterest is subconscious 
mental division between Roosevelt the Progressive and the Roosevelt whom 
Richard Hofstadter has called "the herald of modern militarism." The real 
Roosevelt, however, was of one piece, many-faceted but consistent in reflecting 
the views of a turn-of-the century Progressive. 
Actually despite Roosevelt's sometimes brutally militaristic figures of 
speech which horrify modern sentimentalists, army strength declined during 
the Roosevelt Administration; and while the President condemned 
Congressional critics who wished to whittle it down even further, he regarded 
the size of the Army as relatively suitable for the needs of the United States, 
though her responsibility in international politics had greatly increased. 3 
When, for instance, he advised Elihu Root on points to be included in a speech 
for the campaign of 1904, he cited "building up the navy" on one hand, but 
"proper organization of the army and the national guard" on the other. 4 
Roosevelt's army policy was, in fact, typical of Roosevelt the judicious 
politican. An attempted increase in the army would have produced strong 
opposition from those who equated higher troop strength with a more powerful 
anti-democratic force. Then too, Roosevelt realized that for the army, 
organizational reforms were more important than increased manpower and 
appropriations. Perhaps he could not have had both. In the Navy, for instance, 
where a building program was his primary objective, Roosevelt achieved no 
notable administrative reforms. Furthermore he had a strong opinion that 
the Regular Army would never fight a major war itself but would act both as an 
effective first line of defense and as a cadre for the volunteers who would flock 
to the standard. Rather than increase its size, Roosevelt sought to raise the 
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army to its highest possible efficiency and effectiveness. 
As one of the most broadly (if not deeply) knowledgeble of American 
Presidents, Roosevelt applied all his past experiences and studies to the 
problems of army reform—from his struggles as a Civil Service Commissioner 
to his interest in the Boer War. But, of course, his personal participation in the 
War of 1898 greatly influenced his judgments. In a negative sense it fixed part 
of his military understanding firmly in the nineteenth century. Even as 
President, Roosevelt "thought of war in terms of man-to-man combat, dashing 
cavalry charges and brilliant tactical maneuvers; not of mass carnage, germ 
infested prison camps and endless stultifying boredom." 7 Yet his powers of 
observation were keen, and he learned much from the young officers who 
surrounded him. 
Numerous minor reforms and suggested reforms stemmed directly from 
his own army service. Expressing an advanced point of view, he advocated 
loosely fitting field uniforms in camouflage colors which would provide 
"absolute ease and freedom" for the wearer.8 He called the ramrod bayonet 
"about as poor an invention as I ever saw" because it broke easily and 
recommended that its replacement be a triangular weapon more nearly 
resembling the modern knife bayonet.9 Remembering that his own saber had 
been worse than useless during the Santiago Campaign— ... it kept getting 
between my legs when I was tearing my way through the jungle —he 
suggested that officers carry rifles or at least swords that could "do damage. 
Machine guns had fascinated Roosevelt from the first time he had seen them in 
action against Spanish postitions, and he requested (but Congress refused) 
funds to develop this weapon further, including the organization of an 
experimental machine gun troop of cavalry. 
The President was more successful with a reorganization of the Medical 
Corps, the serious deficiencies of which he had well noted in the 
Spanish-American War. He believed it was not enough that the army doctor be 
a competent professional; he should be a military professional as well, having 
"knowledge of the administration and sanitation of large field hospitals and 
camps." In April, 1908, Congress did put the Medical Corps on a firmer basis 
and increased its personnel.12 
Roosevelt was also concerned with the doubtful quality of army chaplains. 
He expected them to be men with the Progressive virtues "of practical sense, of 
genuine morality, of deep religious feeling, with the attainments of a gentle­
man," not men who desired the position as a "soft job. He suggested that ap­
plicants pass an examination administered by their own denominations, thus 
making each church body more directly responsible for its own candidates. In­
stead a governmental examination was devised which Roosevelt disliked, espe­
cially the section on mathematics which he believed was being given too much 
weight.14 
There is no indication that Roosevelt ever attended a performance of 
Gilbert and Sullivan's Pirates of Penzance, but he would undoubtedly have 
been amused by the "modern Major General" who knew "many cheerful facts 
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about the square of the hypotenuse" but less of tactics than a novice 
in a nunnery." Roosevelt had a special dislike of mathematics, having done 
poorly in the subject during his freshman year at Harvard, but, in any case, it 
was the practical rather than the academic that he wished to see emphasized in 
the training of army officers.15 Once he personally reviewed the case of an 
enlisted man cited for bravery but denied a commission on the basis of a test in 
mathematics.16 Even the post-graduate service schools established under the 
hand of Elihu Root received only perfimctory recommendations in Roosevelt's 
Annual Messages to Congress, and he warned his Secretary of the "danger of 
too much book learning" at the Army School of the Line. "My brief military 
experience was enough to show me (he wrote Root) that the men upon whom I 
had a right to count were the young fellows who were naturally good with horse 
and rifle, naturally eager, pushing and resourceful and by no means bookish."17 
Roosevelt's attitude toward education at the Military Academy followed 
naturally. Only the Superintendent's Congressional influence prevented the 
President from ending much of the Academy's program in the more theoretical 
aspects of mathematics.18 On the other hand, Roosevelt ordered all the classes 
at West Point to participate in a system of calisthenics devised by the German 
gymnast Hermann J. Koehler and strongly suggested that modern languages be 
taught for speaking rather than for reading knowledge.19 
While Roosevelt was quite tolerant of hazing at the Point, a reflection 
perhaps of his Social Darwinist theory of leadership, he displayed a typically 
Progressive sense ol patrician responsibility for army enlisted men who, he 
believed, were "peculiarly a people who have no one specially interested in 
them and w ho must trust to justice and the abstract sense of right of the people 
at Washington. "20 In the Annual Message of 1907 he recommended pay 
increases for the arm\ which would be "relatively greater" for the enlisted man, 
and these increases were voted by Congress in 1908-the first such raise since 
the Civil W ar. Roosevelt also asked Congress for the establishment of warrant 
officer grades, assuming that the new ranks would be largely filled by veteran 
enlisted men.21 He helped end discrimination against enlisted men in uniform 
by threatening to cancel the license of any public establishment in the District 
of Columbia which so discriminated and by suggesting that officers be ordered 
to wear their uniforms more often.22 As an incentive for exceptional initiative, 
the President supported the commissioning of enlisted men to fill positions left 
vacant by a lack of West Point graduates, and to combat the serious problem of 
desertion, he suggested that after twelve years of honorable service the veteran 
be given preference in civil service positions.23 
Roosevelt accepted Leonard Wood's argument that desertions occurred 
because "we do not play the game seriously."' Both former Rough Riders felt a 
soldier's instruction should be "full of field problems," "night marches and 
attacks," "not six months of walking around the parade ground." 24 Roosevelt 
hoped, in fact, that the importance of practice in military duties would be 
emphasized at all levels, "there is no use in providing new field artillery or 
heavy guns for the coast defense unless our men can handle them," he once 
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wrote.25 Impressed by the improvement which target practice had wrought in 
the navy, the President proposed a similar program for the army, even 
recommending pay raises for expert marksmen.26 It was also Roosevelt's desire 
to assemble a whole division once a year and hold extensive maneuvers, for he 
believed that "only by actual handling and providing for men in masses while 
they are marching, camping, embarking and disembarking, will it be possible to 
train the higher officers to perform their duties well and smoothly." 7' 
As a man who prized non-material values, Roosevelt also understood the 
necessity of providing military awards and honors. He personally upgraded the 
value of the Medal of Honor which he had once called "the greatest distinction 
open to any American," ordering that future recipients be presented the Medal 
by "the President, as Commander-in-Chief" in a "formal and impressive 
ceremony.28 It was also during the Roosevelt Administration that the grounds 
for the award were made more restrictive, and the Medal itself was redesigned. 
Documentation for Roosevelt's personal participation' in suggesting these 
changes is lacking; however, the President did order a campaign medal struck 
for the Cuban Pacification of 1906-1909.29 
Roosevelt's passion for "the strenuous life" of physical fitness provided 
another very personal contribution to army reform. He had, of course, made 
building his body a lifelong crusade, and was impressed in Cuba with the 
natural advantage he and the Rough Riders had over the older regular army 
officers and the state troops who were unused to exertion. Perhaps the most 
celebrated forms of exercise in which the President participated were the rides 
and walks he took around the Washington area. Usually some army officers 
accompanied him, sometimes applicants for promotion to brigadier general or 
above. As Leonard Wood wrote later: 
The officer's ability to follow the President was 
the equivalent of a first-class medical certificate. 
If he could not follow him, his chance for final 
selection was a pretty slim one, for Roosevelt 
believed the senior officers who would come into 
command in war should be not only mentally 
but physically fit....A tramp with the President 
usually meant that the invited ones would arrive 
rather smartly turned out. They usually 
departed, however, more or less complete 
wrecks.30 
The number of anecdotes about these half-scramble, half-swim, point-to-point 
jaunts through Rock Creek Park are, as might be expected, numerous. On one 
occasion a rather ponderous officer slid down the banks into the river and in the 
process tore his clothing and lost his glasses. Wood recalls that 
...he was a very sad-looking specimen, 
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nearsighted and absolutely lost as to his 
whereabouts. The President noticed a mounted 
policeman in the distance and, calling the 
officer, said to him with great solemnity: 
"Officer, this is a general of the United States 
army. He wants to go to Washington. Take him 
to where he can get the streetcars...Don't fail to 
remember that he is a general in the army." 31 
After more than one such "unpleasant experience" with high ranking 
officers, Roosevelt "issued directions that each officer should prove his ability 
to walk fifty miles, or ride one hundred in three days."32 Perhaps the final step 
was taken after the President realized that a mandatory march or ride would 
accomplish two objectives simultaneously: it would raise the level of fitness in 
the officer corps while eliminating many of the older desk officers who had 
blocked his plans for merit promotions. A final sentence in one of Roosevelt's 
letters to his Chief-of-Staff, ostensibly concerning physical fitness, queries: 
"Are there any other ways that can be devised for getting the dead wood among 
the field officers before retiring boards?" 33 Roosevelt demanded that he be 
given the names "in every case" of those who failed to take the test or who fell 
out while taking it, and a physical examination required in the same army order 
automatically disqualified 12 per cent of the colonels on active duty.34 
Those most adversely affected, the Washington bureaucrats, began 
mobilizing their political power, and there was accordingly much grumbling in 
both Congress and the press. To silence the critics who called the test excessive, 
Roosevelt rode over a hundred miles on one icy January day and as usual, the 
worse the weather, the more difficult the country, the more he reveled in the 
test. Roosevelt hoped that sentiment generated by the ride would counter the 
pressures of the "great coterie" who were only waiting for him "to leave the 
White House to deluge the next President with applications to modify the or­
der." 35 In this he was unsuccessful; the tests were abandoned during the Taft 
Administration. Nevertheless he was able, as he had also intended, to instill the 
perpetuation of concern with physical fitness into the army as a matter of esprit 
de corps. Mental Colonel Blimps remained, but physical ones became a 
rarity-somewhat ironically since improvements in transportation were making 
it increasingly less necessary for field grade officers to be physically agile. 
Secretary of War Root and his young military advisors were, however, only 
slightly concerned with this type of symptomatic remedy for an army which 
needed important organizational changes. Building upon the military theories 
of Emory Upton, Root proposed that a general staff and a Chief-of-Staff replace 
the anomalous Commanding General who in peacetime had little to command. 
Roosevelt certainly supported his Secretary in what was to become one of the 
most far-reaching military reforms of the decade, but it is possible that the 
President would not have thrown so much of his political weight behind the 
measure had it not been for the opposition of the current Commanding General, 
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Nelson A. Miles. 
Roosevelt had acquired a distinct distaste for the old Civil War general as 
early as the Spanish-American War, but Miles' fatuous political 
ambitions—Roosevelt said he had "the Presidential bee in his 
bonnet -completed the alienation.37 Miles had funneled army documents into 
the hands of War Department critics, claimed that the Roosevelt 
Administration s plan to consolidate small army posts was an attempt to 
overawe organized labor and attacked the handling of the Philippine campaign. 
As a final touch Miles hinted broadly that Roosevelt had never been present at 
the engagement on San Juan Hill.38 When the old general denounced the 
General Staff bill before the Senate Military Committee and dealt it a severe 
setback, Roosevelt with difficulty restrained himself from retiring the General, 
fearing that direct action might create more political repercussions.39 Instead 
the President leaked his displeasure to important editors and Senators and 
compiled a dossier on the massacre of Wounded Knee where Miles had been in 
command.40 
When the bill came up again during the Second Session of Congress, 
Roosevelt and Root planned a long round-the-world tour for their Commanding 
General, and passage of the measure seemed assured.41 Nevertheless on the 
morning of January 31, 1903, as Root and Roosevelt were leaving the White 
House for a ride in Rock Creek Park, they received an unexpected report that 
the bill, "in which we were greatly interested," had failed of passage. ". . . In 
consequence Mr. Root looked gray and worn when we started and our 
conversation during the ride was of .. .a melancholy type .... But when we got 
home we found the bill had passed after all, so that our woe was 
unwarranted." 42 
Roosevelt's highly personal opposition to Miles was perhaps an indication 
that should both the old general and the Secretary of War leave office (which 
they did several months later), the extent of innovation in the command 
structure would be more apparent than real. T. Harry Williams, for instance, 
has called the early workings of the General Staff "highly anticlimatic" when 
compared with the theoretical outline.43 A number of command problems 
remained to be resolved in the traditional American fashion of extemporization, 
but it is noteworthy that nothing like the Wood-Ainsworth or Pershing-March 
controversies occurred during the Roosevelt Administration. In part the reason 
why the inherent conflicts in the general staff system did not manifest 
themselves during Roosevelt's term of office was that the President himself 
remained non-doctrinaire in his dealings with the War Department, sometimes 
acting through the Chief-of-Staff, sometimes through the Adjutant-General, 
sometimes through the Secretary of War. Even during the most serious military 
action of his Administration, the Cuban occupation of 1906, Roosevelt 
channeled his orders indirectly through Adjutant-General Ainsworth.44 As for 
military advice, Roosevelt seems to have sought that as regularly from his 
friend. Baron Speck von Sternberg, the German Ambassador, as from his 
Chief-of-Staff.45 
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Perhaps the greatest influence which President Roosevelt had upon the 
army was his attempt at reform in promotion policy, an extension of his sincere 
belief in merit appointments. William Henry Harbaugh has written that "civil 
service reform was at once the most confirmed and most sustained cause of 
Roosevelt's career, and he read into it both the gospel of efficiency which is the 
conservative's creed and the open society which is the democrat's dream." 46 
Roosevelt was as consistent when he dealt with the army as 
Commander-in-Chief as he had been when he was Police Commissioner, Civil 
Service Commissioner and Governor of New York. 
In his pre-Presidential years Roosevelt directed an enormous barrage of 
letters at Washington officials recommending various officers whom he had 
known in Cuba--so many in fact, that it became something of a joke among his 
friends.47 As President in his own right he used his prerogatives to further 
military careers by assigning favored officers to staff duty, occasionally using 
the same powers to pack off disfavored officers to some insignificant post.48 
But with the contraction of the army during his Administration, Roosevelt lost 
the ability to assign regulars to higher ranks in the volunteers. Under the law, 
the President could exercise his appointive powers only in the selection of 
second lieutenants and general officers. Other ranks in the Regular Army were 
awarded strictly on the basis of seniority. 
Believing that ability, not seniority, should be the criterion for 
advancement, Roosevelt explained that he wanted "men. . . who now and then 
make mistakes but. . .also do the big things rather than overcautious officers 
who "never do anything bad. 49 Ihere was a low rumble of protest when 
Roosevelt began implementing his merit promotion policy by advancing junior 
field grade officers like Tasker Bliss and William Carter, but it did not compare 
with the howl which arose when he tried to appoint his old friend, Leonard 
Wood, to the rank of major general. A good deal of the opposition was simply 
personal and political. Wood had entered the service through the Medical 
Corps and had risen to the rank of brigadier general because of his friendship 
with prominent Republicans like McKinley and Roosevelt. The West 
Point-educated senior officers understood perfectly that should this unorthodox 
officer be confirmed as major general, he would within a few years be making 
army policy as Chief-of-Staff.50 
After some rather disagreeable Congressional hearings, Wood s promotion 
was confirmed, but the fight virtually destroyed Roosevelt's attempts at making 
merit promotion the rule rather than the exception. "No one incident of my 
administration, Roosevelt wrote later to a naval aide, has caused me more 
criticism, more difficulty, more trouble of every kind, than getting Wood made 
major-general. The army was against it, Congress was against it, and the people 
at large were overwhelmingly against it." 51 This growing opposition was, in 
fact, clearly evident in the Senate's reaction to the President's nomination of 
another friend, A. L. Mills, to be brigadier general. Mills, a Regular Army man 
and a Medal of Honor winner, had his appointment voted out of committee by 
the same vote as Wood's, but anti-Administration forces staved off a vote in the 
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Senate for nearly a year.52 
Despite Congressional pressure, Roosevelt made his most radical, and yet 
most deserving appointment in September, 1906, when without precedent in 
peacetime, he promoted a captain, John J. Pershing, to brigadier general. 
Pershing was hardly an ordinary captain, however, having acquired three 
college degrees and having distinguished himself in action against Apache and 
Zuni Indians, Spaniards at San Juan Hill and Moros in the Philippines. 
Characteristically, Roosevelt tried to promote him immediately to brigadier 
general in 1903, but Root contemplating the political results, dissuaded him. 5i 
The President did transfer Pershing to the General Staff and at the same time 
addressed a strong message to Congress demanding a reform in the method of 
promotion whereby recommendations of higher officers would determine the 
ranking of their juniors.54 
Congress did nothing. Pershing, however, courted and married Helen 
Francis Warren, daughter of Senator Francis Warren, chairman of the Military 
Affairs Committee. Perhaps Roosevelt considered the relative ease with which a 
promotion could then be made; at least some of the 862 officers over whom 
Pershing was jumped thought so.55 In any case, this was the President's first 
and last promotion of a company grade officer to the rank of general. The 
Senate positively refused to ratify any more nominations unless the men 
in question were already colonels. Attempts to retire officers "not necessarily 
unfit, but least fitted to remain in the service"--Roosevelt at his euphemistic 
best-were also ignored by Congress.56 
Yet it is probably no exaggeration to claim that Roosevelt's greatest 
influence upon the army was in the area of personnel rather than policy. "I 
have always been more interested in the men themselves," he once wrote 
Frederick Jackson Turner, "than in the institutions through and under which 
they worked."57 Roosevelt seems to have been an excellent judge of character, 
for most of the men whom he recommended or promoted became distinguished 
officers, many of them ranking generals of the First World War. Only when the 
President met solid opposition from both Congress and the army did he 
reluctantly agree to discontinue this private extension of the merit principle and 
resume appointing generals on the basis of seniority. 
That Roosevelt bowed to the wishes of Congress on what was one of his 
most strongly held convictions is an indication that in action he was a political 
realist. It was typical of Theodore Roosevelt the Progressive to promote 
relatively mild reforms with a great deal of vehemence yet in the process rarely 
stray far from the American tradition of pragmatism, compromise and 
unsystematized arrangements. 
1 
Theodore Roosevelt, An Autobiography (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1920), p. 242. 
2 Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1968), p. 206. 
THE SOUTH CAROLINA HISTORICAL ASSOCI ATION 
3 Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States (Washington: 
GPO, 1961), pp. 736, 718. "Annual Message, 1901" in Hermann Hagedorn, ed. The 
Works of Theodore Roosevelt, "National Edition" (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1926), XV, 122. Elting E. Morison, ed. The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), V, 358; Aug. 14, 1906. 
4 Letters, IV, 811; June 2, 1904. 
5 Ibid., VI, 980 note. 
6 c. f. ibid., VIII, 1146; Jan. 10, 1917. 
7 William Henry Harbaugh, Power and Responsibility: The Life and Times of 
Theodore Roosevelt (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1961), p. 98. 
8 Letters, III, 163; Oct. 8, 1901. 
9 Ibid., IV, 1090; Jan, 4, 1905; IV, 1260; July 3, 1905. 
10 Theodore Roosevelt, The Rough Riders, Works, XI, 63. Letters, IV, 1090; Jan. 
4, 1905. 
11 Letters, VI, 1319; Oct. 26, 1908. See also Preface by Theodore Roosevelt to 
John Henry Parker, History of the Gatling Gun Detachment, Fifth Army Corps at 
Santiago (Kansas City, Mo.: Hudson Kimberly Publishing Company, 1898). 
12 "Annual Message, 1907," Works, XV, 468-469. William G. Ganoe, History of 
the United States Army (New York: Appleton-Century, 1936), p. 431. 
13 Letters, VI, 958; Mar. 4,1908; III, 272; June 10, 1902. 
14 c. f. Letters, VI, 903; Jan. 11, 1908. 
15 Ibid., IV, 907-908; Aug. 26, 1904. 
16 Ibid., VI, 903; Jan. 11, 1908. 
" Ibid.. VI. 903; Jan. 11, 1908. 
18 Ibid., IV, 907; Aug. 26, 1904. "Annual Message, 1906," Works, XV, 406. 
Thomas J. Flemming, West Point (New York: William Morrow & Company Inc., 
1969), p. 278. 
19 Stephen F. Ambrose, Duty, Honor, Country: A History of West Point 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1966), p. 246. Letters, IV, 907; Aug. 26, 1904. 
20 Letters, V, 301; June 16, 1906. 
21 "Annual Message, 1907," Works, XV, 469-470. Ganoe, p. 432. 
22 Letters, V, 435; Oct. 1, 1906; III, 385; Nov. 27, 1902. 
23 Ibid., Ill, 70; May 4, 1901; V, 123; Jan. 1, 1906; V, 511; Nov. 28, 1906. "Annual 
Message, 1907," Works, XV, 470. 
24 Letters, V, 205; Aug. 2,1906 note. 
" Ibid., V, 148; Feb. 7,1906. 
Ibid., V, 750; Aug. 21,1907. "Annual Message, 1907," Works, XV, 470. 
"Annual Message, 1901, Works, XV, 124-125. See also Roosevelt's testimony 
before the Dodge Commission in Report of the Commission Appointed by the 
President to Investigate the Conduct of the War Department in the War with Spain 
(Washington: GPO, 1900), V, 2270-2271. "The Duties of a Great Nation," Works, 
XIV, 290-297. 
28 Executive Order, Sept. 20, 1905, printed in The Medal of Honor (Washington: 
GPO, 1948), p. 440. In most earlier cases the Medals had been sent to winners by 
registered mail; sometimes they were returned to the War Department because the 
soldiers who had won them had been discharged and their whereabouts were 
unknown. 
PRESIDENT THEODO RE ROOSEVELT AND ARMY R EFORM 39  
29 Lawrence F. Abbott, ed. The Letters of Archie Butt (Garden City, N. Y.: 
Doubleday, Page & Company, 1924), p. 155; Nov. 5, 1908. The best work on the 
progressive upgrading of the Medal of Honor is John J. Pullen, A Shower of Stars: 
The Medal of Honor and, the 27th Maine (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1966). 
30 Leonard Wood, "Roosevelt: Soldier, Statesman and Friend," introduction to 
The Rough Riders, Works, XI, xiii-xiv. 
31 Ibid., p. xiv. 
32Letters of Archie Butt, pp. 119-120. Letters, III, 377; Nov. 12, 1902; V, 651; 
July 31, 1907; V, 715; July 13, 1907. James G. Harbord, "Theodore Roosevelt and the 
Army," Review of Reviews LXIX (Jan., 1924), 70. Autobiography, p. 47. 
33 Letters, V, 652; Apr. 20, 1907. 
34 Ibid., V, 861; Dec. 2,1907. 
35 Letters of Archie Butt, p. 286-90. America and the World War, Works, XVIII, 
177-178. 
36c. f. Stephen E. Ambrose, Upton and the Army (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1964), pp. 155-156; William H. Carter, Creation of the American 
General Staff (Washington: GPO, 1924, 68th Cong. 1st Sess.), passim. T. Harry 
Williams, Americans at War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1960), 
p. 101. Elihu Root, Five Years of the War Department Following the War with Spain 
as Shoum in the Annual Reports of the Secretary of War, 1899-1903 (Washington: 
GPO, 1904), p. 165 & passim. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The 
Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1957) pp. 251-252. Philip L. Semsch, "Elihu Root and the General Staff," 
Military Affairs XXVII (Spring, 1963), 16-27. State Papers, Works, XV, 122-127. 
37Letters, III, 242; Mar. 7,1902. 
38 Joseph Bucklin Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and His Time (New York: 
Scribner's Son's, 1920), I, 171-172. Letters, III, 95; June 18, 1901; III, 98, June 22, 
1901; III, 232; Feb. 18, 1902. The controversy was largely one of semantics. 
Roosevelt later wrote in the Autobiography: "We certainly charged some hills; but I 
did not ask their names before charging them." (p. 257). 
39 Carter, pp. 31-35. Edward Ranson, "Nelson Miles as Commanding General, 
1895-1903, 'Military Affairs XXIX (Winter, 1965-66), 192-194. Letters, III, 271; 
June 10, 1902. The Independent, LIV, (Apr. 24, 1902), 953-954. 
40Letters, III, 247; March 24, 1902; III, 271; June 10, 1902; III, 232; Feb. 18, 
1902; III, 241; Mar. 7, 1902. 
41 Ranson, p. 197. Virginia W. Johnson, The Unregimented General: A 
Biography of Nelson A. Miles (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1962), p. 355. 
Carter, p. 49. 
42 Letters, III, 415; Feb. 1,1903. 
43 Williams, pp. 100-116; c. f. Hammond, pp. 17-48; Huntington, pp. 298-299, 
252-53 and Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1967), pp. 322-23. Root's incomplete grasp of the problems 
involved in a general staff is a thesis of Mabel E. Deutrich, Struggle for Supremacy: 
The Career of Fred C. Ainsworth (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1962). 
44 Letters, V, 391; Sept. 1, 1906. 
4^ See for instance Letters, II, 1303; May 19, 1900; III, 297-298; July 19, 1902. 
Harbaugh, Power and Responsibility, p. 287. 
40  THE SOUTH CAROLINA HISTOR ICAL ASS OCIATION 
47 c. f. Letters, II, 1056; Aug. 14, 1899; II, 1957; Aug. 14, 1899; II, 1027; July 1, 
1899; II, 1297; May 16, 1900; II, 1357; July 20, 1900; III, 84; June 1, 1901; III, 12; 
Mar. 12, 1901. 
48Ibid., Ill, 186; Nov. 1, 1901. 
49 Ibid., IV, 1296-1297; Aug. 1, 1905. 
50 Hermann Hagedorn, Leonard. Wood: A Biography (New York: Harper 
Brothers, Publishers, 1931), II, 22-24. Weigley, pp. 327-328. 
si Letters, VI, 100-101; Apr. 10, 1908. Wood was rather unappreciative, and 
Roosevelt went into great detail about how he had countered Congressional forces; 
IV. 759; Mar. 19, 1904; IV, 820; June 8,1904; IV, 826-828; June 8, 1904. 
52 Ibid., IV, 820; June 4, 1904; IV, 827; June 8, 1904. 
53Harbord, "Roosevelt and the Army," p. 71. Richard Wormser, The Yellow Legs: 
The Story of the U. S. Cavalry (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1966), p. 
438. Roosevelt had met Pershing in Cuba—there is a photograph showing them 
together— but there is no indication that the Rough Rider ever saw the Regular in 
action. Letters, III, 517; July 14, 1903; III, 520; July 17, 1903; III, 531; July 25, 1903. 
"Carter, p. 55. "Annual Message, 1903," Works, XV, 200. 
55 Frank E. Vandiver, John J. Pershing and the Anatomy of Leadership 
(USAFA, 1963), p. 13. 
56 Letters, VI, 1000-1001; Apr. 10, 1908; VI, 1039; May 28, 1908 and note. 
57 Ib id., I, 440; Aug. 10, 1898. 
REACTIONS TO NAPOLEON S  INVASION OF EGYPT 41  
HENRY DUNDAS, INDIA, AND BRITISH REACTIONS 
TO NAPOLEON'S INVASION OF EGYPT, 1798-1801 
Edward B. Jones 
That India was the pivotal concern in British reactions to Napoleon s 
invasion of Egypt is hardly a new or startling idea. It is also well known that 
both the oversight of Britain's Indian affairs and the conduct of the renewed 
war with France from 1793 to 1801 were entrusted to the same man, Henry 
Dundas. But the precise role of Dundas in shaping the government's response 
to Napoleon's eastward thrust bears further study. His words and actions on 
this issue bespeak the strength of his belief in the fundamental importance of 
India to the nation's permanent interests and of Egypt to the security of India. 
Against apathy or opposition from colleagues who did not fully share his 
imperial perspective, including even the King on occasion, Dundas persistently 
asserted his influence from both the India and the War offices. And out of it all 
he emerges as the single most important figure in determining British policies in 
response to Napoleon's eastern adventure. 
From the outset of the younger William Pitt's first ministry Dundas was 
destined to play a key part. It was partially by his efforts that the seals of office 
were offered to Pitt in the last weeks of 1783, following the downfall of the 
notorious Fox-North coalition. Charles Fox floundered essentially because of 
the King's displeasure but it was his controversial India bill that provided the 
immediate occasion for it. And in the new Pitt ministry it was Dundas who was 
and remained the India expert without peer. He virtually wrote Pitt's India Act 
of 1784, and under its provisions as head of the governmental "Board of 
Control", supervised the East India Company's Asian affairs over the next 
seventeen years.2 He was also the political manager for Scotland and, with 
Pitt, the government's leading spokesman in the House of Commons. As Pitt's 
boon companion and drinking partner, Dundas was widely believed by 
contemporaries to have exerted an inordinate amount of influence over the 
young minister, ten years his junior. Within the administration, indeed, it was 
Dundas and Pitt together with the latter's young cousin William Grenville 
who formed an effective inner circle capable of dominating most policy 
decisions.3 
With the outbreak of hostilities with revolutionary France in 1 t9 3, Pitt 
called upon Dundas, his most trusted colleague at that point, to marshall and 
manage Britain's war effort. The national and imperial outlooks and values of 
the two men closely coincided. Their war strategy, a leaf from the great 
Chatham's book, stressed overseas commercial-imperial values over 
Continental objectives. Among their associates there was some disagreement 
about this general strategic concept and about particulars within it.4 I hes e 
basic differences and the tenacity with which Dundas held to his course 
underlie much of the discussion about the French campaign in Egypt. 
On taking up his responsibilities for Indian affairs, Dundas immediately 
moved to find out all he could about Egypt and its relevance to Britain s 
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Eastern interests. He examined papers and reports on the subject and consulted 
with a Levant expert and former resident of Egypt, George Baldwin.6 His 
study in 1784-85 confirmed him in the belief that England's vital interests 
would be threatened if Egypt should ever fall into French hands. Within the 
context of the continuing eighteenth century Anglo-French rivalry, which was 
about to run its final course, there was urgent fear that "France in possession of 
Egypt would possess the Master Key to all the trading Nations of the Earth." 
Dundas was advised that the Red Sea-Suez-Mediterranean route remained the 
potentially most efficient Eastern trade route, provided only that the Egyptian 
land link was stabilized, as only a European power could, to assure safety of 
passage. France in control of the region might well short circuit Britain's 
Eastern commercial dominance via the Cape of Good Hope. But still more 
ominous, Baldwin warned, France in Egypt could ". . . m ake it the awe of the 
Eastern World by the facility she would command of transporting her forces 
thither by Surprise in any number and at any time -- and England would hold 
her possession in India at the mercy of France.7 Baldwin's theme in 1785 was 
to be echoed repeatedly by Dundas and others over the next fifteen years. 
Up to the end of 1787 British diplomats in Paris continued to provide 
persuasive documentation of French designs on Egypt and on possible routes to 
India by way of Mesopotamia. The ultimate objective was believed to be the 
subversion of British interests in the East.8 Nevertheless, the best Dundas 
could do was to have George Baldwin dispatched to Cairo in 1786 as British 
Consul. He was instructed to set up regular lines of communication with India, 
as a security measure, and to observe and report on French activities in the 
region.9 Apparently that was as much as the Cabinet would support at that 
point and some thought even that was of dubious value. Some years later, after 
the early rounds of revolution in France, Grenville at the Foreign Office 
inquired of Dundas if Baldwin's mission in Cairo was worth the expense of his 
annual salary.10 
Even after the outbreak of War in 1793, Lord Spencer at the Admiralty 
and Grenville, among others in the Ministry, remained skeptical that the 
French could or would attempt a thrust at India by way of Egypt or 
Mesopotamia. The idea of such a move seemed to them too fanciful to be 
credible.11 Their incredulity persisted despite a series of warnings from 
normally reliable sources. In January, 1795, Sir W. Sidney Smith, a naval 
officer with experience in the Levant, wrote directly to Grenville warning that a 
French move on Egypt might come shortly and expressing deep apprehension 
especially for British commercial interests. He pointed out that the French had 
long contemplated establishing themselves in that region for commercial and 
strategic reasons, that they were thoroughly familiar with conditions there, and 
that circumstances within the Ottoman Empire would make Egypt an easy 
prey. Within the context of the war, declared Smith, a French expedition to 
Egypt would enable them to create a diversion to draw off Austrian forces, and 
". . . our Turkey trade, already at its last effort, will be totally transferred to the 
hands of the French." Still more serious, according to Smith, a French 
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establishment in Egypt would enable them to realize their enduring ambition to 
direct the India trade back into its ancient channel via Egypt and the Red Sea, 
reducing the British share to the level of their own consumption. He contended 
that trade had shifted from the old route to the more circuitous Cape passage 
only because Portuguese naval power under Albuquerque had destroyed Arab 
competitors and that nothing but the internal disorder of the Turkish Empire 
had prevented its shifting back to the more direct route. He suggested the 
immediate destruction of French naval power in the eastern Mediterranean to 
prevent their movement into Egypt.12 Smith did not specifically mention the 
prospect of France's using Egypt as a base for military and naval operations 
against India. But a few months later, the French consul in Egypt was 
recommending to his superiors an assault on Egypt with just such an object in 
view. W ith French mastery of the Bed Sea area, he asserted, 
.. .we should not be long in giving the law to the 
English and in ousting them from India ... by 
way of Suez, during the favorable monsoon, a 
quantity of troops could be transported to India 
with few vessels. Our soldiers would not need to 
be on the sea more than sixty days, instead of. 
by way of the Cape of Good Hope, a matter of 
six months. By way of Suez we should not lose 
one man in a hundred; by the other way, we 
should be verv fortunate not to lose ten per 
* 13 cent. 
Earlv in 1796 William Wickham, the British agent in Switzerland working 
under Grenville's authority, reported that a French mission had recently been 
dispatched to the I man of Muscat, near the mouth of the Persian Gulf. The 
objective was to establish a more regular communication between France and 
the East Indies and to disrupt British communications, by conniving with the 
local princes. He believed this was part of their general scheme for undermining 
British power in India, which also included alliances with Indian native 
powers1.4 Later in the year he warned Grenville that ". . . the projects of the 
enemy in the Mediterranean and the Levant are again vast and dangerous, and 
that everything will be put in practice to extend them to the Red Sea and the 
Persian Gulph." While Wickham saw a connection between these French 
activities and their efforts to secure alliances with native powers in I ndia, he did 
not venture to suggest that a French force might move directly from the Middle 
East to India. 5 
Wickham's warning came shortly after British naval forces had been 
withdrawn from the Mediterranean as a result of Spain's entry into the war as 
an ally of France. Dundas castigated his Admiralty colleague. Lord Spencer, 
for abandoning this vital area. He declared that such a move meant giving up 
all connection with the countries bordering on the Mediteranean, including the 
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whole of southern Europe. He wanted Spencer to reduce the naval complement 
in the English Channel and the North Sea in order to provide the force 
necessary to hold the Mediterranean, which he considered more important than 
either Trinidad or the project he had contemplated in the Pacific.16 His failure 
to mention the exposure of E,gypt and the Levant to a French invasion as a 
result of the withdrawal of British naval forces from the Mediterranean was 
probably deliberate, as he sought to persuade his colleague to reverse his policy. 
He emphasized the importance of southern Europe, expecting this to carry 
more weight with Spencer, who thought the idea of a French move against 
India via the Levant or Egypt was visionary and too improbable to be taken 
seriously.17 
By the middle of April, 1798, Grenville received an intelligence item from 
a reliable agent in Italy indicating definitely that a French expedition was being 
assembled in her Mediterranean ports. The agent believed that the force under 
the command of General Bonaparte would land in Egypt, but ". . . the Blow is 
meant against the East India Company's power in India," and if not 
frustrated" . . . the consequences may be fatal." Whether the French proceeded 
with an immediate assault on India after securing Egypt, or decided to delay it 
until later, their presence in Alexandria, Cairo, and Suez, would place India in 
perpetual jeopardy. Grenville's informant also mentioned the possibility tiiat 
Napoleon's forces might move toward the Black Sea area, with the consent of 
the Ottoman Porte, but the ultimate objective would still be India.18 At about 
the same time this opinion was being dispatched, another writer, probably 
Captain John Blankett, emphasized the commercial importance of Egypt to 
France. He thought Cairo was a natural mart joining Europe to Africa and 
Asia. France, he believed, undoubtedly expected to restore the commerce with 
India and China via the Red Sea route. It would be on a scale far in excess of 
that in the Venetian-Arab heyday, since the British and others had greatly 
expanded the demand for Eastern goods in Europe in the intervening 
decades.19 Within a few days Dundas wrote to Spencer commenting on a paper 
of Captain Blankett on Egypt, "... a subject," said Dundas, "I have long 
considered and think myself tolerably master of. People are so little accustomed 
to look to contingencies so very remote that I have never made it the subject of 
separate discussion." Had it not been for this and all the other demands on 
British naval forces, he declared, 
. . .  I  s h o u l d  l o n g  s i n c e  h a v e  e n d e a v o u r e d  t o  
draw the attention of Government to the 
propriety of getting into the possession of Egypt 
... If any great European Power shall ever get 
possession of . . . (Egypt), the keeping it will 
cost them nothing, and that country . . . will in 
my opinion be possessed of the master key to all 
the commerce of the world.20 
Spencer refused to take Dundas' warning seriously. He mentioned it in a 
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dispatch to Peter Rainier, on station in the Indian Ocean, but remarked that he 
would not have written on that subject if he had not been sending out a dispatch 
anyway.21 From later remarks of Dundas and others, it is evident that 
Grenville also thought the idea of France's moving against India through the 
Middle East was too fantastic to be taken seriously.22 
Early in June, 1798, British officials learned that the French expedition 
had sailed and that its destination was in the eastern Mediterranean. One 
greatly exaggerated report indicated that Napoleon had 40,000 elite troops 
and, assured of support from native powers enroute, he planned to secure 
Egypt, cross Arabia and Persia, and join forces with Indian border princes and 
with Tipu Sultan.23 Dundas was alarmed. "... I have ever since my connection 
with the administration of India (began),"' he wrote to Grenville on 13 June, 
"been at great pains to collect information by every means, and have long made 
up my mind to a Conviction that the possession of Egypt by any great 
European Power would be a fatal circumstance to the Intersts of this Country . 
. ." he discussed in considerable detail the routes Napoleon might contemplate 
between Egypt and India, and in equal detail he listed the countermeasures he 
considered necessary to thwart French plans. Dundas believed that ". . . the 
Possession of Egypt has been long a favorite object both with the old and new 
French Governments, and was always considered by them as the most obvious 
means of undermining the British Power in India . . ." Yet, said Dundas, even 
if t he French should rest content with only the conquest of Egypt. "... without 
extending their views further at present, I should think they had performed the 
most masterly stroke they have ever done for their future aggrandisement in 
power and in wealth."24 Dimdas placed some hope in the belated detachment 
of Captain Horatio Nelson's squadron to attempt an interception of the French 
force before it could land in Egypt, but he felt it was essential to act on the 
assumption that Nelson would fail. "... I am free to confess," he wrote to 
Spencer, "that I feel an anxiety I never experienced in public life before. 
This was no exaggeration. He had never been so agitated. 
The prospect of an enemy thrust into Egypt was seen by Dundas against 
the background of the political situation in India itself. As he reminded 
Grenville in June 1798, 
. . .  w e  a r e  a n  u p s t a r t  p o w e r  ( i n  I n d i a )  a n d  o u r  
Dominion there is established on the foundation 
of the Conquests or Cessions made to us by a 
variety of Native Powers; It is impossible to 
suppose that they do not feel uneasy under such 
Circumstances and therefore a more easy prey 
to the Representations, Seductions, and 
Intrique of another power who comes in the 
plausible form of offering to deliver them from 
English Bondage without desiring any 
recompence in return .. .26 
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Dundas had long been convinced that no individual or combination of native 
princes posed a lethal threat to Britain's power in India. What he did fear was a 
combination of Indian powers in league with the French.27 Thus in June, 
1798, as news of the French move on Egypt came in, Dundas dispatched 
instructions to Lord Wellesley, the recently arrived Governor-Gerneral of India. 
His concern was with a perennial antagonist. Tipu Sultan of Mysore, and the 
Afghan ruler Zeman Shah. Evidence of French support of Tipu had been 
mounting. Dundas sent Wellesley a copy of a proclamation by the governor of 
Mauritius offering the Mysore ruler a French alliance. If the document was 
authentic, he assumed, ". . . we are probably by this time at war with Tipu 
Sultan." If the refractory Sultan should claim he had not authorized the use of 
his name Dundas wanted more than a half-hearted denial. Should you not 
receive a full and sincere disavowal, he instructed Wellesley, ". . . when you 
think it the proper moment for doing so, bring him to an explanation in the only 
way such conduct merits." 28 While the imperial pretensions of Wellesley leave 
no doubt of his own aggressive designs in South India it is equally clear that 
Dundas' instructions were intended as a defensive response to this latest French 
menace to India, by way of Egypt and the Red Sea.29 
At the same time Dundas was busy with other measures to counter the 
French thrust. He urged Dud Spencer to station a naval squadron at the mouth 
of the Red Sea. Writing at an early morning hour, Dundas confessed that 
"India has occupied mv thoughts all night." The decision which he pressed 
upon his colleague, Dundas declared, "... is upon the first stake of the Empire, 
the fact of which may turn upon an hour ... It is impossible that any other 
service can be equally pressing, nor is there another on which so much may 
turn."30 
So critical did Dundas consider the crisis that he immediately ordered 
1,500 troops to be sent from the Cape of Good Hope to India. In view of his 
sentiment concerning the importance of the Cape . . to the permanent and 
essential interests of this country in India." he wrote to Governor Macartney. ". 
. . nothing but the circumstances which appear more immediately to threaten 
those interests, could have induced me..." to detach troops from the Cape.31 
Other reinforcements for India were taken from British regiments in Gibraltar 
and in Portugal, and Dundas sent detailed instructions to Wellesley on 
emergency measure to he taken in India.32 An agent named Harford Jones was 
appointed to the Court of the Bacha of Baghdad ". . . for the special purpose of 
prevailing if possible, on His High ness, should the French direct their views to 
India, either over the Desert or by the Red Sea. to counteract and oppose them 
by every means in his power ..." Significantly Jones was to be an agent of the 
East India Company and was authorized to draw on Bombay for expenses. 33 
His mission was partly based on the supposition that the French might land in 
Syria instead of Egypt, or that they might attempt to follow the route of 
Alexander the Great through Syria.34 Meanw hile William Wickham reported 
that the French mission to Muscat, having been delayed, was finally dispatched 
early in 1 798.35 Captain Blankett, about to embark for the Arabian Sea, was 
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instructed to investigate French activities in that region as well as at the mouth 
of the Red Sea.36 
Dundas directed his attention first to halting the progress of Napoleon's 
forces and then to expelling them from Egypt. He hoped for favorable news 
from Nelson but, he declared "... neither that nor any other success will 
compensate to the country . . . for the misfortune it has undergone by the 
French with a large army getting possession of Egypt. The circumstance haunts 
me night and day . . ." He insisted that the Admiralty take sufficient action to 
prevent the reinforcement of Bonaparte's troops in Egypt. Yet he feared that 
the incredulity of his colleagues on the subject of France's ultimate designs on 
India might frustrate effective action.37 He bitterly complained of Grenville s 
having refused to send an agent to Russia to warn that country, and to concert 
with it, against the possibility of Napoleon's moving toward the Black Sea. The 
fact was, said Dundas, that Grenville believed Napoleon would remain in 
Egypt at least for a while and that a mission to Russia was unnecessary. In 
(the(future, "he declared, "if other Departments will not concur with me in 
such measure as I think necessary for the successful execution of my Duty, I 
must be positive on the subject, and act by agents of my own. He gave instruct-
tions to send a qualified agent to Russia. "...He shall be sent by myself without 
regard to the opinions of any other department. The expense of the mission 
would be paid by the East India Company.38 Despite Spencer s assurance that 
his colleagues, including even Grenville, had generally accepted his view that 
the French in Egypt were a grave threat to British India,39 Dundas continued 
to blame the incredulity of his associates for the sad state of affairs regarding 
Egypt. 
News of Nelson's victory off Alexandria, which arrived in England late in 
September, eased Dundas' pain somewhat. He hoped that it was sufficiently 
decisive to put ". . . us on velvet in the Mediterranean, and indeed every where 
in Europe; but alas! it comes too late for India.' Considering how much better 
the news might have been if his associates had heeded his advice to take action 
sooner, Dundas concluded in a fit of anguish, "I must close the subject, for it 
almost drives me mad to think of it. "The objective after Nelson s victory was 
to prevent the French from supplying or reinforcing their army in Egypt and to 
forestall any attempts by that force to move toward India.'" By late December, 
1798. Dundas believed that India was reasonably safe from any action by 
French troops in Egypt.43 
It was late in 1798 when Dundas first broached, gingerly, the subject of 
expelling French troops from Egypt by force. Several people, he informed 
Grenville, had mentioned such a project to him, but he had set it aside because 
of the expense it would entail. He had even mentioned it cursorily at a Cabinet 
on a recent occasion. With these preliminary remarks, Dundas revealed that lie 
had decided to dispatch one Colonel Maitland to the Red Sea area w ith a credit 
of LI 0.000 or LI 5,000 to investigate the feasibility of an attack on Napoleon s 
army. He was particularly anxious to know if an assault from India would be 
practicable.44 By October, 1799, Dundas believed it was then impossible for 
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Bonaparte to do much in Egypt. "If however he should not soon die out of 
himself, and by the force of the country itself, it may be right to give him some 
help by sending a force from the Mediterranean for that purpose." 45 
By September, 1800, it was clear to Dundas that France must be expelled 
from Egypt as quickly as possible. A scheme to allow the French force to leave 
Egypt voluntarily and to return to France had been repudiated by the British 
cabinet earlier that year. At that time it was thought preferable to leave the 
French force in the unfriendly climate of Egypt rather than permit its return to 
Europe to fight against Britain's allies. Dundas, having been absent in Scotland 
when that decision was made, had always doubted its wisdom.46 In September, 
however, sentiment for negotiating a peace arrangement with France was rising 
both within and outside the Cabinet. Dundas was convinced that in any 
negotiation with France Egypt would be the key issue. Great Britain, he 
assured the King, would negotiate under infinite disadvantage if France 
remained in possession of Egypt. ". . . From the most recent communications 
which have taken place." wrote Dundas, 
there seems to be no doubt . . . that the French 
put more value upon retaining the possession of 
Egypt than they do upon recovering any of the 
possessions taken from them ... in the course of 
the war. Mr. Dundas personally never 
entertained a doubt that the French would 
make a good bargain if they allow Great Britain 
to attain all its conquests, provided they were 
allowed to consolidate their power in Egypt.. .4/ 
If France were permitted to hold Egypt on conclusion of peace, Dundas warned 
Pitt, the threat to British India would be more formidable than ever. France 
could accumulate forces there in such strength as she chose; she could then 
launch an assault across the relatively short expanse of the Arabian Sea without 
warning and at her convenience.48 Because of the public clamor for peace, 
England would not have the option, said Dundas, of breaking off peace 
negotiations if France refused to evacuate Egypt. Thus, he asserted, it was 
essential to get an expedition to the coasts of Egypt as quickly as possible. Even 
if the force could only get as far as Rhodes or Cyprus before peace was 
concluded, it would indicate that the French claims to Egypt were not 
undisputed.49 
George III did not actually reject Dundas* idea of invading Egypt, but he 
believed Portugal should be relieved and that the Minorca and the Gilbraltar 
garrisons should be augmented before an expedition to Egypt was considered. 
He thought 5,000 men would be adequate for the Egyptian campaign,50 
whereas Dundas called for three times that number. Despite the King's 
sentiment, his war minister proposed to the Cabinet that an army of 15,000 
men be dispatched to Egypt, which "... not for obvious reasons ... is the object 
most important. . ." to the true interests of Great Britain.51 The Cabinet 
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adopted Dundas' proposal on the ground "that it is of the utmost importance 
that the French should not be allowed to avail themselved of the Possession of 
Egypt in any Negotiation that may take place between this Country and France 
. . ." The troops were authorized, and General Sir Ralph Abercromby was 
designated to command the operation. Both Grenville and Windham recorded 
their dissent from the Cabinet's resolution. The King was not surprised at their 
dissent. "I confess," he wrote to Dundas, "It is with the greatest reluctance I 
consent to the proposed disposal of troops in the Mediterranean by sending 
15,000 of them ... to Egypt . . ." He feared disastrous results analogous to 
those in the unhealthy environs of the earlier campaign in St. Domingo.53 
Although he regretted that the King's consent was only reluctantly given, 
Dundas persisted in the pursuit of his scheme, professedly out of a deep sense of 
duty. "Every day tends more to convince.. .(me)," he informed the King, "that 
ipon the Success of that measure must depend the permanency of the best 
Interests of Your Majesty's Dominions."54 Time was now an urgent factor, he 
impatiently reminded Windham, as ". . . six weeks of the best time of the year 
was lost in Cabinet deliberations, which I submit to, as I suppose it is a 
necessary Evil, but it tells always . . . against the person who happens to hold 
the pen on such occasions." 55 
Having secured his point, Dundas quickly began dispatching orders for 
what he doubtless considered one of the most important undertakings of his 
career. In early October, 1800, strategically situated Malta was captured as 
part of the British move on Egypt.56 Sir Ralph Abercromby, commanding the 
main expeditionary force, was orderd to attack Alexandria and the adjacent 
region and to co-operate with a Turkish force already assembling in Syria. 
Captain Home Popham's squadron, taking aboard a British regiment at the 
Cape of Good Hope, was dispatched to the Red Sea. Abercromby was expected 
to land at his assigned destination in December, 1800, while Popham would 
arrive in the Gulf of Aden in February, 1801. Dundas ordered Wellesley and" 
the governors of Madras and Bombay to dispatch 1,000 Europeans and 2,000 
Sepoy infantry to rendevous with Popham at Mocha as soon after his arrival as 
possible.57 
Contemporaries widely credited Dundas with the conception and 
successful execution of the British campaign in the Levant in 1801. Even those 
who had earlier opposed him were lavish in their acclaim. I he King reportedly 
drank a toast to the man "who proposed and carried into execution the 
expedition to Egypt, for in my opionion, when a person has been perfectly in the 
wrong, the most just and honourable thing for him to do is to acknowledge it 
publicly." 58 Some historians have been less kind. Holden Furber concluded, 
along with J. W. Fortescue, that the expedition's success was due less to 
Dundas than to the gallantry of Sir Ralph Abercromby and the blunders of the 
French commander.59 Whatever the facts may be about the soundness of 
conception and implementation of the expedition, it is clear that it would not 
have taken place at all at this juncture without the vigorous exertions of 
Dundas. His design was to assure that France would not be left with an 
50  THE SOUT H CAROLINA HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION 
uncontested claim to Egypt if and when peace broke out. From that 
standpoint his efforts seem to have been highly successful. The French were 
duly ousted from Egypt and, more importantly, from the bastian of Malta. 
Dundas foresaw that, with Malta in British hands, the entire eastern 
Mediterranean would be protected from any future French menace and Indian 
security would be correspondingly enhanced. 
Yet, prospects for his strategic designs in the Mediterrane ,n were abruptly 
altered in the early months of 1801, while the Egyptian campaign was still in 
progress. The Pitt ministry floundered over the issue of Irish Catholic 
emancipation,60 and a new government led by Henry Addington took up the 
seals of office. Supported by Pitt and others from the former ministry, the 
Addingtonites prepared to respond to the public clamor for peace. But, in doing 
so, they effectively ignored Dundas' designs in the Levant and the strategic 
concepts underlying them. Almost alone among the important veterans of his 
late ministry, Pitt supported Addington's peace terms. J hey provided that 
Britain should retain two captured possessions, Ceylon and Trinidad. The 
Cape of Good Hope was to be restord to the Dutch and turned into a free port. 
Malta was to be returned to the Order of the Knights of St. John and to be 
independent of both France and Britain while Egypt would be restored to tbe 
Ottoman Porte. "On the whole," wrote Pitt,"I see nothing very materially to 
regret but the loss of the Cape; and even important as that is, I think the terms 
may be considered as on the whole highly creditable, and, with respect to both 
the East and West Indies, very advantageous.'* Most of the former associates 
Pitt consulted strongly opposed the peace proposal. They were unanimous in 
deploring the relinquishment of the Cape and Grenville, Lord Mulgrave, and 
Lord Camden joined Dundas in insisting upon the importance of Malta or 
Egypt to the future security of Britain's Eastern interests.62 Dundas had 
assumed that Malta and the Cape, along with Trinidad and Ceylon would be 
sine qua non in the projected peace. He saw Malta as the means by which the 
Levant, and therefore India, could be insulated from future French threats 
without incurring the expense of a permanent British occupation of Egypt. . . 
I had never allowed myself even to suspect the abandonment of the Cape and 
Malta...," he wrote to Grenville. "By giving up the Cape we have given up one 
of the essential points of security to India; and we have done even worse by 
giving up Malta, for we have abandoned Egypt to a future danger from France 
. . ." He could see no reason why either Egypt or Malta should have been 
subject to the treaty in view of the complete success of British arms in both 
places. Dundas expressed a deep sense of gloom, both to Grenville and to Pitt, 
about ". . . the calamitous consequences . . ." which he foresaw resulting from 
the settlement. His best consolation, he lamented, was that at his age he may 
not live to witness it all.63 
Dundas' vision of ultimate calamity was not vindicated by events after 
1801. Yet the soundness of his assumptions about the strategic significance of a 
French force in Egypt is not thereby discredited. One can only speculate on 
what might have developed if the French had been left in Egypt by the Amiens 
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settlement. Whatever misgivings Dundas had over Britain's failure to retain 
Mala, he had assured the French exodus from Egypt. And he had done so 
against formidable opposition. 
Even at the outset of his tenure as unofficial minister for India, Dundas 
clearly perceived the potential of a French presence in Egypt in relation to 
Britain s interests in India and beyond. By his account, only the prevailing 
incredulity and consequent apathy of his colleagues restrained him from taking 
early actions to thwart a potential French eastward move. Yet it is doubtful 
what actions he could or would have taken before 1793, beyond sending an 
agent to Cairo as he did. He did strongly oppose the withdrawal of British 
naval forces from the Mediterranean in 1796. When hard evidence of a 
projected French expedition to Egypt was first received in April 1798, he 
clamored for immediate countermeasures while other key figures such as Lord 
Spencer refused to take the reports seriously. 
News of Napoleon s successful landing in the Nile region brought Henry 
Dundas nearer to abject panic than any other event in his public career. By 
nature and by years of political seasoning he was not easily ruffled and there 
can be no doubt that his anguish on this occasion was genuine and deep. Yet, 
with the belated support of his Cabinet colleagues, he moved with cool 
efficiency to counter any contingencies he could anticipate growing out of the 
French expedition. Once it was clear that the French force was isolated «and 
incapable of expansion beyond the immediate area Dundas was again at ease. 
So he remained, guardedly, until he perceived a renewed threat in the fall of 
1800 with the prospect of a French force being left in Egypt on the outbreak of 
peace. 
Dundas consistently regarded a French presence in the Levant in terms of 
the security of Britain's Eastern interest. As a war minister with a long and 
dedicated preoccupation with India, his strategic perspective was probably 
unique. This explains his extreme and quite uncharacteristic agitation over this 
issue while none of his cabinet associates showed comparable concern. Dundas' 
vexation with skeptical colleagues and his persistance in pursuit of his strategy, 
even in the face of royal displeasure, reflect the intensity of his feelings on the 
subject. Moreover his difference with several colleagues over Egypt and the 
Mediterranean is part of a more fundamental divergence of opinion on Britain's 
general war strategy and objectives. William W indham, conspicuously, and 
others to a lesser extent, stressed a continental strategy and called for British 
efforts to restore the Old Regime in France!4Dundas, supported by Pitt and 
most of their colleagues, opposed undue involvement in Europe while divesting 
the enemy of their overseas possessions which could be made useful to Britain's 
vital interests. In July, 1800, Dundas proposed expeditions to capture some of 
the island bases yet remaining to France as a 
. . .  m e a n s  o f  s t r e n g t h e n i n g  o u r s e l v e s  o r  w e a k i n g  
our Enemies ... It was by the direction of our 
force at the early period of the war to the 
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annihilation of the Colonial and Commercial 
Resources of the Enemy, that we have been able 
during the later period of it, to maintain our 
own preeminence and administer so bountifully 
to the necessities of others.65 
With this conception of national interests combined with his peculiar India 
orientation Dundas, more than his associates, viewed a French presence in 
Egypt as a potentially lethal threat to British interest in India. And the complex 
of commercial-imperial interests centered in India were of foremost importance 
in his scheme of relative imperial values. Thus his actions in response to the 
French menace in Egypt were vigorous and pivotal. He did not prevent the 
initial landing but he played a key role in neutralizing it. He keenly feared the 
consequence of Britian's relinquishment of Malta at the Peace of Amien but his 
earlier exertions had played a decisive part in liquidating the French presence 
in Egypt and thus enhancing British security in India. 
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THE MOTIVATIONAL UNDERPINNINGS 
OF THE 
BRITISH EXPLORATION OF EAST AFRICA 
For centuries men had marvelled at the mighty river which traced a 
verdant strip through the Egyptian desert and wondered where its life-giving 
waters originated. Yet in mid-nineteenth century the source of the Nile 
remained as shrouded in mystery as it had been when the Roman poet Lucan 
wrote: 
Yet still no views have urged my ardour more 
Than Nile's remotest mountains to explore. 
Lucan, The Civil War. 
It was, as the eminent explorer and Africanist Sir Harry Johnston later stated, 
"the greatest geographical secret after the discovery of America." 1 
In 1856, two English explorers, John Speke and Richard Burton, entered 
the intralacustrine regions of East Africa in search of the legendary "Mountains 
of the Moon" and a solution to this ancient enigma.7 Through a combination 
of fortuitous circumstances, tenacious work and prescient intuition, Speke 
discovered Lake Victoria, which ultimately proved to be the legendary 
well-spring of the Nile. Speke's revelation and the excitement and controversy it 
engendered captured the imagination of his countrymen, and two generations 
of British explorers following in his footsteps virtually completed the 
geographical conquest of Africa. The combined activities of these men formed a 
key constituent ingredient in contributing to knowledge of and molding opinion 
on the "dark continent.'" They provided a frame of reference within which the 
early participants in the "scramble" for Africa worked, and the explorers' 
functions in this capacity leave little doubt that they were precursors of 
imperialism. In light of these considerations, it is apparent that if the explorers' 
activities are to be studied in the proper context, some awareness of why they 
initially were drawn to Africa is essential. The purpose of this paper is to 
provide such an analysis by focusing on the motivational factors which 
underlay the explorers' African endeavors.3 
The careers of ten individuals form the basis of this study. All thought 
themselves explorers, although the distinctions between explorer, missionary, 
adventurer, and similar categorizations are not always readily discernible. The 
men vary considerably in accomplishment and present-day renown, but 
collectively they epitomize the exploration factor in East and Central Africa. 
They are, in addition to Burton and Speke, John Petherick, James Grant, 
Samuel Baker, Verney Cameron, Henry Stanley, James Elton, Joseph 
Thomson, and Harry Johnston. With the obvious exception of David 
Livingstone, who better fits the mold of missionary than that of explorer, this 
group represents the bulk of British discoveries in East Africa during the years 
1856 to 1890.4 
To a man, the explorers were tinged by the adventurous romanticism 
which attaches itself to subjects that capture the popular imagination. Exploits 
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in unknown or perilous regions always have attracted such fancies, and an 
intense desire to discover the origin of the mighty stream which had made 
Egypt its gift was a thought which loomed large in the minds of all the early 
British explorers of the East African hinterland. One of the goals expressed by 
the doyens of the Royal Geographical Society, who supported the researches of 
Burton and Speke, was that the expedition m(ight) lead to the solution of that 
great geographical problem, the determination of the sources of the White 
Nile." 5 Furthermore, visions of discovering the Nile's fabled "Coy 
Fountains had been implanted ineffaceably in the minds of both Burton and 
Speke. 6 
As early as 1853, Burton's fertile imagination had been stirred by a 
conversation with the German missionary, Johann Krapf, regarding "The 
White Nile, Killamanjaro (sic) and (the) Mts. of the Moon." He invidiously 
characterized the missionary as reminding "one of a de Lunatico," yet Burton's 
skepticism did not deter him from questioning Krapf extensively on "what has 
been done and what remains to be done." 7 By February, 1855, Burton was 
positively enamored of the Nile sources. He wrote to Norton Shaw, the 
secretary of the Royal Geographical Society: "Privately and 'entre nous,' I 
want to settle the question of Krapf and (the) 'eternal snows.' There is little 
doubt of the White Nile being there abouts." 8 
Speke s interest in the Nile's headwaters, although obscure as to origin, 
was even more pronounced in its single-mindedness than Burton's. The subject 
became a consuming passion with Speke, whom a contemporary described as 
'the most determined dare-devil possible," and in mid-1857 he candidly 
admitted: "I feel myself practically bedded with, and instinctively impelled on 
to the prosecution of geographical research, the same way as formerly the 
attainment of sport was the culminating point of my ambition." 9 Thus both 
men, in the words of Burton s wife, "pined for the honour of discovering the 
sources of the Nile." 10 
A murderous native attack in Somaliland aborted the explorers' first 
footsteps toward the Nile, but following an interlude in which both men served 
in the Crimean W ar, Burton "again turned lovingly to Africa. . . resolved to 
renew (his) original design of reaching the unknown regions and of striking the 
Nile sources via the eastern coast." Inasmuch as Speke had suffered with him 
"in purse and person" in his earlier attempt to penetrate Africa, Burton invited 
him to accompany the new expedition. The story of their ensuing journey, 
culminating in great discoveries but also irreconcilable differences between the 
two, is a familiar one. 
After struggling to overcome inadequate resources, debilitating sickness 
and the recalcitrance of the natives, Burton and Speke reached Lake 
1 anganyika. Burton belived this was their goal, "the reputed Lake of 
Nyassa, but Speke thought otherwise.11 En route he had garnered 
information concerning a second lake, "described by the Arabs to be both 
broader and longer than the Tanganyika. . . which they call Ukerewe," that he 
was "burning to see." 12 Speke resolutely insisted on exploring this second lake 
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in order to fulfill the Royal Geographical Society's instructions to the letter, but 
overriding this sanctimoniously expressed sense of duty was, as Speke later 
admitted, an intense personal desire "to carry out my long-cherished hopes of 
discovering the sources of the Nile.''13 Burton, exasperated by Speke's 
persistence and happy "to get rid of him!," granted his subordinate permission 
to push onward alone to this second inland sea. He was thereby "betrayed into 
the greatest mistake of his life." 14 
Speke made a rapid and relatively trouble-free march to the lake, and on 
August 3, 1858, he sighted a vast expanse of water which he intuitively 
concluded was the source of the Nile: "I no longer felt any doubt that the lake 
at my feet gave birth to that interesting river, the source of which has been the 
subject of so much speculation, and the object of so many explorers." 15 Burton 
scoffed at Speke's claims and likened his conclusions to those advanced by 
Lucetta to justify her preference for Sir Proteus: "I have no other but a 
woman's reason—I think him so because I think him so."16 Such caustic 
sentiments were wasted on Speke, who had become so engrossed by the Nile's 
sources that his convictions superseded all doubts. Burton, for his part, became 
increasingly disconsolate in the face of Speke's irrepresible ebullience, and 
when the two explorers finally returned to England, the seething controversy 
burst wide open. 
The debate that ensued was acrimonious and unedifying, and it 
culminated in tragedy with Speke's unfortunate death in a hunting accident 
followed by Burton's thinly veiled hints that it had been suicide. Yet it 
demonstrates the extent to which the two men, once the best of friends, had 
succumbed to the Nile's spell. Furthermore, many uncertainties concerning the 
exact nature of Nile geography remained even after Speke had made yet 
another journey to the lake he named Victoria, after his sovereign. These 
ambiguities naturally were seized upon by armchair geographers, and this 
factor, together with the attention focused on the Nile by the public airing of the 
differences between Burton and Speke, soon attracted other adventurers. 
Speke's anxiety to visit the lake a second time was acute, as he candidly 
admitted: "I felt as much tantalised as the unhappy Tantalus must have been 
when unsuccessful in his bobbings for cherries in the cherry-orchard, and as 
much grieved as any mother would be at losing her first-born, and resolved and 
planned forthwith to do everything in my power to visit the lake again." As 
his companion for this journey he chose James Grant, a Scot of the "highest 
personal courage and perseverance" whose adventurous character made him a 
likely candidate to succumb to the Nile's spell. While he never experienced the 
same degree of emotional fervor which motivated Speke, Grant rejoiced at his 
opportunity to participate in the search "to determine the locality whence the 
head waters of the White Nile take their rise." 18 
Eventually two other explorers, John Petherick and Samuel Baker, also 
were involved in the Speke-Grant Expedition. Petherick, a hulking man "like a 
rampant hippopotamus" who Lord John Russell characterized as having "a 
wild Arab sort of manner, fitter for those districts (the interior of Africa) than 
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St. James's Street," was involved in the expedition for primarily economic 
reasons. Yet despite his remarkable rapaccity he shared Speke's eagerness "for 
ripping open Africa together." 19 Petherick, accompanied by his recent bride, 
was to lead an auxiliary expedition up the Nile, with the primary purpose of 
effecting a meeting with and succouring Speke and Grant on their voyage down 
river from Lake Victoria. However, he privately informed his brother-in-law of 
an ambition to "explore . . . (the) source ... of that mighty River," and in a 
published prospectus soliciting support for his endeavor, Petherick openly 
stated that "sixteen years' experience on the Nile, and the brilliant examples of 
illustrious countrymen," had instilled him with "the desire and ambition" to 
assist "in the discovery of the sources of the Nile." Thus even the shrewd, 
materialistic mind of Petherick was captivated by the glamor and romance 
associated with the search for the Nile.20 
For Samuel Baker, a close friend of Speke's, the reported discovery of 
Lake V ictoria and its supposed connection with the Nile must have acted as a 
stimulant as well as coming as something of a shock. From a series of letters 
Baker wrote to the Royal Geographical Society in 1858, it is clear that he 
already had begun to consider approaching the area from the south, and from 
that point onward one senses a gradual encroachment finally reaching the point 
of preoccupation of the Nile sources in Baker's mind.21 He acknowledges as 
much in an 1861 letter to his sister in which he states: "For some time past I 
have cherished a secret determination to make a trip into the Unknown. . . ever 
pushing for the high ranges from which the Nile is supposed to derive its 
sources." Following the departure of Speke and Grant for Africa, Baker 
decided to organize his own expedition. By this time the lure of Africa had 
become so great that he confided to a family member his resolve that "nothing 
but death shall prevent me from discovering the sources of the Nile." 22 
Stanley, the last explorer to be significantly involved in the problem of the 
Nile's sources, deviated somewhat from the norm established by his 
forerunners. He was, according to Francis Galton, who knew many of the 
explorers intimately, "essentially a journalist aiming at producing sensational 
articles." Nonetheless, his intercourse with Dr. Livingstone had imbued him 
with lasting geographical ambitions, and news of the great missionary's death 
fired Stanley "with a resolution to complete his work, to be, if God willed it, the 
next martyr to geographical science, or, if my life was to be spared, to clean up 
not only the secrets of the Great River throughout its course, but also all that 
remained still problematical and incomplete of the discoveries of Burton and 
Speke, and Speke and Grant." Ultimately Stanley was to avoid the suicidally 
oriented plan first proffered and to succeed gloriously in its alternative. 
It required two decades for explorers to completely corroborate the 
correctness of Speke's solution to "the Matterhorn of the RGS, the grandest 
feat and the longest delayed." In the interim, the charismatic influence of 
Africa created heated rivalries, sometimes accompanied by personal rancor, 
and the attraction of the continent's geographical mysteries was a major 
motivating factor for all of the first generation of British explorers in central 
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Africa. "Chinese" Gordon may have declared, while serving the Egyptian 
Khedive in the Sudan: "I do not care whether there are two lakes or a million, 
or whether the Nile has a source or not." 24 Yet for Burton, Speke, Grant, 
Petherick, Baker and Stanley, the appropriately styled "Coy Fountains" of the 
Nile had an effect not unlike that the Sirens exercised on Odysseus. , 
The fascination surrounding the quest for the Nile's sources and the 
controversy which was an outgrowth of this search was but one aspect of a 
broader phenomenon which affected all the explorers under consideration. The 
alluring enticement of Africa attracted them in the same way their colorful 
beads and gaudy cloths attracted the natives. Africa's magnetism extended 
beyond the narrow if intriguing confines of a single geographical mystery and 
contemporary commentators were fully cognizant of this fact. Laurence 
Oliphant captures the essence of the matter when he writes of the explorers: 
"The object which has impelled these gentlemen to place themselves in these 
various attitudes of discomfort and danger, has, in the majority of cases been 
simply,' the fun of the thing'—a love of adventure."25 Even the cynical Burton 
admitted: 
The theme (African travel) has remoteness and 
obscurity of place, difference of custom, 
marvellousness of hearsay; events passing 
strange yet credible, sometimes barbaric 
splendour, generally luxuriance of nature, 
savage life, personal danger and suffering 
always borne. . . with patience, dignity, and 
even enthusiasm.26 
In a word, a true aura of romanticism surrounded exploration. 
Afromania was a disease defying rational explanation. The seemingly 
irresistible impulses which motivated men to search initially for the Nile 
continued unabated. Baker found himself "made up of queer materials, averse 
to beaten pathes," and harboring a demon of discovery of which he wrote: "A 
wandering spirit is in my marrow, which forbids me rest. Africa has always 
been in my head." 27 Burton too shared this affliction, as is indicated by his own 
diagnosis: "Discovery is mostly my mania." 28 Stanley, who served as a link 
between the first and second wave of East African explorers, wrote: "As yet I 
see no sign that ever I shall love civilization better than I love roving." 29 Even 
the comparatively steady James Elton styled himself an "idler and 
wanderer."30 Since childhood Joseph Thomson had been captivated by the 
writings of men who were his fore-runners in Africa, and he was a-man whose 
"stomach rebelled) against the infliction of sedentary occupation." It is 
scarcely surprising that, in the words of his brother, "the mystery and pathos of 
Africa's darkness... laid hold of his imagination." 31 
The lives of Verney Cameron and Harry Johnston reveal similar symptoms 
of wanderlust, and Africa offered a ready and attractive arena for their 
superfluous energies. Cameron had led a roving life since boyhood, and his 
initially fruitless, but nonetheless persistent, entreaties to the Royal 
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Geographical Society requesting permission to participate in the search for 
Livingstone symbolize the earnestness with which he sought African adventure. 
Johnston, having once been introduced to the continent while painting in North 
Africa, felt "the real Africa beyond the Sahara . . . drawing him with an 
irresistible allurement," and he inwardly wondered: "Shall I ever look hack 
with longing regret to the quiet happy home I have left and sigh for the 
thousand miles of land and sea that separate me from it?" 32 They, like all the 
explorers, were tinctured to a considerable degree by the enthrallment of Africa. 
The resulting inner drive probably stands foremost as a motivational force 
when the explorers are considered as a group; however, for many of the men 
overtones of escapism quickened and gave added impetus to their headlong 
rush towards the Dark Continent's vortex. Africa naturally exercised an 
especially potent influence among those men who placed little value on the 
venerated constancy of British life, and this factor introduces a degree of 
duality into what might be termed the obsessive element of the explorers' 
motivation. The intriguing mysteriousness inherent in East Africa's unexplored 
state certainly drew adventurous men, but the area also offered many of them 
an avenue of escape. The explorers were, after all, extraordinary individuals. 
Flamboyant eccentrics, loners or protesters out of sympathy with and 
frequently ostracized by "proper" society, they sought relief and redress in the 
comforting loneliness provided by the wilds of Africa. 
Burton, for example, was an arrogant social misfit who delighted in 
ostentation and revelled in scandal. Stifled by conventiality and the restricting 
mores of Victorian England, he chose to spend most of his life roaming the 
unknown frontiers of geography and ethnology (particularly taboo sexual 
customs) in reckless attempts to assuage his insatiable inquisitiveness. In a rare 
moment of introspection, he wrote a friend: "Starting in a hollowed log of 
wood— some thousand miles up a river, with an infinitesmal prospect of 
returning! I a sk myself 'Why?' and the only echo is 'damned fool! . . . the Devil 
drives." 33 Speke likewise found England's narrow confines restricting, and 
there seems little doubt he was driven by an inner compulsion to find himself. 
He liked to be alone, loosing his hidden frustrations and inner complexities in 
tremendous bursts of energy or in useless slaughter of African animals. 
Moreover, society has a way of preferring company other than that of a man 
who purportedly had a penchant for shooting pregnant animals and then eating 
the unborn fetus in an almost ritualistic manner. Burton's vitriolic pen even 
suggested that Speke "openly declared that being tired of life he had come to be 
killed in Africa." This seems unlikely, but easily frustrated and unable to 
satisfy his pent-up emotions by accepted methods, Speke found the solace and 
solitude he desired in Africa. 
There is similar evidence of escapism influencing other explorers, 
particularly Stanley and Johnston. Stanley's own Autobiography provides 
graphic evidence that his entire adult life was an effort to sublimate a childhood 
and paternal background over which he had exercised no control. Exploration 
offered him a means of compensation and redemption for both real and 
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imagined personal shortcomings that resulted from his status as a bastard child. 
He "knew no man well and, conversely, no man knew Stanley." Africa 
constituted an avenue of withdrawal which resulted from Stanley's inability to 
establish lasting friendships among Europeans.35 Escapism may not be exactly 
the appropriate term to apply to Harry Johnston, yet he was a decidedly 
distorted reflection of Victorian intellectual curiosity and geographical 
scholarship. He took inordinate delight in shocking staid associates, and the 
presence of this curious little "prancing proconsul" enlivened more than one 
Victorian tea party. His poem, "A Cannibal's Ode to His Aunt," never ceased 
to fascinate half-believing listeners: 
Search through the crowed market, 
Visit each cannibal feast, 
Where will you meet 
W ith a corpse so sweet 
As that of the dear deceased? 
Juicy she was and tender, 
And little did we discern 
The good we should reap 
From the cost of her keep: 
She has made us a noble return. 
Beauty we scarce remember, 
Virtues we soon forget, 
But the taste of our Aunt Eliza 
Clings, clings, to my palate yet. 
The motivational factors of allurement and escapism explain the 
ambivalence which affected the explorers' thinking on Africa. Sooner or later 
every one of them expresses complete disgust with a land they find devoid of 
civilization and inhabited by a people who were the embodiment of original sin 
and who possessed no redeeming cultural features. Such emotions were 
transitory, but the sentiments of Samuel Baker are typical: "This country is no 
paradise, be assured: it is exactly the other place, without one redeeming point. 
Both morally and in its natural features, it is hell itself, in plain English." 
Hellish or not, Africa was the equal of some insidious drug which, once 
established, cast those under its spell into a perpetual enslavement from which 
there was virtually no escape. So great was the encroachment of the "dark 
continent"' on their minds and imaginations that like lemmings the explorers 
seemed impelled to return to its embrace until it killed them. An enraptured 
Joseph Thomson knew he would die "with the spirit of Africa at my lips," and 
Baker, who so often spoke of Africa in derisive tones, admitted: "The hard soil 
of Africa is a more fitting couch for the last gasp of an African explorer than the 
down-pillow of civilized home." 38 
Other factors, while not as pervasive or influential, also directed the 
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explorers to Africa. Strangely, many of the men who found that Britain bound 
them in chains of convention were moved by sincere feelings of patriotism, 
although this pride in their country may have been intermingled with desires for 
personal prestige. Certainly some aspects of the explorers' motivations were 
basically personal in nature. Speke, Grant, Baker and Thomson all welcomed 
the unrivalled opportunities for hunting provided by African travel, and John 
Petherick hoped for material gain.40 
Yet he was alone among the explorers in seeking personal enrichment. 
Although they usually returned from Africa with grandiose visions of the 
continent's economic potential, none of the other men under consideration 
demonstrated any significant concern with embellishing their fortunes. Equally 
curious is the relative absence of a feature which serious students of Victorian 
England would expect to be virtually omnipresent. Expressions of the humane 
purposefulness that nourished the age's evangelical outlook are scarcely 
noticeable preceding the explorers' first ventures in Africa. Pious platitudes 
abound in their printed works, and several of the men demonstrated sincere 
interest in introducing Christianity to Africa; however, their altruism was 
primarily the product of afterthought. Nonetheless, once established it was a 
very real feature of their total outlook, and many of the explorers made 
significant contributions to strengthening humanitarian impulses in Britain. 
This factor, together with the near-total absence of greed on the part of the 
explorers, emerges as a redeeming characteristic in lives which were not, as the 
foregoing indicates, altogether praiseworthy. 
They were highly individualistic, egregious men, yet there are striking 
similarities in their motivations. They belonged to a common breed branded by 
unusual qualities which cumulatively explain why they chose to lead lives of 
adventure. Ascription to them of traditional motives such as "God, gold and 
glory" is both overly simplistic and in large measure inaccurate. Underneath 
the thin veneer of scientific purposes which ostensibly served as a primary goal 
in all their explorations lay a complex structure composed of many animating 
elements, some of which have been enumerated in this paper. At the heart of the 
edifice were fundamental themes such as restlessness, egocentric romanticism 
and an innate love of adventure. Dreamers, vagabonds cast aside by a world 
which whirled those vested with idiosyncracies into its eddies, Africa offered 
these rootless men a natural outlet for the inner turmoil and unquenchable 
curiosity which were an integral part of their life styles. 
These gypsy-like features were their distinguishing marks—that which set 
them apart—but the totality of the explorers' passionate love affair with Africa 
included more commonplace components. Even though tinged by wanderlust 
and abnormality, the explorers must be viewed against their age. Thus their 
motivational make-up includes, in varying degrees of intensity, facets such as 
patriotism, humanitarianism and the dogged resolution to achieve which 
typified an era that never tired of extolling the virtues of self-improvement. 
Alongside these stand diverse scientific motives—natural corollaries of 
geographical exploration—and a host of less widely diffused influences. In 
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short, a variety of interdependent and interacting factors drew the explorers to 
Africa. Together these attributes formed the explorers' mental baggage in their 
African journeys. 
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SOME IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF 
THE FRENCH POLICY OF JAMES I, 1610-1619 
Thomas V. Thoroughman 
During the second decade of the seventeenth century the three most powerful 
rulers in Western Europe were at peace with one another and inclined to remain 
so. An empty treasury, mounting debts, a difficult parliament, an indolent 
temperament, and a genuine conviction that most wars were wasteful and 
unnecessary disposed James I to peace. For Marie de Medicis, Queen Regent of 
France, peace was essential for the maintenance of royal authority and public 
order during the minority of Louis XIII. Even Philip III of Spain hoped to 
avoid hostilities for at least the duration of the Twelve Years Truce concluded 
in 1609. After an exhausting and unsuccessful forty year struggle with the 
Dutch, he needed time to rebuild his empire's economic and military potential 
before resuming the fight. With these three rulers anxious to avoid war, only 
relatively minor conflicts troubled Western Europe until 1620, when the 
Bohemian revolt expanded into an international contest. But despite the 
absence of a major war, armed conflict presented a constant threat to the 
statesmen of the day. Any development that promised to enhance or decrease 
materially the power of Spain or its enemies or to alter the existing 
Protestant-Catholic balance in Europe, dangerously strained the fragile 
diplomatic machinery that kept the peace. 
In such a state of affairs, relations between England and France concerned 
all the other states of Western Europe. Divided, they were weaker than Spain; 
united, they were at least a match. Furthermore, in a very literal sense, the two 
powers, standing between militant Catholicism and militant Protestantism, act­
ed as the arbiters of Europe. Together or separately, they involved themselves, 
by invitation or insistence, in every dispute of any consequence that threatened 
the precarious peace. As long as these two nations cooperated effectively, peace 
seemed assured. 
Statesmen in both England and France saw the importance of maintaining 
good relations and working together in the interests of the peace which both 
needed and desired. In spite of this recognition, however, the two powers 
became ever more estranged as the decade wore on. Their increasing inability to 
act in concert and their declining prestige allowed the powerful religious 
animosities and territorial ambitions of lesser powers to erupt and drag Europe 
into one of its most disastrous wars. This result, tragic enough in itself, marked 
the failure of the foreign policies of both countries. This was particularly true of 
England and James I, who saw his aspiration of being the peacemaker of 
Europe dashed, his son-in-law stripped of his inheritance, and his domestic 
enemies capitalizing on his failure. Part of James's misfortunes must be 
attributed to the failure of his French policy. For this, he was as much to blame 
as anyone. 
The fundamental aim of English foreign policy was simple. France and 
Spain must be kept apart so that they would not unite their awesome powers 
against England and Protestant Europe. To accomplish this, the King of Eng­
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land hoped to perpetuate the dissension between the two major Catholic States 
which had existed throughout Henri IV's reign, while he himself kept on good 
terms with each. The execution of this policy was not so simple. By committing 
several bad mistakes in trying to effect it, James contributed to the failure of an 
already difficult task. 
There were no major problems in Anglo-French relations as long as Henri 
IV lived. Because of his fixed antagonism toward the House of Habsburg, 
Henri felt the need of friendship with England. Moreover, the lingering good 
will left over from the grand alliance of France, England, and the United 
Provinces against Spain in the 1590's facilitated good relations between the two 
powers. They negotiated a beneficial commercial treaty in 1606, supported 
Venice in her dispute with the papacy in 1607, arbitrated the truce negotiations 
between Spain and the Dutch in 1607-1609, and supported the Protestant 
claimants or "Possessioners" in the Cleve-Julich crisis of 1609-1610. Only the 
repayment of a sizeable debt incurred when Henri borrowed money from 
Elizabeth in the 1590's troubled relations between the two crowns in 1610. 
Yet the debt proved to be of diplomatic importance. When the King of 
France was preparing for war against the Habsburgs in 1610, he sought a firm 
military alliance with Britain to strengthen his hand. ' But the English were 
justly suspicious of Henri's ultimate goals in the imminent conflict and used the 
difficulties over the debt as an excuse to prolong the negotiations for an alliance. 
Although James had agreed to support the Possessioners with the 4000 English 
troops already in the Netherlands, he had no desire to be drawn by Henri into a 
general conflict that might aggrandize France without profiting himself. 2 
Therefore the alliance treaty was still far from concluded when the most 
catastrophic event of the decade occurred—the assassination of Henri IV on 
May 4, 1610. 
Henceforth, the anti-Spanish policy of the French monarchy, which had 
proved so helpful to Protestants in the past, could no longer be taken for 
granted. Unless something were done, there was indeed some danger that 
France might withdraw into a strict neutrality. Worse still, she might become a 
satellite of Spain or a new victim of civil or religious wars. But the English were 
more immediately concerned with the three items left pending by Henri's 
death: the Cleve-Julich dispute, the defensive alliance being negotiated, and 
the future orientation of France in foreign affairs. 
Since there was no English ambassador in France at this crucial time, 
James I hastened to send Sir Thomas Edmondes to till that vacancy. Having 
served as minister to the Archdukes in Flanders from 1605 to 1609 and on 
several missions to France in the 1590's, Edmondes was one of the most 
seasoned diplomats in England. His principal tasks as ambassador were to 
determine the effects of Henri's death and to urge the French to render their 
promised support to the "Possessioners" in Cleve.3 
Edmondes arrived in Paris on May 24 and enjoyed the honor of being the 
first foreign representative to perform the office of condolence to the Queen 
Mother and young Louis XIII. But afterwards, when he spoke to the French 
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ministers about the promise to assist the Possessioners, he found them reluctant 
to commit themselves.4 In the following weeks the French government 
nevertheless decided to abide by its previous agreements with the Protestant 
allies of Henri IV. Edmondes felt that his efforts at persuasion, along with those 
of the Dutch Ambassador, had contributed materially in bringing the French to 
this decision.5 By August 12, the French army had joined the other allied forces 
commanded by Maurice of Nassau at Julich. After a gallant defense by the 
Imperialist garrison, the town surrendered on honorable terms, and the allied 
armies disbanded shortly thereafter. 
By this time, Marie de Medicis found it extremely desirable to avoid 
further activity abroad. She needed to concentrate on domestic problems and 
the conservation of her authority. Immediately following the assassination, it 
appeared that Henri's death would unite the entire nation behind her. But 
when the fears of war with the Habsburgs and domestic disturbances did not 
materialize, the spirit of unity evaporated. The impulse of self-interest among 
the magnates inevitably began its triumph over public responsibility. The Due 
d'Epernon soon instituted a dangerous precedent by seizing control of the 
citadel at Metz with the obvious intention of using it as a personal power base in 
northeastern France. Other magnates followed his example in their provincial 
governments. Almost every letter from Edmondes to the Earl of Salisbury, the 
Secretary of State in late 1610 and early 1611 contained news of the duels, 
feuds, intrigues, and contests in France. Marie had neither the means to 
appease, nor the force to suppress, all the nobles. 
In view of the circumstances the Queen Regent naturally endeavored to 
establish amicable relations with foreign powers, particularly those in a position 
to foment the factious nobility, the Huguenots and the militant Catholics. Henri 
IV had concluded alliances with the Dutch in 1609 and the German 
Protestants in 1610. To complete her circle of treaties with neighboring 
Protestant states, Marie had only to conclude the defensive treaty being 
negotiated with Great Britain. But to do this, there had to be a settlement of 
Henri's debt to the English crown.7 
After considerable haggling, Marie and her advisers made an offer in June 
to pay LOO,000 within two years, the remaining claim of L280,000 to be paid 
by the United Provinces. 8 The English accepted the proposal. 
Agreement on the debt cleared the way for the conclusion of the defensive 
alliance, which James hoped to use to keep France from drifting too far from 
her old allies. 
The treaty 9 concluded in London on August 19 dealt primarily with 
defensive arrangements between the two kingdoms. If either of the two suffered 
an attack from a third power, then the other must provide specified military 
aid, regardless of any agreements made between the second kingdom and the 
attacking power. Neither king nor any of his subjects could give aid to declared 
enemies or rebels of the other or grant them asylum. A substantial portion of the 
treaty dealt specifically with commercial problems, such as compensation for 
goods or property seized arbitrarily, restitution to rightful owners of goods 
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recovered from pirates, and permission for the resident ambassador or his 
deputy to attend courts trying cases involving the lives or properties of his 
countrymen. 
Besides retaining the friendship of the Protestant powers, the Queen also 
hoped to forestall any trouble from Spain. She soon found an opportunity. She 
broke off the marriage negotiations that Henri IV had begun with the Duke of 
Savoy and began new ones with Spain.'0 A startled world discovered in 
August, 1611, that not one, but two marriages had been arranged. Louis was to 
wed the Infanta Anne; and his sister Elisabeth, the future Philip IV. 
James I, though not completely unprepared, felt deeply incensed at this 
turn of events.1' The Spanish Ambassador, Don Alonso de Velasco, had led the 
King to believe that Philip III favored a match between the Infanta and the 
Prince of Wales. 2 On their side the French had not consulted or informed 
James of the advanced stage of the negotiations, to which treatment he felt 
entitled as an ally of long standing. That the Stuart ruler was irate soon became 
evident to the French Ambassador in stormy sessions with the King in 
September and October.13 More serious than the affronts to James's 
self-esteem was the possibility that France might now favor Spain against the 
Protestant powers. 
In order to reconcile the Protestant states to the projected marriages, 
Marie sent special emissaries to England, the German Protestants, and the 
United Provinces to give assurances that the marriages would not alter France's 
ties with her old allies or weaken her resolve to succor them in time of need. 14 
As her representative to Britain, the Queen chose the Due de Bouillon, a 
leading Huguenot magnate who was quite popular in England for his consistent 
opposition to Spanish influence at the French court.15 
Besides explaining the Spanish marriages, Bouillon undertook a personal 
mission by promoting further the suit of his nephew, Frederick V, the Count 
Palatine, for the hand of Elizabeth, James's only daughter. In addition, the 
Duke had orders to broach unofficially the question of a match between Henry, 
the Prince of Wales, and Louis's second sister, Christine.16 Bouillon arrived in 
England in April, 1612, but intended to play his own game and not the 
Queen's. He joined forces with the dying Salisbury to facilitate the conclusion of 
the fateful marriage between Elizabeth and Frederick but made no genuine 
effort to reconcile the English to the Franco-Spanish marriage alliance. Instead, 
he aroused James's interest in the match between Prince Henry and Christine 
by suggesting that the resultant negotiations might provide a means to break up 
the nuptials between France and Spain. It was thus during Bouillon's embassy 
that the King of England began the intrigues with the malcontent princes of 
France which made genuine cooperation between the two states increasingly 
difficult. 7 James chose to sacrifice his existing relationship with the French 
monarchy of openness and qualified trust for a low intrigue to break up the 
Spanish marriages which had little chance of success. 
In accordance with Bouillon's suggestion, the King directed Edmondes to 
begin unofficial discussions with Villeroi the French Secretary of State about a 
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match between Christine and Henry. Neither party felt any urgency to 
conclude the matter, however.18 Since Christine was only seven at the time, the 
marriage could not be consummated for some years to come. In accordance 
with contemporary practices, James was also considering at least two other 
possible brides for Henry: the Duke of Savoy's daughter and the Duke of 
I uscany s sister, both of whom were older than Christine and could offer larger 
j • 19 dowries. 
In the autumn of 1612 the English negotiations with Tuscany floundered 
because of the strong opposition of the Pope, but those with France and Savoy 
reached an advanced stage. The Queen Regent, disliking the prospect of a 
union between two states flanking France, increased her dowry offer to 
<00,000 crowns and now seemed eager to conclude an agreement. But James 
appeared inclined toward the Savoy marriage when Prince Henry suddenly 
died on November 7.20 
The death of the Prince of Wales considerably dampened the dealings with 
Savoy but hardly interrupted those with France. Within three days of Henry's 
death, Viscount Rochester, James's favorite who now acted as Secretary of 
State, wrote Edmondes to begin discussions for a match between Prince 
Charles and Christine.21 Very likely the French preferred Charles to Henry, for 
the latter had obviously been dabbling in their affairs by carrying on a 
suspicious correspondence with certain of the great nobles and Huguenot 
leaders. 
By this time Henry was not alone in meddling in the affairs of others. For 
the first several years of Ixmis's reign, James made no serious attempt to 
influence French internal and foreign policies except through direct dealings 
with Marie and her ministers. He probably feared alienating her and hoped 
that French policies would prove favorable to his interests without undue 
interference. Also, it took several years for the different factions in France to 
sort themselves out and the political situation to clear after Henri IV's death. 
Therefore James instructed Edmondes to make it clear that he would not 
support any rebellion or resistance on the part of the Huguenots unless the 
government drove them to it by extreme provocation. He even promised Marie 
that he would help suppress them if t hey rebelled without cause. 23 
When Marie de Medicis's determination to effect the marriages with Spain 
became clear, James's attitude toward France changed. The King approved of 
the factious conduct of the Bourbon Princes of the Blood, the Prince de Conde 
and Comte de Soissons, for the first time when they withdrew from Court to 
show their disapproval of the Spanish alliance.24 Through Bouillon and 
Edmondes, James established a close communication with the Princes and their 
allies, the dukes of Nevers and Mayenne, and the Marechal d'Ancre.25 But to 
James's disappointment, the death of the Comte de Soissons in October, 1612, 
deprived the conspirators of one of their strongest and most resolute men.26 
The rest could not bring themselves to attempt a coup d'etat. After observing 
their hesitation and irresolution and becoming pleased with the resumption of 
the marriage negotiations for Prince Charles, the Stuart monarch returned to 
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his former course of trying to work with the Queen and her ministers. 
In the meantime negotiations for the union between Charles and Christine 
had progressed so well that by August, 1613, a successful conclusion seemed 
likely. During this time the French court greatly favored the match, which they 
counted on to keep the Huguenots quiet and balance the alliance with Spain. 
Only the religious privileges to be permitted the princess and the sizes of the 
dowry and jointure appeared to stand in the path of a final agreement.27 But 
toward the end of the year James began to raise his demands. This hardening of 
the King s attitude caused Edmondes, who was anxious to conclude the matter, 
to return to England without orders to obtain a final decision from his master. 28 
Arriving in London early in February, Sir Thomas discovered great 
opposition to the marriage treaty among some lords of the Privy Council. The 
Catholics, crypto-Catholics, and more militant Protestants all opposed the 
marriage. Edmondes and Buisseaux, the French ambassador, hoped that 
James, who seemed to favor the match, would override all opposition. But by 
this time the King's difficulties with the Addled Parliament and the threat of 
civil war in France delayed further progress on the treaty.29 
The crisis in France arose in January 1614. Many of the most powerful 
nobles, including Conde Bouillon, Nevers, Longueville, Mayenne, and 
Vendome, dramatically withdrew from court to their provincial governorships 
and began to take arms. Long discontented by the monopolization of the 
government by a few ministers and favorites, these princes were capitalizing on 
public dissatisfaction with the government and the unpopularity of the Spanish 
marriages and the Queen's pro-Spanish stance in the Savoy-Mantua dispute of 
the preceding year. 
In February 1614 Conde wrote Marie an open letter complaining of the 
abuses and misdeeds of the Queen's chief ministers and demanding reform 
through a meeting of the Estates-General.30 To avoid the threatening revolt, 
the Queen Regent agreed to convoke the Estates-General and to suspend the 
marriages until Louis had attained his majority. Although the confrontation 
had ended and both parties looked forward to the meeting of the representative 
body, the Malcontents continued to intrigue, writing James and sending agents 
to England.3' 
Meanwhile Edmondes, the Scots, and Buisseaux tried vainly to keep 
James committed to the French marriage alliance, but Sir John Digby, 
Sarmiento, the Spanish ambassador, and the Howard faction had succeeded in 
reviving the King's interest in a Spanish match. Even though Sir Thomas 
returned to France in August with a commission to conclude the French treaty, 
neither his government nor the French wanted to arrive at a final settlement 
before the Estates-General met, the Franco-Spanish marriages either effected or 
broken off, and the outcome of troubles in Savoy and Cleve-Julich known. 33 
The negotiations were suspended. In September the royal council proclaimed 
Louis's majority and in October the Estates-General convened. James I, the 
Malcontents, and the Huguenots hoped that the three orders would demand the 
termination of the marriages with Spain. But the government ministers gained 
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control of the assembly and extracted requests for the accomplishment of the 
marriages from the first two orders. Disappointed, the Malcontents again 
turned their thoughts toward revolt. 
Soon James found himself approached by the discontented nobles, certain 
Huguenot elements, and the Duke of Savoy to intervene openly to prevent the 
marriages. As yet, the English King could not bring himself to take such a 
dramatic step. But he did encourage the Malcontents and the Duke of Savoy in 
their opposition and used every occasion to speak against the alliance. In 
a harangue to Buisseaux, he predicted troubles in France if the marriages took 
place.34 Again, considerations of the overall European situation and his anxiety 
to have their cooperation in dealing with the touchy situations in Piedmont and 
the Rhineland made James reluctant to sponsor armed opposition to the 
French government. 
When the Queen and her ministers made final arrangements for the 
marriages in the spring of 1615, however, James took stronger steps to hinder 
them. He directed Edmondes in June to make an official remonstrance to 
Marie and Louis, urging them to postpone the marriages on the grounds of 
Louis's youth, the unrest in France, and the unresolved troubles in Cleve-Julich 
and Italy.35 Long afterward the royal council informed Sir Thomas that 
preparations for the trip to Bayonne and the final ceremonies had progressed 
too far to be delayed further. 36 James also sent an agent to the rebellious 
magnates and to the Huguenot assembly at Grenoble, urging them to use 
remonstrances and petitions to stop the marriages.37 
Neither James's harangues to Desmarets, the new French ambassador, his 
personal letters to the French riders, nor the admonitions of the Malcontents, 
the German Protestants, and Maurice of Nassau deterred the royal party from 
setting forth for the border in August.38 Again, the discontented nobles led by 
Conde withdrew to their stronghold and began to levy troops. In September 
Conde was able to lead a very formidable army southward. But by then the roy­
al party had already arrived at Bordeaux. There final arrangements were made 
party had already arrived at Bordeaux. There final arrangements were made 
for the marriages which took place by proxy on October 8, followed by the 
exchange of the brides on October 31. 
By now James clearly perceived that the game was lost. Henceforth, he 
bent his efforts to gain an honorable settlement for the rebellious princes. Since 
the marriages were now accomplished, a civil war could only succeed in driving 
the government into the arms of Spain. To ward off this possibility, James 
ordered Emondes to join the court at Bordeaux and promote a reconciliation. 
Arriving at court by October 16, the Ambassador informed the royalists of his 
mission. The French, however, showed no enthusiasm at his appearance, 
having already informed the Stuart ruler that Fdmondes's house was "the 
ordinary resort of all the malcontents, and ill-affected persons of the State' and 
that his conversations there were seditious. 39 
Although disinclined to use Sir Thomas's services, the court found itself in 
a difficult situation. The outcome of war with the rebels was uncertain. Conde s 
forces matched their own and blocked the route to Paris. Moreover, the oppos­
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ing army lay in Poitou, a province notoriously Huguenot in its population and 
therefore favoring the Malcontents. After two months of delay, the Queen 
Mother and her ministers reluctantly gave Edmondes permission to join the 
Due de Nevers in negotiating an agreement.40 
Sir Thomas already enjoyed the confidence of the Malcontents and at 
length he gained the grudging respect and confidence of the government. Aided 
by the desertions, impoverishment, and privations in both camps, he and 
Nevers succeeded in arranging negotiations which led to the treaty of Loudun 
in April 1616. The agreement provided for monetary compensations and a larg­
er share in the government for the princes, dismissal of Sillery and his brother 
from their posts, a guarantee of edicts granted the Huguenots, and official 
recognition of their recent synod at Nimes. Before the pacification was 
completed, Edmondes performed an additional service by going with the Due 
de Sully to La Rochelle to induce the Huguenot assembly there to accept the 
treaty.41 
Pleased at the prospect of a peaceful France in which Conde and other 
great nobles friendly to England dominated the government, the English King 
sent James, Lord Hay, as Ambassador Extraordinary to Paris. He instructed 
Hay to congratulate Louis on his marriage and the pacification of France and to 
urge the French King to give more support to Savory and favor a league 
between Venice and the Grisons. Although Hay carried a commission 
authorizing the conclusion of the match between Charles and Christine, his 
secret orders were far different.42 He and Edmondes were to break off the 
marriage treaty with France, while making the French appear at fault.43 
During the late civil disturbances, James I had definitely settled on a Spanish 
marriage for Charles. 
Accompanied by a magnificent train, Hay arrived in Paris in July, 1616. 
He was lavishly entertained, especially by the Prince de Conde. But this initial 
success did not last. He and Edmondes were already encountering difficulties in 
their negotiations when Conde was suddenly imprisoned without trial for 
conspiring against Marie and her powerful favorite, d'Ancre. Most of Conde's 
former associates escaped to the provinces, however, and again France stood 
on the precipice of civil war.44 When the two English ambassadors pressed the 
Queen Mother and Villeroi for details concerning the conspiracy, they received 
only a very general answer. A great coolness now arose in the negotiations; the 
marriage treaty reached an impasse when the Englishmen demanded an 
entirely new set of proposals; and Hay soon returned to England, his mission 
generally considered an expensive failure. Although the French marriage was 
occasionally mentioned in England as a possible alternative to the Spanish, it 
received no serious consideration until after James's break with Spain in 1623. 
In December 1616 Edmondes took temporary leave of the French court in 
order to accept his new appointment as Comptroller of the Household. The 
suspicious French were reluctant to see him go. With reason, they feared his 
true purpose might be to urge James to help the magnates who had fled after 
the imprisonment of Conde.46 
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The difficulties between the French government and the rebellious 
magnates again reached the point of hostilities in March 1617. After the 
Conseil d'Etat and the Parlement of Paris had declared them guilty of treason 
and deprived them of their estates and dignities, the Malcontents bound 
themselves at Soissons in a union for mutual defense. But by the time hostilities 
had begun, James had made final preparations for a six months visit to 
Scotland. There he would be unable to keep in close touch with the situation in 
France. Before he left, however, the King instructed Edmondes to leave for 
France as Ambassador Extraordinary as soon as the Malcontents replied to his 
recent letters. Sir Thomas was again supposed to urge a reconciliation. But this 
time he was likely to be ignored, for the Malcontents were in a much weaker 
position in 1617 than in the previous year. 47 
Edmondes was still waiting in London for word from the hard-pressed 
magnates, when news arrived of a palace revolution in Paris. On April 14 
several officers of the royal guard murdered d'Ancre, the Queen Mother's 
unpopular favorite, at the orders of Louis himself. The French King 
immediately sent word avowing this action throughout France, hoping the news 
would appease the Malcontents and avert further bloodshed.48 When James 
received the news at Newcastle, he expressed extreme pleasure. Immediately 
ordering Edmondes to depart for France, he sent congratulations to Louis, 
urging reconciliation with the estranged nobles and help for his friend, the 
Duke of Savoy.49 Sir Thomas arrived in Paris late in May and remained until 
November. But since James was in Scotland most of this time, there was little 
diplomatic activity between the two kingdoms. But to the dismay of the 
English, by the end of the year Sillery regained his old influence and the princes 
had lost what they had gained from d'Ancre's death.50 The King of Great 
Britain thus met disappointment in his hope that the assassination would usher 
in a new era of good feeling in Anglo-French relations. By this time, too, the 
French had become thoroughly disgruntled with James's negotiations for a 
marriage alliance with Spain. It was now the English who appeared too 
Spanish. 
It was this jealousy of Spain's influence at the English court which led the 
French Ambassador to take an exaggerated offence at a slight. On January 6, 
1618, Prince Charles gave his customary masque on Twelfth Night. To avert 
the perpetual precedence controversy between the French and Spanish 
ambassadors at the English court, he took the usual exit of inviting one, 
Sarmiento, now Count of Gondomar, and not the other, Desmarets. Gondomar 
cleverly manipulated the whole situation to make it appear that he had gained 
precedence over the Frenchman. Desmarets was outraged. The affront came 
after a number of incidents which showed that Gondomar's influence and 
effectiveness were much greater than his own. When his demand for an 
unqualified assurance of precedence over his Spanish counterpart was refused, 
Desmarets begged Louis to recall him. This request was granted and the 
Ambassador left England in March. Despite James's repeated explanations 
that there had been no innovation and no slight, Louis did not send a 
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replacement for Desmarets for over a year.51 Since the Stuart ruler had 
neglected to send one for Edmondes, who had returned the previous November, 
only agents remained to represent their monarchs at the respective capitals. 
Another unfortunate incident came late in July 1618. At that time the 
French government abruptly asked Dr. Theodore Mayerne, James's court 
physician and a French Protestant, to leave the country for suspicious dealings 
with Huguenots. Although James complained about his expulsion through 
William Becher, his agent in Paris, and to le Clerc, the French agent in London, 
the French gave no further explanation of their action.52 
Feeling over the Mayerne incident had not yet subsided when a more 
serious incident arose involving Sir Walter Raleigh. When that intrepid 
adventurer returned from his last voyage in 1618, authorities immediately 
arrested him for disobeying royal orders by allowing an attack on San Tome, a 
Spanish settlement in Guiana. While Raleigh was under arrest, le Clerc and his 
interpreter, la Chesnaye, came secretly to see him. Offering him asylum in 
France, they discussed his chances of escape. English authorities soon learned 
of these indiscreet visits. La Chesnaye was arrested and le Clerc brought before 
the Privy Council for examination. La Chesnaye soon confessed to the 
interviews, his story confirming statements by Raleigh. In contrast, le Clerc 
boldly denied any connection with Sir Walter, even in the face of overwhelming 
evidence. When the French agent tried to see James, however, the King 
refused. He no longer recognized him as a minister of the French crown, 
although he indicated that any other representative sent by Louis would be 
welcome.54 When Louis XIII heard of le Clerc's treatment, he retaliated by 
restricting Becher's movements in Paris.55 Within a few weeks each monarch 
recalled his agent at the other's court.56 
By November 1618, diplomatic relations between England and France 
were completely severed. At a time when the hostilities had already begun in 
Bohemia which led directly to the Thirty Years War, the two nations most 
willing and able to maintain the peace found themselves seriously at odds and 
even lacking normal diplomatic communications. The distrust and hostility 
between them had become so great that any effective cooperation between them 
had become exceedingly unlikely. Realizing the dangers of the situation, both 
rulers soon took steps to heal the breach; but in the meantime, the quarrels 
between Protestants and Habsburgs in Bohemia gathered momentum. The 
dipolmatic machinery which usually operated to localize such conflicts had 
broken down with the Anglo-French rupture. There was no longer an effective 
restraining force to check the advance of the Habsburgs in German politics 
without resort to arms. 
The basic pattern of the growing estrangement between England and 
France during this decade seems fairly clear. Convinced that some form of 
rapproachment with Spain was essential for a secure and peaceful France 
during Louis's minority, Marie de Medicis was determined to carry out the 
marriages with Spain. James intensely disliked the prospect of these marriages 
which injured his pride, his own hopes of match-making, and his sense of 
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security. He could not resist giving encouragement to the rebellious magnates 
when they began to actively oppose the government and the marriages. His 
intrigues with these rather irresponsible and ambitious princes inevitably 
antagonized the court party in France, even though they were perfectly aware 
that James was not a man of action. Out of this situation grew increasing 
distrust and suspicion which manifested itself in worsening relations, growing 
disinclination to act together in crises, and increasing jealousies between their 
representatives abroad. A series of unfortunate and indiscreet incidents in the 
year 1618 led to a complete rupture at a crucial time for the peace of Europe. 
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THE PALMETTO REGIMENT GOES TO MEXICO 
Ernest M. Lander, Jr. 
When Congress declared war on Mexico, all South Carolina congressmen 
voted "aye'' except John C. Calhoun. He abstained. Initially, public opinion 
in South Carolina supported the President, but as time passed, public opinion 
gradually changed, and open criticism of the administration began to appear, 
first, over Polk's having provoked the war, and second, over his method of 
conducting it. Calhoun, Joel R. Poinsett, Wadddy Thompson, and Governor 
David Johnson were outspoken critics. A majority of the state's newspapers 
were also adversely critical in varying degrees.' 
Be that as it may, public opinion cannot be dealt with in this brief paper. 
My comments shall be confined primarily to the trials and tribulations of the 
Palmetto Regiment before the decisive battles at Churubusco and Chapultepec. 
And here it may be noted that no matter how South Carolinians regarded the 
President, they were fullsome in their praise of the sacrifice of the volunteers. 
Briefly here is the history of the Palmetto Regiment. It was organized in June 
1846, called into active service in November, rendezvoused at Charleston, and 
moved by way of Mobile to Lobos Island. There it joined General W infield 
Scott's expedition and eventually played a significant role in the crucial battles 
before Mexico City. It remained on garrison duty until the treaty of peace was 
ratified. 
On May 25, 1846, Governor William Aiken announced that President 
Polk had requisitioned an infantry regiment of ten companies from South 
Carolina. Throughout the state efforts were made immediately to enroll 
volunteer companies. The usual procedure was for the colonel of the local 
militia to muster his troops, hold a parade, give a patriotic address, and then 
call for volunteers. In reporting such a meeting at Lexington, a newsman said 
the militia officer "made a feeling and irresistible appeal to their patriotism, 
and urged it as a duty ... to go forth to share the perils and glories of their 
countries battles." He evoked tears as he reminisced about the Seminole War. 
After hearing his and two other speeches, 77 volunteers stepped forward. The 
newsman added: "Tell me not that chivalry of the age has passed." 
Nevertheless, there was indifference in some quarters, and it required a 
great deal of fanfare, appeals to patriotism, and cajolery to raise a company in 
some districts. In others none was raised at all. Excuses for declining to 
volunteer were summed up by the Anderson Gazette: "Some object to the 
length of time their services are required, others to the season of the year ... or 
to the great distance to the seat of war; one has to attend to his merchandise 
and another to his crop; and finally one has married a wife and therefore begs 
to be excused. Upon the while, we are inclined to think, that to secure volun­
teers from this quarter, the fighting must be postponed till the coming of frost, 
or be brought nearer to us." However, by June 19 the Governor had accepted 
the requisite number of companies with their respective officers and had been 
forced to turn down several others. Near the end of June field officers were 
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elected amid much politicking and some logrolling. The emerging victors were 
Pierce M. Butler, colonel, J. P. Dickinson, lieutenant colonel, and A. H. 
Gladden, major.4 
The popular Pierce Butler, 48 years old, an experienced military man, and 
former governor, was probably a poor choice for commander due to ill health, a 
fact frequently noted in the press. He suffered from periodic attacks of acute 
rheumatism which sometimes forced him to bed. In addition, in the early 
autumn of 1846 he underwent surgery for hemorrhoids. Though admitting 
"war or love" was for young men, Butler was eager to lead the regiment and 
was confident he could measure up in the crisis. Upon reaching Mexico, he 
contracted a fever and probably diarrhea. As a matter of fact, on the day of his 
death he arose from his sickbed to fight.5 
The patriotic fervor of the volunteers was dampened by an announcement 
of Secretary of War Marcy on July 14 that the Palmettoes would not be needed 
"at present." In fact, it soon appeared doubtful that the regiment would be 
called at all.6 As a consequence, its organization almost fell into disarray. 
However, as the plans for a quick termination of the war did not progress in a 
hopeful manner, Secretary Marcy on November 16 notified Governor Aiken 
that the Palmetto Rigiment was required immediately. But Marcy carefully 
called attention to the change in the terms of service. The regiment was 
required not for twelve months, as originally stipulated, but for the duration of 
the war. The Anderson Gazette properly suspected that many volunteers would 
now withdraw. What seemed last spring, the editor said "as a mere frolic to 
march to the City of Mexico" now appeared to have "some tall fighting" in the 
offing.7 
Nowhere was the receding patriotism better exhibited than among the 
Greenville volunteers. Originally, that district had recruited two companies, 
and that of Colonel Thomas P. Butler had been accepted for service. On 
December 1 Colonel Butler mustered his company to tell them the good news. 
To his chagrin only 23 signed under the new terms. The Greenville politicos 
were sorely disappointed. Hence, on December 7 a muster was held at the court 
house. On this occasion there was a parade down Main Street, music by two 
military bands, much flag waving by pretty girls, and the usual battery of 
patriotic speeches. With all this only 19 more were persuaded to join. The 
uncertain length of service and general dissatisfaction with the progress of 
American arms had obviously cooled back country spirits. 
Not a single company was recruited from the back country bloc of 
Anderson, Pickens, Greenville, Spartanburg, Laurens, Union, and York 
districts, although initially several companies had been organized in this area. 
By contrast, the low countrymen had been consistently unenthusiastic about 
volunteering from the start of the war, and the only company organized in the 
coastal districts came from the city of Charleston. In referring to a Beaufort 
planter friend who volunteered, James L. Petigru exclaimed; "I think he must 
be a little cracked." With the exception of the Charleston company, the 
remainder of the companies were organized in the central districts of the state. 
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And even there it sometimes required "strenuous efforts" to meet minimum 
quotas.9 
Whenever a company was ready to march, the local citizens invariably 
held a farewell ceremony, which usually included a banquet, toasts, speeches, 
and the presentation of a banner fashioned by local belles. In his reply to the 
Edgefield ladies, Captain Preston Brooks said: "We solemnly pledge ourselves 
to follow wherever it waves and bear it aloft in triumph, or perish beneath it in 
glory." En route to their rendezvous in Charleston the volunteers were feted in 
each town through which they passed. The local militia greeted them at the 
outskirts and escorted them for some distance beyond the town limits. When 
the dusty and sore-footed Chester company marched through Columbia, 
Benjamin F. Perry remarked of the spectators, "I do not think there was a dry 
eye present." 10 
By December 19 all companies, totaling about 900 men, had reached 
Charleston, and marching orders had been issued by the War Department. 
Days were filled with drills, parades, and ceremonials. On the 22nd 
newly-elected Governor David Johnson addressed the regiment and reminded 
the volunteers that the state "looks to you to sustain her honor in the field." 
Two days later in a ceremony at City Hall the mayor presented a banner 
prepared by the city council.11 
Army life did not go smoothly in Charleston. The regiment was short on 
equipment despite the legislature's gift of $20,000. And much confusion arose 
when their makeshift "Camp Magnolia" was wrecked and inundated by a 
heavy storm, thus forcing them into quarters at the race course. Moreover, the 
volunteers complained of the unfriendliness of Charlestonians. This was due in 
part, at least, to their own drunkenness and brawling. In one street fracas a 
volunteer fired into a mob and killed a seaman. Some illness set in and one 
death was reported in camp.12 
Because some of the companies were not at full strength, Secretary Marcy 
authorized Colonel Butler to recruit additional volunteers. The Secretary also 
authorized the acceptance of two additional companies, one of which was added 
later.13 After the Palmettoes had departed, periodic efforts were made to recruit 
replacements within the state for the regiment. Most observers agreed with 
Governor Johnson that "the recruiting service ... proved to be a dull business." 
I here were too many reports filtering back into South Carolina about the 
hardships the volunteers were encountering. Eventually, in the fall of 1847 
about 275 additional volunteers boarded ship in Charleston bound for Vera 
Cruz, and a few volunteers were recruited in Mexico. The latter, according to 
Preston Brooks, "were all a set of vagabonds—generally teamsters who had 
been turned off for drunkenness and had not the means of getting home." 14 
On December 26 the first wing of the regiment departed from Charleston. 
I he second wing followed the next day. The regiment spent five or six days 
encamped near Hamburg, awaiting arrangements for rail transport from 
Augusta to Griffin by way of Atlanta. While at Hamburg, the regiment 
continued its training and heard a farewell address by the Governor "in his 
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usual felicitous style." Although improved in discipline and toughened by the 
rigors of camp life, the volunteers began to suffer much from colds and to some 
extent from pneumonia. Several volunteers remained behind when the regiment 
moved out. One correspondent attributed the illness largely to dissipation. 
More likely it was due to exposure, for the regiment was still short of tents, 
blankets, and medical services, and the January weather was miserably 
unpleasant.15 
After an uncomfortable rail trip to Griffin, the South Carolinians again 
took to the road, several more ill members being left behind. On the march of 
more than one hundred miles the regiment encountered rain and mud and 
was forced to lie over one day because of a severe sleet storm. Butler, though 
impatient to push on lest they arrive in Mobile too late for Scott's expedition, 
began to worry about the health of his men. He chided Dickinson, in command 
of the advance wing, for pushing the volunteers too hard. Dickinson replied 
that he had never pressed forward "at the expense of the health and comfort of 
the soldiers," and he reminded his commander of the difficulties en route of 
securing wagons and provisions. Fortunately for all concerned, the 
unpleasantness was soon dispelled.16 
Throughout their journey from Augusta to Mobile the South Carolinians 
were treated with kindness and ceremony. The following is a news account of 
their entry into Augusta: 
They were received by a salute of cannon at the 
Bridge, and escorted by the Augusta Artillery 
Guards, through our densely thronged streets, 
to the enlivening strains of music, amidst the 
huzzas of our population, who thus essayed to 
cheer them on their way. Many a white 'kerchief 
was waved by fair hands from window and 
balcony, and many a sweet voice bade God 
speed to the gallant volunteers. Often above the 
din and the dust that shrouded the advancing 
column, rose bright and clear in the 
moonlighted air, rocket after rocket which, in 
bursting, shed halos of gleaming light upon the 
banners of the different companies—gifts from 
the hands of beauty to animate the brave in the 
hour of battle. That they will wave triumphant 
in every field, and return unsullied to the land of 
the Palmetto, is our confident hope.17 
There was rarely a village through which they passed where the local citizens 
had not made some preparation to receive and entertain them. Nevertheless, 
the hardships of the trip brought four or five deaths and several desertions—in 
fact, 41 deserted before the regiment left Mobile. One down-hearted recruit 
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wrote a sad letter from Mobile, pleading with his relatives to "pray for the 
return of the poor volunteers." 18 
Arriving in Mobile with the second wing of the regiment on January 16, 
Colonel Butler was greeted with loud cheers when he infomed the volunteers 
that their destination would likely be Vera Cruz. Their joy soon turned to 
displeasure when their commander issued orders restricting all personnel, 
including officers, to the camp la large cotton warehouse and grounds) and 
establishing a strict day-long routine of training. When a group of South 
Carolinians resident in Mobile offered a public banquet, Butler accepted on the 
condition that it be held in the confines of the camp. He then hastened off to 
New Orleans on military business. 
As events turned out, the Palmettoes were assigned to three transports. 
Before they had hardly cleared harbor the ships encountered a storm that was 
the worst in the region in 20 years, according to volunteer N. R. Eaves. He also 
wrote that the 16-day trip to Lobos was "the most perilous voige ever 
experienced we encountered three Nothern stoms, one lasted 48 hours it 
caused us to suffer beyond description." During the rough weather the 
volunteers were crowded below deck, where, in addition to seasickness, they 
were buffeted and bruised by shifting boxes.20 
When General Scott's army moved from Lobos Island against Vera Cruz 
on March 9 and 10, the Palmetto Regiment participated in a minor role. 
Dickinson and several enlisted men were slightly wounded in one skirmish. 
While at Vera Cruz the volunteers encountered difficulties which were a 
foretaste of what was to come. A norther blew in and cut off the beseigers from 
their supply ships. The Palmetoes had no tents or blankets and were reduced to 
half rations. Their adjutant begged the commissary to "send quick for we are 
starving." Supply lines were soon re-established, and food and blankets came 
in, but the regiment received no tents for a month. In addition to supply 
problems, some 200 Palmettoes were stricken with mumps and a few with 
dysentary, diarrhea or measles.21 
After the capture of Vera Cruz, General John A. Quitman's birgade, which 
included the South Carolina Regiment, marched to Alvarado, some 50 miles 
south, for the purpose of procuring mules and beef. The Alvarado "wild goose 
chase—at which there is much mortification," Butler later explained, lasted for 
eight days and prostrated the South Carolinians. It was an especially hot and 
fatiguing march, mostly along a sandy beach. In order to slake their thirsts the 
men were forced to drink from mudholes where the brackish water was as 
"thick as soup" or dig holes for themselves. Because of fatigue, thirst, sore feet, 
and diarrhea there was much straggling. It was later described by one 
participant, with perhaps exaggeration, in the following manner: ' I or miles at 
a stretch the pathway was strewn with prostrate bodies, covered with dust, 
overwhelmed with heat and fatigue, and perishing from thirst. On pitching 
camp at night sometimes not more than 4 or 5 men to a company were present. 
The rest lingered behind and came up during the hours of the night. 
For all its hardships Quitman's brigade did not gain the glory of capturing 
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Alvarado. The town surrendered to the navy before the army arrived. Butler 
described Alvarado as "a low, hot, filthy place—fleas, sand flies, and 
musquitoes—too numerous for comfort." He wrote that "in such a climate no 
one can live in any comfort or safety." He said that the regiment had about 150 
ill men, including about 60 who were unable to march back to Vera Cruz. 
Butler himself was ill. One correspondent wrote that had the Mexicans made 
the effort they might have annihilated the brigade on its return marrh.23 
When stories circulated later that the high rate of illness in the Palmetto 
Regiment was due to an excess of liquor and fruit, a news reporter for the 
Montgomery Advertiser challenged them. Why were such stories circulated? 
"Is it," the reporter asked, "because the Commander-in-chief had laid himself 
liable to be censured by the friends of the regiment in neglecting to have them 
transported in the shipping then under the pay of the government and lying idle 
in the harbor of Vera Cruz?" He pointedly blamed the commander-in-chief for 
causing many of the "best blood" of South Carolina to be cut off in the "bloom 
of their youth."24 
Once again in camp at Vera Cruz the ill and weary Palmettoes continued 
to suffer. Lieutenant John B. Moragne wrote that "no day passes without the 
solemn sound of the death march in the camp." The men grumbled much about 
the lack of proper medical care, which was due in part to a shortage of 
regimental doctors. After a few days' rest Quitman's brigade began the march 
toward Jalapa as the rear guard to General Scott's advance. Some of the 
Palmetto ill rode in wagons, but the most serious cases were left in the hospital 
at Vera Cruz. Shortly a surgeon reported to Butler that he had never seen men 
so emaciated by disease as the ill Palmettoes remaining in Vera Cruz. Many of 
them later died of yellow fever.25 
Because they brought up the rear the Palmettoes missed the Battle of 
Cerro Gordo. Upon reaching the battlefield four days later, Private W. S. 
Johnson reported: "A great many dead Mexicans lying in all directions on the 
Road for miles. Dead men, Horses and Cattle create a horrible stench . . . 
Several Shanties here filled with wounded of both armies." In forced marches 
and on short rations Quitman's brigade toiled through sands infested with 
poisonous insects, drank "hot and acrid" water, and slept amid fleas, sand flies, 
and ants. Quitman privately admitted that almost the entire brigade, including 
himself, suffered somewhat from diarrhea. The weary troops caught up with 
the main army at Jalapa.26 
From Jalapa Scott's army pushed on in late April to reach Puebla in 
mid-May. Disease took its toll along the way. The South Carolinians' problems 
were compounded upon reaching the highlands, for the rainy season had arriv­
ed and the nights were cold. Many members of the regiment, against the advice 
of wiser heads, had thrown away their winter clothing in Vera Cruz and had 
bought summer outfits from the sutlers. Now colds, chills, and some cases of 
typhus fever were added to their other woes. About 150 were laid up in 
hospitals near Jalapa and Puebla. Casualties became so numerous that Butler 
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disbanded the Lancaster company and divided its remnants among the other 
companies.27 
Although the illness in the regiment was occasionally laid to intemperance, 
the major reasons seem to have been the climate, impure drinking water, a 
general lack of sanitation, and bad food. Butler complained to Quitman about 
the "poor and slimy" meat coming from the commissary. The regimental 
surgeon reported much filthiness of the Palmettoes' quarters and clothing. He 
also noted that many of the ill who were on quarters would attend sick call, 
collect their prescriptions, and disappear into the streets, eating whatever they 
could purchase from the market. In time, the surgon cut down sharply on sick 
call deadbeats by requiring each patient to swallow his medicine before leaving 
the dispensary.28 
In addition to disease and the usual hardships of army life several privates 
wrote home about alleged mistreatment by officers. Private W. M. Goodlett, a 
former sheriff of Greenville District, described their unpleasant trip aboard an 
Alabama riverboat. The men were marched, he said, "like so many hogs" on to 
the lower deck among the boilers and machinery. For 36 hours they were 
confined to the hole with little to eat and no sanitary facilities while the officers 
had the run of the boat. Goodlett's troubles increased in Mobile. While on 
patrol duty he noted that the officer in charge failed to enforce Butler's order 
that no one should leave camp. When the Colonel returned from New Orleans, 
Goodlett filed a complaint. Dickinson, who was in command during Butler's 
absence, quickly arrested Goodlett and indicted him on a list of serious counter 
charges. The startled private was immediately court martialed and convicted. 
Having taught the private a lesson, Dickinson then appeared to be 
magnanimous and requested Butler to remit the sentence. This was done before 
Goodlett could appeal his case.29 
Also in Mobile Private I. P. Detter and several other enlisted men who 
went into town were court martialed for being AWOL. Although punished 
lightly, Detter retorted: "In leaving camp, I only followed the example of my 
superiors in rank." Private W. S. Johnson also wrote home of mistreatment; 
whereupon, a friend offered some consolation: "All your friends joyn me in 
saying god of the universe prop up and strengthen the poor soldiers who are 
tyranised over"—and some philosophy: "Men at home who the world looks on 
as men when clothed with authority abroad become tyrants." 30 
I pon leaving Mobile, the privates received no improvement in treatment. 
On the day they boarded ship Johnson recorded in his diary: "No diner to day 
except dry crackers—Every boddy in bad humour, except the officers who feast 
in the Cabbin." The men spent most of the stormy voyage crowded in unlight-
ed, ill-smelling, dirty accomodations below deck that would make "second 
choice to a pig sty." After the surrender of the Vera Cruz privates were general­
ly restricted from the city. Goodlett wrote that the privates were "hardly looked 
upon as human beings." The officers' servants enjoyed greater privileges. While 
the officers revelled in the city at night, "the poor d—d privates,' Goodlett said, 
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were detailed to the beach to bring up rations. And upon reaching Alvarado, the 
privates went hungry all day. That evening it was only after much loud 
complaint that they aroused Commissary Blanding from his game of billiards in 
a local coffee house long enough to issue rations for the night. Goodlett later 
admitted a turn for the better. On the grueling march to Jalapa the officers paid 
"every possible attention" to their men.31 
Meanwhile, back in South Carolina several reports appeared charging the 
officers in general with incompetence and accusing the field officers of 
squandering the $20,000 appropriated by the legislature for the regiment. 
Some of the strictures were severe in tone. The Hamburg Republican accused 
the "Epauletted Gentlemen ... of the most total inefficiency in every 
department of their duty." Butler himself wrote two lengthy letters rebutting 
these "insidious attacks." He denied charges of neglect and mismanagement of 
funds, although he admitted the men suffered privations beyond his control. He 
appointed a special committee of company officers, who found the field officers' 
expenditures of the state fund to be "perfectly correct." In any case, the furore 
died down before the crucial battles in late August.32 
In July General James Shields was appointed commander of the First 
Brigade, which included the South Carolina volunteers. On August 19 and 20 
the weakened Palmetto Regiment, at long last, saw decisive action at Contreras 
and Churubusco. Of a field strength of 331 before the battles 137 were killed or 
wounded. Butler died on the battlefield and Dickinson succumbed 
unexpectedly a few days later to wounds. The regiment suffered an additional 
103 casualties at Chapultepec and Mexico City on September 13 and 14. This 
reduced its effective strength to about 150 men. The entire state lauded the 
regiment, at the same time it mourned the dead heroes.33 
After the American capture of Mexico City the Palmettoes settled down to 
routine garrison duty near the capital. The health of the survivors remained 
generally good, and although homesick the volunteers seemed to enjoy life in 
Mexico. In time they fraternized rather freely with the Mexicans. After the 
peace treaty was ratified the regiment returned to Mobile, where the men were 
discharged about July 1, 1848. Upon arriving back in South Carolina, the 
volunteers were lionized with great ceremony.34 
The Palmetto Regiment had suffered greatly, more so than most. 
Following Churubusco, one volunteer wrote: "It was a sad sight, one I can 
never forget—our poor regiment seems doomed to misfortune; dwindled down 
by disease to a mere handful; a noble band, they are led into battle and half of 
them are left on the field wounded and dead. Of our large regiment and pride of 
the State, almost two thirds have found graves in this country." Was the 
regiment ill-fated? The Charleston Evening News recalled that when Colonel 
Butler received the flag at City Hall a wing of the eagle fell from the staff, 
thereby presaging death or disaster to the Palmettoes. "It may have been an 
omen of death," said the News, "but thank God, not of defeat or disgrace." 35 
PALMETTO REGIMENT GOES TO M EX ICO 91  
Charleston Courier, May 15-16, 1846. See Calhoun to H. W. Conner, May 15, 
1846, H. W. Conner Papers (Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress); Thompson 
in Greenville Mountaineer, March 12, 1847; Johnson to Calhoun, October 27, 1847, 
Calhoun Papers. (Clemson University); and Poinsett in Winyah Observer 
(Georgetown), February 2, 1848. 
2 Two brief accounts of the Palmetto Regiment may be found in David Duncan 
Wallace, The History of South Carolina (4 vols. New York, 1934), III, 111-14; and E. 
T. Crowson, "Manifest Destiny, Mexico, and the Palmetto Boys," Sandlapper, V 
(January, 1972), 32-34, 66-69. 
3 Charleston Courier, May 25, June 15, 1846. 
4Ibid., June 26, July 8, 1846; Anderson Gazette, June 5, 1846. 
Butler also faced some personal problems, such as an impending duel with an 
army colonel and some unsettled claims in the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Butler to B. 
T. Watts, September 21, 1846, Watts Papers (South Caroliniana Library); Butler to 
Behethland Butler, April 4, 1847, Butler to A. Burt, October 22, 28, 1846, Butler to 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, January 4, 1847, Butler Papers (South Caroliniana 
Library); Pendleton Messenger, February 5, 1847; Greenville Mountaineer, October 
15, 1847; Charleston Courier, October 12, 1846. 
6Ibid., July 21, August 1, 1846. 
7 G reenville Mountaineer, November 27, 1846; Anderson Gazette, November 27, 
1846. 
g 
Pendleton Messenger, December 11, 1846; Greenville Mountaineer, December 
4, 11, 1846. 
9 The companies came from Edgefield, Abbeville, Fairfield, Richland, Kershaw, 
Chester, Barnwell, Sumter, Lancaster, and Charleston districts. Charleston 
Courier, November 23, 1846; Anderson Gazette, December 18, 1846; Edgefield 
Advertiser, November 26, December 2, 1846; Sumter Banner, December 2, 1846. 
Ibid., December 2, 9, 23, 1846; Edgefield Advertiser, December 2, 9, 16, 23, 
1846; Greenville Mountaineer, December 18, 1846. 
11 Ibid., December 18, 25, 1846, January 1, 1847, Pendleton Messenger, January 
8, 1847; R. Jones to Butler, December 18, 1846, "Documents of the Palmetto 
Regiment" (unpublished manuscripts, South Carolina Department of Archives and 
History), p. 9; Charleston Courier, December 21, 25, 1846. 
Ibid., December 23, 1846; Greenville Mountaineer, January 8, April 16, 1847; 
Pendleton Messenger, December 25, 1846; E. G. Randolph to M.iry McCreight, 
January 15, 1847 (manuscript in South Caroliniana Library). 
13 Marcy to Butler, December 28, 1846, "Doc. Palmetto Regt.," pp. 16, 21. A 
company from Newberry was added, while the "Butler Guards" from Edgfield failed 
to gain a sufficient number of volunteers. Julia Butler to Pierce Butler, January 
1847, Butler Papers; Edgefield Adveertiser, January 13, 20, 1847. 
14 Ibid., July 7, 1847; "Doc. Palmetto Regt.," pp. 77-78, 235; Winyah Observer, 
June 9, 1847; James Petigru Carson, Life, Letters and Speeches of James Louis 
Petigru. . . (Washington, 1920), p. 258; Anderson Gazette, August 26, 1847. On one 
occasion the Gazette protested that a recruiting team in Anderson had lured 
several teenage school boys into service without the consent of their parents. June 
10, 1847. 
92  THE SOUTH CAROLI NA HISTORIC AL ASSOCIATION 
15 Edgefield Advertiser, January 6, 13, 1847; Greenville Mountaineer, January 
8, 1847; E. G. Randolph to Mary McCreight, January 15, 1847 (manuscript in South 
Caroliniana Library); "Doc. Palmetto Regt.," pp. 22, 30. Two Greenville volunteers, 
H. J. Moore and W. Goodlett, serving in companies from other districts, wrote 
frequent and lengthy letters to the editor of the Mountaineer. 
16"Doc. Palmetto Regt.," pp. 29-40; Edgefield Advertiser, January 27, 1847. 
Many of the ill recovered and later joined the regiment. 
17 Charleston Courier, January 4, 1847 (citing Augusta Constitutionlist, no date). 
18 The recruit, H. S. Dickson, never returned, he died in Vera Cruz. J. Dickson to 
John Dickson, May 1, 1847, Dickinson Family Papers (University of North Carolina); 
"Doc. Palmetto Regt.," pp. 34-35; Edgefield Advertiser, January 27, February 10, 
1847; Greenville Mountaineer, January 22, February 5, 12, 1847. One volunteer was 
killed when he fell from the train. Ibid., January 22, 1847. 
19Ibid., February 5, 1847; Anderson Gazette, February 5, 1847; Edgefield 
Advertiser, February 3, 1847. 
20Ibid., February 10, March 24, 1847; Greenville Mountaineer, March 5, 19, 
1847; Eaves to C. D. Melton, January 29, February 14, 1847, Eaves Papers (South 
Caroliniana Library). 
21 John Hammond Moore, ed., "Private Johnson Fights the Mexicans, 
1847-1848," South Carolina Historical Magazine, LXVI (October 1966), 211; John A. 
Quitman to (Eliza Quitman), April 10, 1847, Quitman Family Papers (University of 
North Carolina); Charleston Mercury, March 9, 1847; Greenville Mountaineer, April 
16, 1847. The mumps had first broken out in Mobile, but the cases did not seem to be 
especially severe. 
22 Greenville Mountain, May 7, 21, 1847; Butler to Behethland Butler, May 2, 
1847, Butler Papers; Edgefield Advertiser, May 5, 1847, February 23, 1848. 
23Ibid., May 5, 1847. Butler added that the exposure and bad water at Vera Cruz 
had given him a cold and "the worse Rheumatism—I ever felt finally — neuralgia."As 
for the volunteers, "At best their duty is painful. ... It is improper service for any 
other than Regular Soldiers." To Behethland Butler, April 4, 1847, Butler Papers. 
General Quitman admitted the march was "hot and fatiguing," but he played down 
the sickness. To Eliza Quitman, April 7, 1847, Quitman Family Papers. Calhoun 
wrote Governor Johnson: "I agree with you that the Materials of which our 
Regiment is composed are not of a description, which such a service requires, I never 
think of the men, and what is before them, but with deep feelings of regret." January 
13, 1847, Calhoun Papers (South Caroliniana Library). 
24 Quoted in Pendleton Messenger, September 3, 1847. 
"Doc. Palmetto Regt.," pp. 61-62, 67, 75; Greenville Mountaineers, May 7, 21, 
1847. Regarding the ill left in Vera Cruz, Moragne added: "I have regretted their 
deaths very much, and more as I was compelled to leave them behind in the hands of 
strangers." To Mary E. Davis, April 12, May 3, 1847, Mary Moragne Papers (South 
Caroliniana Library). 
26 Moore ed., "Private Johnson," SCHM, LXVI, 213; Quitman to Louise, April 
23, to Eliza, May 21,1847, Quitman Family Papers; Greenville Mountaineer, May 21, 
1847. 
27 Ibid., May 14, 21, July 2, 1847; Winyah Observer, November 24, 1847; 
Edgefield Advertiser, May 12, December 1, 1847, February 23, 1848; "Doc. 
PALM ETTO REGIMENT GOES TO MEXICO 93  
Palmetto Regt.," pp. 107-108, 199. The Palmettoes' regular uniforms were 
shipwrecked off the North Carolina coast, salvaged and sent on, but did not arrive 
before the volunteers marched inland. Pendleton Messenger, April 16, 1847. 
28"Doc. Palmetto Regt.," pp. 87-89, 97-99, 109-110; Anderson Gazette, 
September 2, 1847. After the surgeon's new rule, in one day the number on sick call 
dropped from 157 to 124. 
29 Greenville Mountaineer, February 5, 1847. 
30 "Doc. Palmetto Regt.," p. 52; William Maybin to W. S. Johnson, January 24, 
1847, William S. Johnson Papers (South Caroliniana Library). 
31 Moore, ed., "Private Johnson," SCHM, LXVI, 205; Greenville Mountaineer, 
May 7, 21, 1847; Sumter Banner, March 24, 1847. One officer, Captain Francis 
Sumter, proved to be such an alcoholic that Butler exacted a pledge from him not to 
touch another drop of whiskey under the penalty of immediate dismissal. "Doc. 
Palmetto Reg.," p. 66. After the Alvarado expedition Goodlett wrote: "I c ould say 
much more in relation to the dereliction of officers, but to do the subject justice, 
would occupy too much time and space." He admitted some exceptions though "not 
very numerous." Greenville Mountaineer, May 7, 1847. 
32Ibid., June 25, 1847; Charleston Mercury, May 29, 1847; Butler to Behethland 
Butler, May 2, 1847, Butler.Papers; Edgefield Advertiser, March 24, 1847 (citing 
Hamburg Republic, no date), April 5, June 30, 1847. 
33Ibid., October 27, 1847; "Doc. Palmetto Regt.," p. 200; Greenville Mountaineer, 
September 24, October 29, 1847. The distinction followed the dead in burial. Privates 
were placed in common graves with no marks of distinction. Officers were interred in 
wooden coffins. Edgefield Advertiser, April 5, 1848. 
34Ibid., August 2, 1848; Pendleton Messenger, June 2, 1848; Greenville 
Mountaineer, December 24, 1847, April 7, May 26, July 14, 1848; "Doc. Palmetto 
Regt.," pp. 231-41. 
35J. Cantwell to B. Lucas, October 27, 1847 (manuscript in South Carolina 
Historical Society); Winyah Observer, September 22, 1847 (citing Charleston 
Evening News, no date). Documents reveal that the Palmettoes lost 423 men to 
death. 145 to disability discharges, and 41 to desertion. The strength of the regiment 
upon reaching Vera Cruz was 974, but there had been several deaths and desertions 
before that time and some ill left behind. Moreover, the regiment picked up a few 
recruits en route to Mobile and a few more in Mexico. A field report of Palmetto 
casualties as of March 1, 1847 (Lobos Island) showed 14 deaths, 41 desertions, 40 left 
behind sick, 11 discharged, and 37 mustered in, or a net loss of 68 prior to the attack 
on Vera Cruz. The 275 volunteers that left for Mexico in October 1847, did not join 
the regiment. See "Doc. Palmetto Regt.," pp. 256-77; and Wallace, History of S. C., 
Ill, 111; South Carolinian (Columbia), June 22, 1847. 
94  THE SOUT H CAROLI NA HISTORIC AL ASSOCIATION 
CONSERVATIVE ATTITUDES IN THE 
UNITED STATES TOWARD CUBA (1895-1898) 
G. Wayne King 
Conservatism did not present a solid phalanx against the marital spirit 
which precipatated the Spanish-American War in 1898. Conservatism for the 
purposes of this paper is defined in the restricted but classical sense of favoring 
the status quo. In this case, conservatives were simply those who opposed 
United States military intervention into the Cuban insurrection, 1895-1898. In 
this chapter of American history, as in so many others, conservatism acted 
only as a deterrent, delaying what seemed to be inevitable. This role has been 
the task of conservatism so often that Clinton Rossiter, a historian who has 
carefully examined conservatism in America, called it the "thankless 
persuasion." 1 
Nearly every American eventually sympathized with the insurrection 
against Spain which erupted on the island of Cuba on February 24, 1895. 
Generally, conservative Americans, however, characterized themselves by 
attacking rash jingosistic propaganda that would have involved the United 
States in an unnecessary war, stressing that sympathy should not interfere with 
the duties of international law, and deploring the sensationalism of the budding 
yellow press. 
loward their government, conservatives distinguished themselves by 
resisting Congressional resolutions which recognized Cuban belligerency or 
independence, stressing the President's preeminence in foreign relations and 
supporting the Chief Executives' own conservative leadership. With respect to 
the Cuban insurrectionists, conservatives limited their aid by pleading for 
humane war conditions and contributing to the relief of the destitute. 
If any segment of the nation was united in its conservative attitude towards 
Cuba, it was the business element.2 Business journals were among the first to 
advocate a non-intervention policy. In March 1896, as the Congress debated a 
resolution recognizing Cuban belligerency, the New York Journal of Commerce 
commented: "This Country desires no needless complication with Spain." 3 
I he same journal was more harsh in its condemnation of filibustering 
expeditions originating in the United States, a practice which more than 
anything else jeopardized true neutrality.4 But when economic interests were 
involved, it could be just as abrasive in tone with the Spanish. After the Spanish 
military commander in Cuba imposed an embargo on the export of tobacco, 
the journal complained just as vociferously.5 
Attacking the jingo press was another practice conservative business 
journals used. The Commercial Advertiser, a leading business journal in New 
York, denounced Richard Harding Davis, correspondent for a "yellow 
journal, when he reported that Spanish authorities had completely undressed 
women to search them. ITie journal labeled Davis' story along with Frederic 
Remington s graphic drawing as the "most monstrous falsehood that has yet 
appeared even in the new journalism"6 
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Some American businessmen who lived in Cuba hoped that Spain would 
succeed in suppressing the rebellion. This element believed that the Cubans 
were not qualified to govern themselves and would be more avaricious than the 
Spaniards.7 American investors in Cuba gave no indication that they desired 
United States intervention.8 On the contrary, the actions of Edwin F. Atkins, 
one of the most influential American sugar owners, indicated that 
intervention would be most undesirable. Believing that Cuban autonomy would 
prevent United States intervention, Atkins used his important contacts in both 
the Spanish and American governments to achieve this goal. There is evidence 
that he met with considerable success. In the United Sates government no less a 
person than Secretary of State Richard Olney listened to Atkins' advice. 9 
Significantly, the first major proposal made by the United States to Spain in an 
effort to end the fighting in Cuba urged Cuban autonomy. 
The core of American business maintained its conservative attitude until 
the United States intervened in April 1898. In the last week before President 
McKinley relinquished the Cuban affair to Congress, the American Banker 
editorialized that "there is not an intelligent, self-respecting and civilized citizen 
anywhere who would not prefer to have the existing crisis culminate in peaceful 
negotiations." 11 About the same time Edwin Atkins arrived in Washington to 
exert his personal influence for peace. He talked privately with the President, 
the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Navy. Atkins recorded: "I talked as 
I never talked before."12 Perhaps James J. Hill best summarized the 
businessman's attitude. Hill criticized both the Cleveland and McKinley 
administrations for involving the United States in foreign areas while, in his 
opinion, it should have minded its own business. When the war came, however, 
he advocated that it should be pursued to a swift end.13 
Paradoxically, there was little evidence of conservatism in the attitude of 
organized religion toward Cuba. Imbued with the belief espoused by Josiah 
Strong, a prominent evangelical leader, that the Anglo-Saxon race had the duty 
to spread its superior culture under divine guidance to the rest of the world, 
most religious denominations saw the Cuban problem as a moral one and favor­
ed United States intervention. Some Christian churches, however, dissented. 
Among those religious groups that never surrendered their position against 
United States intervention were the Society of Friends, Unitarians and the 
Roman Catholic Church.14 The last group, because the United States rejected 
the Pope's attempt to arbitrate a settlement in April, 1898, bitterly attacked 
pro-war preachers. The American Catholic publication Ave Maria derisively 
chastised: "The pulpits of the country resound with war-cries and calumnies 
against our foes. Many of the pious men who occupy them preferred war to 
peace, and war at any cost rather than peace as a result of the Holy I ather s 
Arbitrations." 15 
Most religious denominations, however, under the strain of moral attrition, 
abandoned the conservative cause. The Churchman, a Protestant tract, stuck to 
a posture of peace until, under the stress of the swift-paced events in the fall of 
1897, it abdicated its position with the comment: "God alone knows the issues 
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of life and death, of peace and war."'6 The Advance, the leading 
Congregational journal abandoned its conservative position when it heard the 
descriptions of horror in Cuba by the moderate Senator Redfield Proctor in the 
middle of March, 1898.17 When war came, even The Independent, an 
ecclesiastically oriented weekly which had religiously hoped for peace, 
rationalized the fact in an article entitled "The Christianity of It." The theme 
was that the United States had to make war to end war. Thus the United States 
entered the war cloaked in the righteous garment of a universal moral cause. 8 
Possibly the organization with the greatest interest in keeping the peace, 
but least influential in avoiding United States intervention, was the American 
Peace Society. Its Vice-President, Edward Atkinson, later one of the founders 
of the Anti-Imperialist League, urged churches to petition Congress for peace 
and implored President McKinley "to avoid the hell of war." 19 
Although there was no geographical stronghold of conservatism, with the 
possible exception of Boston, curiously there was a cohesive ethnic conservative 
attitude towards Cuba in the German-American community. Before the Cuban 
uprising had attracted widespread attention in 1895, the St. Louis Westliche 
Post exposed the motives of the inchoate jingoist: "As France has her 
chauvinist, so we have our jingoes, people who rattle the sword . . . and 
endeavor to force the country into playing the part of a brutal bully."20 It 
called upon all good citizens to oppose the jingoist intentions.21 Such widely 
separated newspapers as the New York Vols-Zeitung, the Cleveland Wachter 
un Anzeiger, and the MilwaukeeSeebote indicate that the conservative attitude 
prevailed in many German-American settlements. These newspapers used the 
usual conservative arguments. Among these were that the Cuban rebels were 
too disorganized to deserve recognition of belligerency or the sanction of 
international law to justify their legitimacy. In addition, they employed a few 
unusual arguments. For instance, the Cincinnati Volksblatt thought that war 
would bring national disgrace and that those who clamored for war saw it as a 
boon for business. The latter argument was a twist on the jingoist's taunt that 
conservatives were the lackeys of Wall Street.22 
The conservatives never concerted or sublimated their energies. Instead 
their opposition to United States intervention into Cuba was scattered and 
sporadic. There were eminent conservatives, however, who could make their 
voices heard. One of the most improbable men to be found in this group was 
John Burgess, the political scientist whose racial theories gave approbation to 
the expanionist sentiment which helped mold an atmosphere conducive to war. 
With rare myopia, Burgess established the School of Political Science to 
promote world peace. The professor failed to see that his own racial ideas were 
inimical to this goal. Yet Burgess fulminated against intervention. As war 
clouds approached, he found scapegoats which he attacked through the 
Political Science Quarterly. Burgess quixotically regarded atrocity stories 
emanating from Cuba as British fabrications to induce a Spanish-American 
conflict. He condemned Mark Hanna as a tool of business, interested in war 
profiteering and denounced Theodore Roosevelt as a representative of a class of 
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young, ambitious men seeking political advancement through war fame. When 
war came, Burgess cursed the martial spirit of the American people and 
succumbed to melancholia.23 
Another'unlikely pedagogic opponent to the Cuban involvement was 
William G. Sumner of Yale University. In the summer of 1896 he wrote an 
article in Forum which criticized any contemplated United States involvement. 
Fearing a war that might arouse latent imperialism in the United States, 
Summer stated that the American system of government was unfit to rule 
"subject provinces." On the other hand, the vision of Cubans in the United 
States Senate horrified him. Contrary to his colleague Burgess, he would have 
been gratified if England absorbed Cuba, since he thought that the United 
States would then have access to the economic advantages of Cuba without any 
political responsiblity.24 
Indeed, the Cuban issue made "strange bedfellows." Carl Schurz, a bona 
fide liberal on most issues, assumed a distinctly conservative stance towards 
Cuba, Schurz, long before Sumner, expounded similar beliefs. He maintained 
that history proved domocracy had never survived in tropical climates such as 
that of Cuba and, moreover, that any extension of our democratic institutions 
would have serious effects on its vitality.25 Moorfield Storey, President of the 
Massachusetts Reform Club and an independant by profession, behaved and 
talked like a conservative. His novel opposition to war with Spain was that it 
was certain to be successful. In that success he saw the germination of forces 
noxious to the democratic institutions of the United States. In his clairvoyance, 
Storey foresaw large standing armies and navies, a nation militarily aggressive, 
and territorial acquisitions. In a speech to the Reform Club he concluded: 
"God grant that such calmities are not in store for us." 26 
In Georgia resting from the election of 1896, Tom Watson, the 
unsuccessful Vice-Presidential candidate on the Populist ticket, hurled parthian 
shots at his former running mate, William Jennings Bryan, as the latter vied 
with Repulbicans and Democrats in expressing martial sentiments. During his 
metamorphosis from a Populist leader to Democratic demogogue, Watson 
condemned the war spirit of the country in its hiatus from sanity.27 Another 
political figure who had recently undergone a political transition was Eugene V. 
Debs. As war approached, Debs expressed the socialist position. Like Watson, 
he used the war fever to advance his own ends: 
There are thousands who are not swept from 
their feet by the war craze. They realize that war 
is national murder, that the poor furnish the 
victims and that whatever the outcome may be, 
the effect is always the same upon the toiling 
class. 
In 1894 the press denounced us for the alloy­
ed reason that we were murderous and 
blood-thirsty, and now the same press opposes 
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us because we are not. We are opposed to war, 
but if it ever becomes necessary for us to enlist 
in the murderous business, it will be to wipe out 
capitalism, the common enemy of the oppressed 
and downtrodden of all nations.28 
Incongruous as this coterie was, they all had one common 
characteristic—they were on the periphery of power, therefore their influence 
was negligible. Fortunately, however, their views were not dissimilar to the 
views of many conservatives with power. 
Although the conservatives by themselves were never numerous or noisy 
enough to withstand the agitation of the jingoes, in President Grover Cleveland 
they possessed a bulwark that successfully resisted the aggressive pressure 
throughout his administration. Cleveland succeeded by the strong use of his 
• 29 executive powers. 
The first official measure the President made toward the Cuban 
insurrection was to issue a proclamation of neutrality. Although he did not 
proclaim this policy until June 12, 1895, over four months after the initial 
uprising, the Chief Executive admonished his fellow citizens to obey the 
neutrality laws, because offenders would be "rigorously prosecuted."30 True to 
his word, Cleveland vigorously upheld strict neutrality. Since filibustering 
posed a serious threat to Cleveland's position, on July 27, 1896, he issued a 
second proclamation which tightened the restrictions on filibustering. So 
vigilant was Cleveland that during his administration only fifteen of some forty 
expeditions succeeded. In fact, the American patrol against filibusters was more 
effective than the Spanish.31 
Probably, the greatest threat to Cleveland's policy came from the 
Congress. The Chief Executive stubbornly opposed the pressure from the jingo 
element in Congress to recognize Cuban belligerency, or independence, or to 
have military intervention. Throughout his term he sought to stand by the 
position stated in his annual message to Congress in 1895: "no matter what 
our sympathies our plain duty is to observe in good faith the recognized 
obligations of international relationship." 32 
Cleveland saved his trucelence for Congress. When the Senate considered a 
joint resolution on Cuban belligerency, the President snapped: "If it comes, it 
will give me an opportunity to tell the American people some plain truths, and 
d d if t hey don't get them." 33 He demolished a Congressional threat to declare 
war by asserting that he could not mobilize the army in such a contingency. 
Unlike President McKinley, Cleveland never abdicated any of his foreign 
policy powers to the legislative branch.34 To prevent eventual intervention, 
however, Cleveland knew that he had to do more than uphold the neutrality 
laws. 
Only peace in Cuba could remove the issue permanently from American 
politics. Knowing this, Cleveland, perhaps influenced by Atkins, worked for 
peace by pressing Spain to grant Cuba autonomy. Although he failed in this 
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effort, the President continued his search for peace almost until his last day in 
office.35 Conscious of his ultimate failure, Cleveland apologized to the new 
President on inaugural day for passing on "a war with Spain." Although 
Cleveland felt that he had failed, he "had done everything in his power to avert 
what he believed would have been a useless and disgraceful war ..." 36 
While most of the credit for this should be attributed to Cleveland, he did 
not stand alone. In addition to the able support the President received from 
both of his Secretaries of State, he did havp defenders in the Congress. These 
conservatives, however small in number, used various arguments to 
support Cleveland's leadership. Among the rational arguments that the 
conservatives in Congress employed, the executive's prerogative in foreign 
relations sanctioned by the Constitution and by tradition probably was the most 
persuasive. When reason appeared to be futile against the emotional jingoes, 
however, the vastly outnumbered conservatives resorted to derision. While it is 
difficult to assess the value of these tactics, it can be said that Congress never 
successfully infringed upon Cleveland's powers in dealing with foreign affairs.37 
During Cleveland's administration, the conservative press characterized 
itself chiefly by applauding the actions of the executive branch of government 
and censoring the jingoist actions in the legislative branch. Generally, during 
Cleveland's tenure, the Republican newspapers opposed his moves in relation 
to Cuba and the Democratic newspapers either approved or acquiesced in his 
measures.38 Like its allies in Congress, the conservative press used satire and 
truth as its main weapons. For example, the New York Herald dubbed 
Senator Wilkerson Call "the eminent ambassador from Florida to the United 
States" because he had introduced a bill calling for annexation of Cuba in each 
Congress since shortly after the end of the Ten Years War.39 Jingoes in 
Congress were not the only targets of the conservative press. It also mocked the 
sensational stories which appeared in the yellow press. For example, the 
ascerbic E.L. Godkin, editor of the Nation, sneered that "neither side (in Cuba) 
is waging war with anything like the fury of the newspaper correspondents." 40 
These fabian tactics, conservatives realized, were no substitute for a 
permanent solution to the Cuban problem. Torn between sympathy for the 
rebels and tolerance toward Spain, they hoped for a deus ex machina in 
Spanish reforms, Cuban autonomy or, as The Independent wished aloud: "If 
Spain would only allow Cuba to purchase her freedom (with United States 
money), how happily would the devastating warfare ... be ended." 4' 
Whatever the method, a peaceable solution to a potentially inflammable 
situation was the primary concern of most conservatives. As long as the Cuban 
insurrections continued, they saw the United States drawn closer and closer to 
a vortex which would lead to an imwanted war and new responsibility. As the 
Cleveland Administration ended, although the Cuban situation had grown 
more dangerous with time, the conservatives could still point to the fact that the 
United States was at peace. 
President William McKinley was a conservative. Although he was not the 
same stripe of man as his predecessor, for over a year McKinley continued 
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Cleveland's policy of working for a negotiated peace in Cuba while keeping a 
lid on the jingoes in Congress. In a conversation with the retiring President the 
night before the innaugural, McKinley remarked that he would "be the 
happiest man in the world" if he could leave the White House "with the success 
(towards Cuba) that has crowned your patience and persistence ..." 42 
The new President had support for his goal. Along with regular 
conservatives, new men of power rallied behind the Chief Excutive. Among 
these were Thomas Reed, newly elected Speaker who could be trusted to keep 
the jingoes in the House of Representatives in order and Mark Hanna, who 
entered the Upper Chamber. 43 With their party chief in the White House, 
many Republicans proved to be chameleon. Following McKinley's leadership, 
some who had previously displayed their bellicosity toward Spain suddenly 
inserted siren tones of friendship in their speeches. 44 
The Republican press, like most party stalwarts, changed its position on 
Cuba overnight to support the new President's leadership. The Milwaukee 
Journal noting this phenomenon, commented that responsibility brought 
soberness as a corollary. The New York Evening Post witnessed the 
transformation of McKinley's Secretary of State John Sherman with pleasure 
and was convinced by his performance. These neophytes, however, should be 
regarded as only pantomine conservatives.45 
Continuity was the essence of the regular conservative press. It continually 
earned the President's deliberate, concilliatory position toward Spain, while 
condemning the exaggerated and emotional threats and demands of the jingoes 
in the Congress. The humanitarian endeavors of the President and private 
organizations to help the Cuban victims also received praise. In addition, the 
conservative press eagerly searched for and commended any Spanish moves 
toward reform in Cuba. But signs of impatience and despair that Spain alone 
would end the war began to appear. Imperceptibly some conservatives began to 
prepare themselves to accept United States intervention on humanitarian 
grounds—the same basis that until then had been used as a weapon against 
intervention. 46 
Despite the attritional effect of the prolonged twilight struggle, the year of 
1897 ended with a note of hope. Spain, under a new government, instituted new 
reforms in Cuba. As the year ended, United States intervention appeared to be 
unlikely. 47 
Unfortunately, a series of incidents shattered this quasi-serenity and 
plunged the United States into a "splendid little war" within four months of the 
new year. The events which led directly to United States intervention in Cuba 
in April 1898 left many conservatives disoriented and bewildered, while others 
escaped into a world of delusion. 
When the President dispatched the battleship Maine to Havana, the 
Chicago News called its peaceful reception "the most convincing of all possible 
tokens that every danger of rupture has passed, and that our relations with 
Spain are now on a rock bottom peace basis." 48Harper's Weekly reported thai 
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there was every reason to think the visit was a wise and friendly act. Even when 
the Maine exploded some conservatives saw potents for peace. The 
Philadelphia Inquirer warned that the destruction of the Maine was an exam­
ple of the annihilation both nations would inflict with terrible weapons of mod­
ern warfare. There would be no victory for either country, it cautioned.49 
Inexorably the tide for intervention gained momentum as the asthenic 
conservative sentiment wavered in the wake of the events of February. On 
March 9, 1898, Congress passed a fifty million dollar appropriation for nation­
al defense. Ominously, for the first time, the conservatives and the jingoes were 
in accord as not one dissenting vote was cast. The conservatives deluded 
themselves, however, by thinking the measure would strengthen the President 
in his bargaining with Spain; therefore, they acted as if they had struck another 
blow for peace. The Journal of Commerce, showing an appalling lack of 
understanding of Spanish people, speculated that the measure might have 
a more calming effect there than in the United States.50 
The more realistic conservatives still placed their hope for peace in the 
President. Since the beginning of the insurrection in 1895, the Executive Office 
had been the most puissant force for peace. In placing their trust in McKinley 
at this time, however, the conservatives failed to see the attritional effects that 
the viscissitudes since the turn of the year had upon him. 
By the end of March the kaleidoscopic events in the international situation 
coupled with increased personal problems had placed McKinley in a 
deleterious psychological state. The President had lost so much sleep that he 
had begun to use soporific narcotics. The dark shadows under his eyes and the 
fatigue in his face were evident to those close to him. George B. Cortelyou, the 
private secretary to the President, recorded on March 20, "the far-away, deep 
set expression" in McKinley's eyes. Clearly, the strongest link in the 
conservative chain was rapidly becoming the weakest. Indeed, on April 11 the 
conservative cause was surrendered by McKinley to a Congress dominated by 
the jingoes. 51 
The final failure of the conservatives eclipses their successes. It cannot be 
denied that the Cuban insurrection continued for over three years with 
mounting liberal-jingo pressure for intervention before the United States 
entered the war. That the United States never entered the Ten Years War under 
similar pressures for intervention diminishes this success somewhat. It must be 
remembered, however, that America in the late 1890's was more amenable to 
such persuasions than in the two previous decades. 
It is clear that the main credit for this three year delay belongs to the 
executive branch. It was not until McKinley abandoned his conservative 
position that intervention became possible. In Congress, the conservatives 
brought clarity to confusion, sanity to sensation and temperance to 
temperamentalism. Altogether these institutions allowed the American people a 
path which it chose not to take. The conservative press played a similar role. It 
used the devices of satire, ridicule and the simple truth to fight the excesses of 
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yellow journalism. 
In the end, the failure of conservatism was the failure of reason and 
common sense in a nation intoxicated by prosperity and social Darwinism. 
The final tragedy is that ample evidence demonstrates the presence of 
anti-interventionist sentiment in the United States, however diffuse, which a 
resourceful determined Chief Executive could have rallied to avoid 
confrontation with Spain in the spring of 1898. A John Adams of 1798 was 
needed in 1898. 
On President Harry Truman's desk during his years in the White House 
was a sign: "The buck stops here." In April, 1898 President McKinley passed 
the "buck" to an aggressive Congress. 
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